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CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION OF 
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL UNITS: A 
PROPOSAL FOR STATE 
REGULATION AND A MODEL ACTt 
Bernard V. Keenan* 
[A] man's Self is the sum total of all that he can call 
his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but ... 
his house, . . . and . . . his lands . . . . All these things 
give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he 
feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels 
cast down .... 1 
William James' nineteenth century observation aptly charac-
terizes the emotional downswing of many residential tenants ex-
periencing the condominium conversion of their apartment 
building. Fearful of involuntary relocation and the immediate 
prospect of increased housing costs,2 tenants have attempted to 
forestall or halt the conversion plan by seeking legislative assis-
tance. As a result of these efforts, state and local legislatures 
have frequently responded by enacting regulatory safeguards for 
tenants confronted by conversion plans. 3 
t Copyright c, 1987 by Bernard V. Keenan. All rights reserved. 
• Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., 1970, College of the Holy 
Cross; J.D., 1973, Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M., 1981, Columbia University 
School of Law. 
1. W. JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 291 (1890). 
2. Congressional hearings document convincingly the social, psychological, and finan-
cial hardships experienced by numerous tenants residing in rental units that are con-
verted to condominiums. Condominium Conversions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Housing and Consumer Interests of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1980) [hereinafter Condominium Conversions Hearing]; Condominium Housing 
Issues: Hearing on S. 612 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the 
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) 
[hereinafter Condominium Housing Issues Hearing]; Condominiums and the Older Pur-
chaser: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) 
[hereinafter Condominiums and the Older Purchaser Hearing]. 
3. Approximately one-half of the 50 states and one-fifth of the local communities 
experiencing conversion activity have enacted regulatory controls. D1v1SION OF POLICY 
STUDIES, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL Hous1NG TO 
CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES-A NATIONAL STUDY OF SCOPE, CAUSES AND IMPACTS 
viii (1980) [hereinafter 1980 HUD STUDY). 
A compendium of "condominium conversion statutes" is presented in Comment, Con-
639 
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Current legal scholarship abounds with essays detailing those 
factors believed to have precipitated the conversion movement, 
and narrating the hardships endured by certain tenants who 
confront it. But the literature mainly analyzes judicial decisions 
confronting the constitutionality of legislatively enacted tenant 
protections." This Article deviates from the standard format by 
focusing on legislative responses. Given that legislative action is 
justified and constitutional, a wide array of possible enactments 
may be considered. Prudent regulation must fairly balance the 
competing interests of the property owner and the tenants, in 
addition to considering the public's need for condominium hous-
ing opportunities. Present laws often fall far short of this 
standard. 
This Article has several objectives. Part I provides a founda-
tion for discussion by briefly outlining the relationship between 
the recent history of the rental housing market and those factors 
prompting the conversion of apartments to condominium status. 
With this background information, the relevance of conversion 
legislation is more readily grasped. Part II seeks to establish that 
state government is the appropriate governmental entity to for-
mulate legislation intended to protect individuals affected by the 
conversion of rental units.11 Federal legislation has addressed this 
dominium Conversion Lease Extensions for Elderly and Disabled Tenants: Is Virginia's 
New Law a Panacea?, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 207, 223-24 (1982). This list indicates that the 
legislatures of the 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted conversion stat-
utes, but this presentation is at least partially flawed by citing the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts' basic condominium legislation as pertaining to the conversion issue. 
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 183A, §§ 1-22 (1986). This statute has no relevance to the topic of 
condominium conversion. Care must therefore be exercised in reviewing the many stat-
utes that are cited in this list. 
4. See Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting Te-
nants from Condominium Conversion, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 179 (1983); Lewin, The 
Case for Governmental Action to Retard Condominium Conversion Activity, 1 YALE L. 
& PoL'Y REv. 126 (1982); Comment, Regulating Condominium Conversions: Do Munici-
pal Ordinances Adequately Protect Tenants' and Owners' Constitutional Rights?, 1985 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 935; Comment, The Condominium Conversion Problem: Causes and Solu-
tions, 1980 DuKE L.J. 306; Note, Municipal Regulation of Condominium Conversions in 
California, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1979); Note, Regulatory Responses to the Condomin-
ium Conversion Crisis, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 513 (1981). 
This Article focuses upon condominium conversion with only a brief reference to the 
conversion of rental apartments to cooperative ownersjlip. Cooperative conversion has 
been generally limited to the New York City, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco-Oak-
land metropolitan areas. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at IV-8. 
For detailed legal information concerning condominium and cooperative ownership, 
refer to 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: CONDOMINIUM LAW AND 
PRACTICE (1987) [hereinafter CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE]; 2 P. ROHAN & M. 
RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE (1987). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 42-66. 
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specific issue in the relatively unknown Condominium and Co-
operative Conversion Protection and Abuse Relief Act of 1980.6 
In this Act, Congress acknowledged the need for some control 
over the conversion process, but concluded that state and local 
governments already had significant regulatory authority and 
were the more appropriate bodies to exercise this power.7 Part II 
argues that state government regulation of condominium conver-
sion should preempt municipalities from similar involvement.8 
Part III reviews case law and highlights certain features of cur-
rent state and local legislation. It also attempts to establish the 
constitutional limits of appropriate state and local conversion 
controls. Part IV offers a Model Act that a state legislature may 
consider for adoption. The model legislation is partially com-
prised of provisions culled from existing state statutes, local or-
dinances, and the Uniform Condominium Act.9 The proposed 
legislation is also, however, directed toward issues that have 
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3616 (1982). The federal act requires that tenants residing in 
converting structures with five or more units 
are entitled to adequate notice of the pending conversion and to receive the first 
opportunity to purchase units in the converted projects and that State and local 
governments which have not already provided for such notice and opportunity 
for purchase should move toward that end. The Congress believes it is the re-
sponsibility of State and local governments to provide for such notice and oppor-
tunity to purchase in a prompt manner. The Congress has decided not to inter-
vene and therefore leaves this responsibility to State and local governments to 
be carried out. 
Id. § 3605. Congress disarmed the legislation by failing to establish a deadline or an 
enforcement mechanism for state and local promulgation of the "notice" and "right of 
purchase" provisions. Furthermore, states and communities are authorized to "override" 
the federal act. Id. § 3610. It appears that the existence of the federal law has been of no 
consequence. 
7. Id. § 3605. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 52-66. 
9. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT (1980). The Act's consideration of condominium conver-
sion is found at§ 4-112. Ten states have adopted the Uniform Condominium Act in the 
following statutes: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1201 to -1270 (Supp. 1987); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1601-101 to 1604-118 (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT.§§ 515A.1-101 to .4-
118 (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 448.1-101 to -120 (Vernon 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-
1701 to -1741 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-7A-1 to -7D-20 (1978 & Supp. 1987); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-1-101 to -4-120 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 3101-3414 (Purdon 
Supp. 1987); RI. GEN. LAWS§§ 34-36.1-1.01 to -4.20 (1984 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 55-79.39-.103 (1986 & Supp. 1987). 
Although the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws continues 
to sponsor the Uniform Condominium Act as an independent legislative model, the Com-
missioners also decided to combine the Uniform Condominium Act with the Model Real 
Estate Cooperative Act and the Uniform Planned Community Act. The resulting model 
legislation is the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, which offers a common 
structural and regulatory scheme applicable to all three forms of common ownership. See 
UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT, 7 U.L.A. 237 (1982). 
The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act has been adopted by Alaska, Connecti-
cut, and West Virginia. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.08.010 to .995 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
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been inadequately treated or ignored by current laws. Part V 
presents an extended commentary on the Model Act. In this 
way, the Article offers a framework within which a state legisla-
ture may formulate appropriate legislation in the field of condo-
minium conversion law. 
l. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOUSING MARKET FORCES AND 
CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS 
An abundant supply of rental housing existed in the early 
1970's, but the number of available units declined significantly 
by 1980.10 Numerous forces converged upon the rental housing 
market and produced an unattractive climate for significant con-
struction. Soaring costs of land, finance charges, labor, and 
materials deterred building efforts. The dwindling supply of 
available rental units amid a growing population directly af-
fected the national rental housing vacancy rate.11 In 1981, this 
vacancy rate dropped to one of the lowest levels since 1960.12 
Although rental vacancy rates were low in the early 1980's, 
many apartment building owners nonetheless experienced a de-
cline in profits because the operating costs of their structures 
increased.13 Furthermore, the existence of rent controls in cer-
§§ 47-282 to -293 (West Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE§§ 36B-l-101 to -4-120 (1985 & Supp. 
1987). 
10. In 1971, about 762,000 rental units were constructed in structures containing five 
or more units. Impact of lnfiation on Small Business: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
General Oversight and Minority Enterprise of the House Comm. on Small Business, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (statement of Herman J. Smith, First Vice President, Nat'l Ass'n 
of Home Builders, Data Source-Bureau of the Census, HUD). But by 1980, private 
rental construction had slumped to about 275,000 units. Rout, Sky-High Interest Rates 
Put Apartment-Building on Hold, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1981, at 31, col. 1. 
11. For a detailed history of the rental housing market, refer to GENERAL AccouNTING 
OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING: A NATIONAL PROBLEM THAT NEEDS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION 
(1979). 
12. The 1981 national vacancy rate was five percent. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SER. H-111-85-Q3, CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS: HOUSING VACANCIES 
1 (Third Quarter Statistics, 1985) [hereinafter HOUSING VACANCIES]. As one authority 
explains, "[W]hen a rental vacancy rate falls below 6 (percent], market parity is de-
stroyed and tenants are forced to pay higher rents than they can afford, accept housing 
below previous standards, or uproot their family and move to different jurisdictions with 
a high vacancy rate." Condominium Housing Issues Hearing, supra note 2, at 45 (state-
ment of Daniel Lauber, Principal Consultant, Planning-Communications Associates). 
13. Rental Housing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of 
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 
at 40 (1980) [hereinafter Rental Housing Hearing] ("The problem of paying for rising 
costs in an inflationary economy has been compounded in recent years by a fuel crisis 
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tain communities14 and the failure of rental income to keep pace 
with inflationary increases111 influenced some owners to retreat 
from rental housing involvement. The condominium conversion 
route offered a profit-generating alternative, coupled with at-
tractive tax advantages. 18 
and high financing costs.") (statement of Joseph A. LeFante, Commissioner, New Jersey 
Dep't of Community Affairs); see also GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, supra note 11, at 16. 
14. It is virtually impossible to offer a clear depiction of the intertwining relation-
ships among rent controls, housing abandonment, and the national scarcity of rental 
housing. The presence of rent controls apparently contributes to an increase in real es-
tate tax delinquencies. Real estate tax delinquencies increased 100% in Boston after the 
enactment of rent controls, and New York City's six percent delinquency rate since 1965 
is the highest rate in 40 years. District of Columbia Appropriations for 1980: Hearings 
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 
at 215 (1979) (statement of Richard Francis, Executive Vice President Nat') Rental 
Hous. Council). 
Much attention has been directed toward the rent control ordinance adopted in 1979 
by the City of Los Angeles. It is viewed as the prototype regulatory package of current 
times. For a detailed discussion, see Hill, As Rent Control Spreads Across Country, Its 
Friends and Foes Watch Los Angeles, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1980, at 40, col. 1. A recent 
study indicated that the Los Angeles program had reduced housing costs for long-term 
tenants, but had increased rents to above market levels for tenants who have recently 
moved. In addition, the study determined that rent controls had only a slight effect on 
lessors' rates of return and on the condition of the rental housing stock. Los Angeles 
Rent Restrictions Benefit Long-term Tenants, Study Shows, 14 Hous. & Dev. Rep. 
(BNA) 153, 154 (July 14, 1986). 
The United States Supreme Court has strengthened the legal foundation for rent con-
trol by ruling that rent control ordinances are not facially inconsistent with the federal 
antitrust laws. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986). But the Supreme Court is 
presently scheduled to review a local rent control regulation that requires a landlord to 
subsidize a tenant through denial of proposed rental increases based upon a tenant's 
economic hardship. It is alleged that the regulation violates the just compensation, due 
process, and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. Pennell v. City 
of San Jose, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986) (en bane) (ordi-
nance upheld as not facially unconstitutional), aff'd, 56 U.S.L.W. 4168 (1987). 
The reader should note, however, that a detailed HUD study failed to establish a sta-
tistical relationship. between rent controls and the volume of condominium conversion 
because of the small number of jurisdictions with rent control and the variations in such 
laws. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at V-16. 
15. Some analysts have suggested that rent levels failed to keep up with the general 
inflation in costs and personal incomes due to "a perceptible shift in preference from 
renting to owning among those renters who could afford to consider it." CITIZENS Hous. 
& PLANNING Ass'N, INC., MASSACHUSE'M'S Hous. FIN. AGENCY, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE SO'S 
3 (1983) (Spring Conference Series Report) (statement of John Weicher, Former Deputy 
Director, President's Comm'n on Hous.). Home ownership thus offered an attractive 
hedge against inflation. Another reason derives from the fact that "rental housing mar-
kets are dominated by small scale operators." Small scale owners who wished to avoid 
tenant turnovers depressed rent levels. Id. (statement of Anthony Downs, Senior Fellow, 
Brookings Inst.) ("[S)mall landlords give rent concessions to good tenants, ultimately, in 
the aggregate, depressing the overall rental market."). 
16. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at V-25 to V-30. For an illustration of this profit-
making opportunity, refer to CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 3A.04. 
The tax advantages are clearly outlined in most of the previously cited law review 
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As a result of these economic pressures, 3.56 % of the rental 
units in larger multifamily structures were converted to condo-
minium ownership during the 1970's.17 This seemingly minor 
number of national conversions masked the concentrated activ-
ity occurring within certain localities. Almost sixty percent of 
the nation's 366,000 conversions from 1970 to 1979 occurred in 
only twelve of the country's thirty-seven largest metropolitan ar-
eas. 18 Converted buildings usually contained a minimum of five 
residential units, even though smaller structures represent about 
sixty percent of the country's rental accommodations.19 Because 
the conversion of rental apartments to owner-occupied status 
often results in the displacement of tenants, the tightly grouped 
centers of condominium conversion influenced the rental va-
cancy rates of larger structures within these metropolitan 
areas.20 
In the 1980's, the national rental vacancy rate began to rise. 
The national rental vacancy rate for the first nine months of 
1985 was approximately 6.4 % . 21 But these statistics can be mis-
leading unless the somewhat imprecise nature of the information 
upon which they are based is recognized. For example, these sta-
tistics sometimes include apartments of questionable habitabil-
ity. 22 Also, the vacancy rate is higher in some sections of the 
articles. See supra note 4. A particularly thorough treatment is offered in Day & Fogel, 
The Condominium Crisis: A Problem Unresolved, 21 URB. L. ANN. 3, 27-32 (1981). 
17. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at IV-9 n.9 (this statistic is based on multifamily 
structures containing five or more units). 
18. Id. at IV-5, IV-8. The twelve high activity areas were Boston, Chicago, Denver-
Boulder, Houston, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Miami, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York 
City, San Francisco-Oakland, Seattle-Everett, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Washington, 
D.C. The especially active Chicago and Washington, D.C. areas accounted for 31 % of the 
nation's total conversions. Id. 
19. S. REP. No. 736, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3506, 3556-57. This Senate Report confirmed a slightly earlier statistical 
presentation which also found that approximately 32% of all rental units are located in 
single-family houses and about 27% in two- to four-unit structures. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SER. H-111-79-5, CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS: HOUSING VA-
CANCIES 1 (Annual Statistics, 1979). 
20. California, Washington, D.C., and the metropolitan areas of New York City, Den-
ver, Chicago, Boston, and Seattle head the list of areas hardest hit by housing shortages. 
National Council of Senior Citizens, Condominium Conversions: Options for Tenant and 
Rental Market Protection, reprinted in Condominium Housing Issues Hearing, supra 
note 2, at 86-96. Many of these metropolitan areas were previously noted as subject to 
significant conversion activity. See supra note 18. 
21. HOUSING VACANCIES, supra note 12, at 1. 
22. See Kurtz, Rental Shortage-Debate and Dilemma, Boston Globe, Dec. 31, 1983, 
at 37, col. 3; see also Bushnell, Rental Market: Good to Some, Grim to Others, Boston 
Globe, Aug. 20, 1983, at 33, col. l; Scott, Figures on Vacancy Rates for City Rental 
Units Differ, L.A. Times, Mar. 16, 1982, pt. II (Metro), at 1, col. 1. These articles empha-
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country due to an oversupply of rental units and well below the 
national average in other areas.23 
Because high finance and operating costs and low federal sub-
sidies continue to forestall many developers from constructing 
multifamily rental structures,24 other factors probably account 
for the shift of direction in the national vacancy rate. For in-
stance, the number of younger households has declined. This 
group has traditionally constituted a significant portion of the 
tenant market. But the high cost of living has prompted many of 
size the unreliability of rental vacancy figures and the disparate formulae for determin-
ing the vacancy rate. The federal government computes the rate "by dividing the num-
ber of vacant units for rent by the total rental units." It excludes "vacant units that are 
seasonal or held off the market." HousING VACANCIES, supra note 12, at 9. 
23. The oil-rich states of Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana, for example, constructed 
new rental units anticipating an influx of new residents that never occurred. In Houston, 
occupancy was less than 80% in 1983. Multifamily Starts Predicted to Fall, 11 Hous. & 
Dev. Rep. (BNA) 28 (June 26, 1983). Apartment construction in the Sun Belt generally 
has boomed, resulting in a growing number of loan defaults and foreclosures. Celis, Sun 
Belt Apartment Construction Is Booming, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1985, at 6, col. 1. Al-
though most areas of the country have experienced their highest rental vacancy rates in 
the past two decades, the Northeast has recently seen low rental vacancy rates. Apart-
ments and Condos: Apartments Up, Boston Globe, June 13, 1986, at 66, col. 1. In the 
third quarter of 1985, the rental vacancy rate for the Northeast was 3.8% as compared 
with the South's 9.2% vacancy rate. HOUSING VACANCIES, supra note 12, at 2. Boston's 
vacancy rate is approximately 2%. French, Few Apartments in City's Future, Boston 
Globe, May 23, 1986, at 71, col. 2. New York City's vacancy rate is similar. Partially as a 
result, the rental amounts paid in these municipalities are the country's highest. Gorov, 
Top Rents in Country, Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1984, at 23, col. 5. 
24. Doan, "No Vacancy" Signs Spread in Rental Housing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Oct. 12, 1981, at 52; Whitehouse, Why House Builders' Costs are Rising, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 8, 1984, § 8, at 1, col. 2; Norman, Interview: George Sternlieb, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 
1982, § 8, at 6, col. 1. A recent housing update predicted that multifamily housing con-
struction would slip during 1986 due to overbuilding in recent years and the resulting 
high vacancy rates. The new tax legislation might also create a disincentive for future 
construction plans. Apartments and Condos: Multifamily Declines, Boston Globe, June 
6, 1986, at 75, col. 1. 
Federally subsidized construction of rental housing has dropped sharply. The Reagan 
administration implemented a voucher system, which is a variation of a rent subsidy 
program. This program eliminated federal involvement in construction efforts, and the 
administration believes that an adequate supply of rental units already exists. Kurtz, 
supra note 22, at 37, col. 3. A recent poll reveals, however, that 51 of the 66 cities sur-
veyed reported a growing demand for housing assistance and an inadequate market to 
supply this need. Lublin, Declining Housing Aid Worsens the Struggle for Many Poor 
People, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1984, at 1, col. 1. 
The Reagan administration budget for 1988 provides for voucher distribution to 
103,000 families, double the number approved by Congress for 1987. Creative Coupons 
for Poor Renters, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1987, at 26, col. 1. Some tenants have experienced 
difficulty in securing rental units under the voucher system because landlords accepting 
vouchers must improve the rental property to federal standards, pass annual inspections, 
and accept government involvement in settling tenant complaints. Lublin, Vouchers for 
Housing Help Some of the Poor, Fail to Benefit Others, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at 23, 
col. 2. 
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these individuals to double up or delay a move from their paren-
tal home.211 At the same time as the number of potential younger 
households has declined,26 the more financially able members of 
this younger group have opted for home ownership. 
A second element contributing to the upswing in the vacancy 
rate is the introduction of increased numbers of single-family 
houses and condominiums into the rental market.27 A surge in 
the sales market, however, may remove many of the formerly 
owner-occupied units as rental housing. A steady national eco-
nomic recovery is also likely to recreate demand for rental hous-
ing among some of this younger group. 28 
A full understanding of the condominium conversion scene 
suffers due to a lack of reliable, broad-based statistics.29 Availa-
25. Bushnell, supra note 22, at 33, col. l; Guenther, Rental Vacancies Start Rising 
Despite Drop in Construction, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1983, at 31, col. 1. In 1983-1984, 52% 
of men aged 20-24 lived with their parents. Forty-three percent of this group had resided 
with their parents in 1970. Delaying marriage and a "return home" after divorce contrib-
uted to this figure. More Young Adults Live With Parents, Says Study, Boston Globe, 
Nov. 8, 1985, at 17, col. 4 [hereinafter More Young Adults]; see also Adams, Fewer Nests 
Are Emptying, Boston Globe, June 17, 1987, at 1, col. 4. 
High rental costs have also prompted many tenants to take in roommates to share 
expenses. Joyce, More Turn to Sharing to Cover Rising Rents, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 
1985, § 8, at 1, col. 3. 
26. Adults under age 30 usually constitute less than 20% of all households, but re-
present 37% of renter households. Softening in Rental Market Attributed to Decline in 
Under-30 Households, 11 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 543, 543 (Nov. 21, 1983) [hereinaf-
ter Softening in Rental Market]. The addition of new households in the last few years 
has been running at about 1.4 million a year after averaging 1. 7 million annually from 
1970 through 1980. Fewer New Households Starting, Survey Finds, Boston Globe, Nov. 
30, 1985, at 37, col. 4; More Young Adults, supra note 25, at 17, col. 4. 
27. In 1982, an estimated 400,000 owner-occupied units were converted to rentals. 
Approximately 63 % of these units were single-family houses. The addition of such units 
to the rental housing supply has noticeably dampened attempts to increase rents in areas 
such as Seattle and southern Florida. Hamey, Rental Condo Market Booms, Boston 
Globe, Apr. 15, 1984, at A27, col. 2; Guenther, supra note 25, at 31, col. 1. See infra note 
34 for a description of the oversupply of condominiums in certain geographic areas. 
28. The nation's population grew 4.2% between 1980 and 1984. Households Growing 
Faster Than Population, Boston Globe, Sept. 30, 1985, at 16, col. 3. This signals a poten-
tial future demand for rental housing among younger households. At present, approxi-
mately 500,000 potential renter households are Jost to the market due to the "doubling-
up" process. Softening in Rental Market, supra note 26, at 543; see supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
Recent census reports indicate a renewed interest in metropolitan area living that 
probably will result in a greater demand upon available housing. Peterson, People Mov-
ing Back to Cities, U.S. Study Says, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1. 
29. The 1980 HUD Study constitutes the only comprehensive source of condominium 
conversion statistics. See supra note 3. The federal government and states do not record 
conversion activity and "[m)ost major cities do not collate records on conversions, mak-
ing credible statistics harder to come by than apartment leases." Franklin, Tenants Are 
Fighting a Rise in Conversions to Condominium Use, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1979, § 1, at 
18, col. 1. 
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ble information reveals certain markets to be strong,30 while na-
tional conversion figures are dropping appreciably.31 This phe-
nomenon may be explained by the high cost of conversions. 
People interested in purchasing an apartment building for con-
version are likely to encounter a high selling price. Once they 
have purchased the building, they may have to offer a financing 
program to attract condominium buyers. In the present econ-
omy, such costs can be an insurmountable hurdle for many 
developers. 32 
In some communities many of the residential rental structures 
best suited for condominium ownership have already been con-
verted;33 and certain municipalities have even been experiencing 
a glut of unsold condominiums.3" High interest and unemploy-
ment rates accompanied by slow income growth in younger 
households have also chilled the sales of condominiums in nu-
30. In 1982, approximately 75% of the nation's condominium and cooperative con-
versions occurred in New York and 57% in New York City. Other strong markets are 
Charlotte, North Carolina; Abilene and San Antonio, Texas; Bakersfield, California; Eu-
gene, Oregon; Wichita, Kansas; Chicago; Philadelphia; and Detroit. Oser, Conversion 
Pace Abates Across Nation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, § 12, at 25, col. 1, 26, col. 4; Wall 
St. J., June 8, 1983, at 33, col. 1. Boston's condominium conversion rate soared to new 
heights in 1986. A 25% increase in conversions over 1986 was occurring in 1987. Malone, 
Condos Added in Boston at Record Rate, Boston Globe, June 2, 1987, at 1, col. 2. An-
other report reveals "islands of demand" for condominiums along the east coast. Condo 
Construction Rises, Wash. Post, May 4, 1985, at E24, col. 2. 
3L A U.S. Housing Markets Survey predicts a national drop to a seven year low of 
70,000 to 75,000 conversions. Significant declines occurred in Dallas and Washington, 
D.C. Condo, Co-op Conversions Expected to Drop to Seven-Year Low in 1984, 11 Hous. 
& Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1092, 1092 (May 7, 1984) [hereinafter Condo, Co-op Conversions]; 
see Oser, More Units Being Rented as Oversupplies Grow, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1985, § 
12, at 14, col. 1 [hereinafter Oser, More Units]; Oser, supra note 30, at 25, col. 4; Condos 
Do Better, But That's Not Saying Much, Providence J., June 27, 1982, at G-1, col. 1; 
Yudis, Bear Market for Conversions?, Boston Globe, Apr. 24, 1982, at 33, col. 1. 
32. One study attributes the downturn in the number of conversions partially to the 
fact that "it became impossible for converters to pay the sellers' price for properties, 
provide a mortgage buy-down for unit buyers, and still make a profit .... [C]onverters 
could pay 45 percent of the projected sell-out price for a project, but prices were being 
bid up to 50, 55, and ... 70 percent." Low Vacancy Rates, Seller Financing Called 
Keys to Successful Condominium Conversions, IO Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 792, 792 
(Feb. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Low Vacancy Rates]. 
33. E.g., Oser, supra note 30, at 26, col. 4 ("[T]he inventory of choice rental property 
in Chicago is modest compared with Manhattan, where years of controlled rents and 
little new construction has helped breed an intense and unsatisfied demand for 
housing."). · 
34. The inventory of condominium units has reached a record high, particularly in 
the Sun Belt states. Condo Sales Down Sharply in Sun Belt Markets, Survey Shows, 12 
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 970 (May 6, 1985). Condominium selling prices have declined 
by 15% to 35%. Sales in San Antonio and Houston have plunged by 50%. Cells, Condo-
miniums Fade as the Life Style Sours and Deflation Sets In, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1985, 
at 1, col. 6. 
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merous markets. 311 Many of these unsold units return to the 
rental market. Furthermore, the conversion rate has declined be-
cause financially secure real estate syndicators, intent upon ac-
quiring rental properties for depreciation benefits, compete di-
rectly with converters.36 For the conversion trend to regain 
vitality and offer the benefits of home ownership opportunities 
in a condominium setting, a decline in project acquisition and 
finance charges seems necessary.37 There also must be a greater 
disparity between the costs of new construction and the costs of 
converting rental units in order to attract developers to the con-
version process. Although an adverse rate of inflation and other 
economic variables greatly influence the decisions of both devel-
opers and unit purchasers, many predict more favorable market 
conditions leading to an acceleration of the conversion pace. 38 
Some have argued that the true impact of the conversion 
movement upon the rental housing scene is virtually impossible 
to assess. One significant proponent of this view is the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). A study done 
by HUD in 1980 found no consistent relationship between con-
version levels and rental vacancy rates. 39 But this generalization 
based upon national statistics may not be true in certain locales. 
Conversions can be viewed as either a response to a strong 
35. Prial, A Bright Future, But a Shaky Present, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, § 12, at 
15, col. 1. See generally Oser, supra note 30, at 25, col. 4 ("Outside New York, many 
conversion efforts have failed entirely, with the properties reverting to rental status 
.... In these cases, the properties usually revert to lenders."); Wall St. J., June 8, 1983, 
at 33, col. 1 (detailing the same situation in California and Texas); Conway, Pop Goes 
the Condo, FORBES, Mar. 14, 1983, at 14. 
36. According to a U.S. Housing Markets survey, "the only significant conversions 
being started ... involve properties which aren't attractive to syndicators." Condo, Co-
op Conversions, supra note 31, at 1092; Low Vacancy Rates, supra note 32, at 792. Re-
cent federal tax code revisions, however, create disincentives to investment for specula-
tors with an interest in purchasing rental properties. See generally CONDOMINIUM LAW 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 4 (Spec. Supp.: The Tax Reform Act of 1986-Summary of 
Major Changes Affecting Real Estate 1987). 
37. According to the Wall Street Journal, some "buyers regard condos as an alterna-
tive to, but not a substitute for, owning a single-family home." A Chicago study found 
that "two-thirds of the buyers of single-family homes were childless couples or singles, 
the logical buyers for condos." The report noted that "this situation could change 
quickly if prices catch fire again." Wall St. J., June 8, 1983, at 33, col. 1. 
38. Various developers and analysts have commented that conditions are improving 
and "the conversion market is about to have a rebirth. [S]teep buy-downs for end loans 
are no longer needed." Low Vacancy Rates, supra note 32, at 792. In this context, "low-
end condominiums which . . . are 'best sellers' " must be distinguished from "high-end 
condos, which 'are not moving at all.'" Multifamily Starts Predicted to Fall, supra note 
23, at 29; Low Vacancy Rates, supra note 32, at 792. The pace of construction of new 
condominiums is holding relatively steady and accounts for 16.7% of single-family starts 
nationally. Oser, More Units, supra note 31, at 14, col. 3. 
39. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at V-11. 
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purchasing market or as an escape valve for rental property 
owners confronted by low-operating margins. The 1980 HUD 
Study does not provide firm conclusions on this issue."0 More-
over, the HUD Study's figures reflect lower mortgage interest 
rates than in recent years and a robust construction industry. 
The pinch of conversions upon the rental housing supply may 
well be more significant than what these outdated statistics 
reveal. 
The currently rising rental vacancy rate conjoined with a na-
tional decline in the number of condominium conversions should 
not dissuade state legislators from considering the regulation of 
future apartment conversions. The conversion rate may never 
regain the vitality of the 1970's. But the forecast of renewed in-
terest in conversion properties and condominium ownership 
should prompt legislators to determine and satisfy the concerns 
of tenants, project sponsors, and potential purchasers attracted 
by the prospect of condominium ownership.41 
II. AN ARGUMENT FOR STATE PREEMPTION OF CONDOMINIUM 
CONVERSION 
Although the 1980 HUD Study indicates that approximately 
one-half of our state legislatures have adopted statutes relating 
to condominium or cooperative conversion,42 no state .has explic-
itly preempted local regulation of such activity. Many communi-
ties do not regulate conversion of multifamily residential struc-
tures, perhaps due in part to a belief that the state has 
40. Id. at V-19. 
41. As a New York State Commission reported: 
Many knowledgeable commentators and housing officials have concluded that 
the conversion of apartments to cooperative or condominium status is our best 
hope for long-range preservation of the housing stock. Experience in New York 
and elsewhere has demonstrated that conversions generate pride of ownership, 
the upgrading of properties and stabilization of neighborhoods. While it is unde-
niably true that conversions are most likely to occur in the more desirable resi-
dential areas, the past decade has witnessed a filtering down effect, with residen-
tial buildings in different areas of the state (and in all different price ranges) 
now undergoing conversion. The municipality gains, not only from the added 
impetus that conversions give to maintenance and improvement of residential 
buildings, but also from full payment of real estate taxes and a perceptible in-
crease in the assessed valuation of properties that have undergone conversion. 
2 NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY COMM'N ON RENTAL·Hous., REPORT OF THE NEW YORK 
STATE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON RENTAL HOUSING 2-111 (1980) (footnote omitted) 
[hereinafter TEMPORARY COMMISSION]. 
42. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at XI-1. Most of the state statutes concern con-
dominium conversion. Id.; see also supra note 3. 
650 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:3 
preempted the field. Other localities adopt ordinances that 
merely copy the state statutory provisions. Some offer supple-
mentary protections.'3 The latter group of local ordinances are 
often more restrictive than state legislation. 44 
The litigation and controversy surrounding these laws reveal 
uncertainty concerning whether state enactments preempt local 
ordinances.0 A familiar pattern emerging from the case law em-
phasizes the failure of state legislatures to address the issue of 
preemption in a definitive manner. If the state legislature wishes 
to preclude municipal regulation of condominium conversion, 
then its statute should clearly and emphatically preempt the 
field.46 
Courts have rarely discussed the motivation behind any al-
leged preemptive legislation. •7 Ambiguous and otherwise 
unartfully drafted legislation often directs judicial attention to-
43. OFFICE OF Poucv DEv. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., THE CoN-
VERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES-STATE AND LOCAL 
CONVERSION REGULATIONS 14 (1981). 
44. Day & Fogel, supra note 16, at 55. 
45. Only a small number of lower court cases have directly confronted the condomin-
ium conversion/preemption issue. Each court encountered difficulty reaching a resolu-
tion. See Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, 490 F. Supp. 706 (D.N.J.) 
(holding that state regulation preempted municipal conversion moratorium), aff'd, 633 
F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1980); Bownds v. City of Glendale, 113 Cal. App. 3d 875, 170 Cal. Rptr. 
342 (Ct. App. 1980) (finding that state guidelines did not preempt the local housing plan 
because the guidelines did not have the effect of law); City of Miami Beach v. Rocio, 
Corp., 404 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (invalidating city's conversion moratorium 
and lease extension provision on the basis that it conflicted with state law), appeal de-
nied, 408 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1981); Rockville Grosvenor, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 289 
Md. 74, 422 A.2d 353 (1980) (invalidating county conversion law because of conflict with 
state law); Plaza Joint Venture v. Atlantic City, 174 N.J. Super. 231, 416 A.2d 71 (App. 
Div. 1980) (holding conversion ordinance preempted by state's comprehensive statutory 
regulation of the area); Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 172 
N.J. Super. 426, 412 A.2d 816 (Law Div. 1979) (holding local conversion control pre-
empted by state's comprehensive regulation of the area through eviction controls); Coun-
cil for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Koch, 119 Misc. 2d 241,462 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 
1983) (holding city ordinance not preempted by a state statute), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 942, 
463 N.E.2d 620, 475 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1984). 
46. As the court noted in Bownds, 113 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 348, "If 
the Legislature desires to preempt the decision making power of local governments in 
the field, it should specifically say so." 
47. Almost all of the cases cited supra note 45, are silent as to the reasons prompting 
state preemption of the condominium conversion field. In Hampshire House Sponsor 
Corp., however, the court recognized the existence of a "chronic statewide housing 
shortage" and concluded that the imposition of conversion controls "implicates complex 
economic, social and political issues. The state legislature is better equipped than most 
municipalities to formulate a comprehensive approach to this delicate problem." 172 
N.J. Super. at 434-35, 412 A.2d at 821 (quoting Helmsley v. Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 243, 
394 A.2d 65, 86 (1978)). 
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ward determining whether the legislation is preemptive,48 and if 
so, to what extent. In pursuit of this objective, courts have de-
vised various formulae." 9 
Instead of textually analyzing these tests, 110 this Article consid-
ers the reasons underlying preemptive action. In general, state 
legislatures have preempted municipal regulation of numerous 
issues of general statewide concern or areas where uniformity of 
rules is desirable.111 Once state preemption has occurred, a con-
flicting or supplementary municipal law will be deemed invalid. 
State legislation even preempts a home rule community's claim 
of an independent legislative power.112 
With respect to condominium conversions, the availability of a 
suitable rental housing supply and the protection of tenants con-
fronted by condominium conversions constitute issues of state-
wide concern.113 On this basis, a state government has adequate 
grounds to regulate the conversion of apartment buildings.114 Yet 
48. Courts are required to devote considerable attention to determining whether a 
state statute preempts the condominium conversion field. An unambitious state legisla-
tive effort only exacerbates the problem. For examples of such state laws, see the stat-
utes analyzed in City of Miami Beach, 404 So. 2d at 1068-69 and Rockville Grosvenor, 
289 Md. at 87-93, 422 A.2d at 360-64. 
49. The simplest judicial test for state preemption concerns a search for statutory 
terminology expressly preempting a topic from local regulation. Often such language is 
absent and a .court then looks for an implicit preemption. In this case, detailed and 
comprehensive state regulation of an area may justify a court in concluding that the 
state legislature acted preemptively. In any event, a court may still overturn a local ordi-
nance if it conflicts with a state statute. The cases cited supra note 45 reflect the various 
judicial formulae. 
50. This Article avoids a detailed textual consideration of these judicial tests because 
it argues for state legislation that clearly prohibits local regulation of condominium con-
version, obviating the need for imposition of the judicial tests. 
51. 0. REYNOLDS, HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 43, at 119-22 (1982). Ex-
amples of some issues necessitating the prohibition of local legislation include matters 
relating to criminal activity, the operation of the court system, the public health, the sale 
and consumption of liquor, certain licensing procedures, and education. Id. §§ 39-41 at 
107-16; see also E. McQmLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 21.34, at 249 (3d rev. ed. 
1980). 
52. 
(H]ome-rule municipalities are subject to the general laws of the state, ... 
[and] if there is, as to a matter of general concern, a conflict between state law 
and the law of the home-rule city, the state law must prevail. 
... When the state has (preempted a particular field of activity], there is no 
room for city law on the matter, whether law of a home-rule city or a non-home-
rule city. 
0. REYNOLDS, supra note 51, § 42, at 116-17, § 43, at 120. 
53. The fact that approximately 25 states have adopted conversion legislation sup-
ports the notion that the issues are of statewide importance. See supra note 42 and 
accompanying text. 
54. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
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a state legislature should weigh the alternative of permitting lo-
cal municipal law to regulate condominium conversion. Because 
the impact of condominium conversion has been heavily concen-
trated in certain urban areas,511 many of these communities may 
assert themselves as the most appropriate regulatory body. Ar-
guably, the local community should be allowed to deal exclu-
sively with the conversion issue because it is most familiar with 
its current housing situation. This belief has swayed some state 
legislatures to delegate regulatory authority to municipalities.116 
Although these concerns are understandable, ample justification 
exists for total state preemption. 
Statistics indicating that widespread conversion activity is un-
likely to occur in numerous communities within a state117 seem to 
strengthen the position of advocates opposing state preemption. 
But because large urban areas have experienced the most con-
versions, allowing these communities to address the conversion 
control issue may result in a regulatory scheme favoring the 
larger community's interests while isolating the local rental 
housing market from the concerns of neighboring communities, 
developers, and nonresidents seeking housing within a particular 
city or town. An insular municipal conversion policy may dis-
suade future apartment construction efforts, impose an inordi-
nate demand for housing upon adjoining communities, and pre-
clude a condominium ownership venture for current residents 
and nonresidents. In other words, the community may be too 
self-protective in designing its program.118 The state legislature 
55. See supra note 18. 
56. For example, in California, condominium conversions are generally controlled by 
municipalities. See Bownds v. City of Glendale, 113 Cal. App. 3d 875, 170 Cal. Rptr. 342 
(1980); Comment, Conversion of Apartments to Condominiums: Social and Economic 
Regulations Under the California Subdivision Map Act, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 466 (1980); 
Note, Municipal Regulation of Condominium Conversions in California, 53 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 225 (1979). 
Massachusetts permits the communities of Acton, Boston, Brookline, Cambridge, and 
Somerville to regulate local condominium conversion. A uniform statute governs the re-
maining municipalities, unless the municipality elects to waive the statute and either 
preclude regulation or vary the state plan. Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, 1983 
Mass. Acts 926. 
57. See supra note 18. Many smaller communities have only a negligible number of 
apartment buildings. 
58. For example, some commentators criticize the Massachusetts community of Cam-
bridge for imposing a total ban on condominium conversion through its administration 
of local conversion controls. Cambridge "has refused to grant removal permits for vacant 
apartments even when those apartments were gutted prior to the passage" of the conver-
sion ordinance "and [the unit] would not be returned to the rental market." A permit 
removing the apartment from rent control allows the owner to convert the unit. SMH 
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUC., AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF CONDOMINIUM CONVE~SION 
34 (1983). 
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offers a more objective deliberative body, bolstered by the state's 
research and investigative abilities. State legislative committees 
have greater resources and more experience in dealing with 
housing needs from a regional perspective. The growth of the 
conversion of rental units to include additional urban and sub-
urban communities enhances the justification for state 
involvement. 
The desire for uniformity of rules also argues for state pre-
emption.119 Municipalities unencumbered by preemptive state 
acts may be subject to intense local lobbying efforts and thus be 
likely to adopt varying tenant and rental housing supply protec-
tions. Some municipal bylaws and ordinances are conceptually 
unsound, vague, or result in claims of unfounded enabling au-
thority60 and unconstitutional overregulation.61 These deficien-
cies ultimately require courts to adjudicate claims arising under 
diverse local laws. A uniform set of rules would eliminate the 
expense and time associated with the processing of numerous, 
similar judicial claims. Landowners, developers, and tenants de-
serve uniform regulation that bypasses the possibility of poorly 
drafted local regulations. 62 State legislation may not be problem 
59. 
A review of the law and practices in the [condominium] conversion field reveals 
a maze of highly technical rules, many of which overlap . . . . This regulatory 
maze parallels the situation in the field of rent regulation generally, and adds to 
the confusion concerning the rights of tenants involved in conversion situations. 
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that the laws and regulations con-
cerning conversions be made uniform throughout the state. 
2 TEMPORARY COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 2-121. 
60. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that communities may regulate 
condominium conversion only pursuant to the grant of individual special acts promul-
gated by the state legislature. Accordingly, a community's conversion plan could not be 
upheld as incident to the exercise of the zoning power. CHR Gen., Inc. v. City of 
Newton, 387 Mass. 351, 439 N.E.2d 788 (1982). A city also may not adopt conversion 
regulations incident to its power to operate the water and sewer systems, or the power to 
regulate traffic and city streets. Bannerman v. City of Fall River, 391 Mass. 328, 461 
N.E.2d 793 (1984). These cases were decided prior to the adoption of pertinent state 
legislation mentioned supra note 56. 
61. See infra notes 77-135 and accompanying text. 
62. Landlords and developers support reasonable minimum statewide standards in 
the belief that they will forego dealing with numerous local variations. This became evi-
dent during consideration of proposed state legislation in Massachusetts. Blake, About 
Clout and Condo Conversions, Boston Globe, Nov. 27, 1983, at 29, col. 1; A Condo Ad-
vance, Boston Globe, Sept. 22, 1983, at 30, col. 1; Black, Condo Bill Consensus Called 
'Close', Boston Globe, Sept. 13, 1983, at 19, col. 6; see also supra note 60. 
A Maryland State Bar Association committee supported the concept of state preemp-
tion. The committee urged that the General Assembly enact "one statute that will gov-
ern condominiums in the entire State so that this important new phase of real estate 
development is not sectionalized on a county by county basis." This excerpt of the report 
appears in Rockville Grosvenor, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 288 Md. 74, 83, 422 A.2d 
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free; however, issues of regulatory interpretation and scope are 
more effectively addressed by a single state enactment that re-
flects the resources available to state government. 
As an initial investigatory measure, state and municipal build-
ing or housing officials should determine the sites of past, 
present, and proposed conversion activity. State legislators may 
then use this information in resolving their approach toward 
preemption. Among other facts, state governments may wish to 
learn the number of local conversions; the time span within 
which they occurred; the number of displaced elderly, handi-
capped, and low income tenants; relocation sites of displaced 
tenants; the municipality's total rental unit and vacancy rate 
figures; the location of concentrated areas of rental housing; the 
amount of recent multifamily housing construction; and the 
presence of major industries and employers in the community. 
By supplying such information, the municipality will in essence 
have conducted a mini-HUD Study.63 
The exact number of states preempting local legislation in this 
area is difficult to determine, because many statutes await judi-
cial review to resolve the preemption issue. Although some 
states have acted in a somewhat preemptive fashion, 6"' and cer-
tain states permit communities to adopt regulations more re-
strictive than those mandated by the state,611 most statutes ap-
353, 362 (1980). The proposed Model Condominium Code also urges state preemption. 
Rohan, The "Model Condominium Code"-A Blueprint for Modernizing Condominium 
Legislation, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 587, 592 (1978). 
63. Of course, in many instances the actual HUD information may still be helpful. 
See supra note 3. 
64. The Hampshire House, Claridge House, and Plaza Joint Venture decisions 
demonstrate that the New Jersey courts have found that various state statutes effec-
tively preempt the conversion control area. See Claridge House One v. Borough of Ve-
rona, 490 F. Supp. 706 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 633 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1980); Plaza Joint Venture v. 
Atlantic City, 174 N.J. Super. 231, 416 A.2d 71 (App. Div. 1980); Hampshire House 
Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 172 N.J. Super. 426, 412 A.2d 816 (Law Div. 
1979). 
65. For example, the Maryland Condominium Act prohibits local governments from 
enacting condominium conversion laws that are more restrictive than the state protec-
tions. If a local "rental housing emergency exists," however, the community may adopt 
additional protections to benefit elderly, handicapped, and low or moderate income 
tenants. These supplementary protections are authorized by the state's Condominium 
·Act.Mo. REAL PROP. CooE ANN.§ 11-140 (Supp. 1987). Minnesota adopted the Uniform 
Condominium Act's standard tenant protections with certain variations. For example, a 
city "may prohibit or impose reasonable conditions upon the conversion of buildings [to 
condominiums] only if there exists within the city a significant shortage of suitable 
rental dwellings available to low or moderate income individuals or families." MINN. 
STAT. § 515A.l-106 (1982). Virginia mandates certain condominium conversion protec-
tions designed to assist tenants in all communities. In addition, a county, city, or town 
"may enact an ordinance requiring the elderly or disabled tenants . . . be offered leases 
or extensions of leases on apartments they then occupied." VA. CooE ANN. § 55-
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pear at least ambiguous. A definitive statement of state 
preemption is clearly preferable to the current haphazard condi-
tion of the law of condominium conversion.66 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVELY CREATED 
CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION PROTECTIONS 
A state legislature seeking to foreclose municipal regulation of 
the condominium conversion process, and simultaneously desir-
ing to adopt a statute of statewide application that offers protec-
tions to preconversion tenants, must attempt to determine the 
proper constitutional limits of such regulation. Unfortunately, 
existing case law sheds little light upon this topic. Very few state 
or local conversion regulations have undergone judicial scrutiny. 
Of those that have, litigation most frequently focused on ques-
tions of statutory interpretation or doubts concerning the au-
thority for adopting municipal controls.67 
The success of a plaintiff landowner's challenge appears to de-
pend upon the degree of state or local regulatory involvement. 
Statutory or municipal enactments offering minimal tenant pro-
tections have escaped judicial review, perhaps indicating either 
widespread satisfaction with the provisions or the belief that an 
unsuccessful legal challenge would result. Laws providing long-
term statutory protections for tenants, on the other hand, tend 
79.94(6)(£) (Supp. 1987). Although Maine provides for certain tenant-related condomin-
ium conversion protections, a municipality is not prohibited from "imposing more strin-
gent standards." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1604-lll(f) (Supp. 1986). New York con-
trols the conversion of apartments to condominiums and cooperatives in New York City, 
but has not preempted supplementary city regulation. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(5) 
(McKinney 1984); see Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Koch, 119 Misc. 2d 241, 
462 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 942,462 N.E.2d 620, 475 N.Y.S.2d 279 
(U/84). 
66. See infra note 142 and accompanying text for a sample statute providing such a 
statement of preemption. 
67. See cases discussed supra note 45; see also Greater Boston Real Estate Bd. v. 
City of Boston, 397 Mass. 870, 494 N.E.2d 1301 (1986) (finding defendant lacked express 
or implied legislative authorization to require a landlord to obtain a permit from a mu-
nicipal board before certain residential rental units could be converted); Bannerman v. 
City of Fall River, 391 Mass. 328, 461 N.E.2d 793 (1984) (holding condominium conver-
sion ordinance conflicted impermissibly wiJ;h the state's Home Rule Amendment and 
could not be justified as incident to the city's power to operate the water and sewer 
system or to regulate traffic and city streets); CHR Gen. Inc. v. City of Newton, 387 
Mass. 351, 439 N.E.2d 788 (1982) (holding local zoning ordinance cannot serve as the 
basis for regulating condominium conversion if the ordinance only affects the ownership 
of the property); Goldman v. To~n of Dennis, 375 Mass. 197, 375 N.E.2d 1212 (1978) 
(holding local zoning bylaw is permitted to control the condominium conversion of a 
nonconforming cottage colony). 
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to generate litigation.68 The inadequacy of home rule powers,69 
alleged violations of equal protection70 and substantive due pro-
cess, and fifth amendment "takings" challenges fuel most at-
tacks upon the validity of condominium conversion statutes. 
Due process or uncompensated "takings" claims seem to be con-
sidered most seriously by the courts. 
The following sections off er guidance to legislators considering 
the adoption of a state condominium conversion law. Outlining 
relevant legal principles, including an analysis of due process at-
tacks founded upon claims of improper legislative purpose or 
complaints of fifth amendment uncompensated takings, estab-
lishes a perimeter within which the adopted legislation is likely 
to pass constitutional muster. 
A. Substantive Due Process-The Proper Exercise of State 
Police Power in Regulating Condominium Conversions 
Laws regulating condominium conversion will generally be 
viewed as an exercise of the police power.71 Courts reviewing 
68. See discussion of the Loeterman and Flynn decisions, infra notes 111-17 and ac-
companying text. 
69. District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., 415 A.2d 
1349 (D.C. 1980) (en bane), overturned a conversion ordinance because the City Council 
had utilized an emergency power provision to attempt to enact permanent legislation. 
Such a procedure falls beyond the proper exercise of home rule power. See also Ban-
nerman v. City of Fall River, 391 Mass. 328, 461 N.E.2d 793 (1984). 
70. An equal protection challenge, founded upon the claim that owners of residential 
rental properties are subjected to conversion restrictions that are not applied to other 
properties, is likely to fail. A reviewing court will uphold the regulation so long as the 
conversion restrictions are rationally related to proper statutory objectives such as pro-
tecting low income and elderly tenants, or maintaining a minimum number of rental 
units within the community. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
Grace v. Town of Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979), and Reiner-Kaiser 
Assocs. v. McConnachie, 104 Misc. 2d 750, 429 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1979), 
appeal denied sub. nom. Devereaux v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Bd., 51 
N.Y.2d 705,412 N.E.2d 1327, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1980) followed the rational basis analy-
sis and denied property owners' equal protection claims in a condominium conversion 
context. See related discussion infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. 
71. Because the federal government is limited to specific enumerated powers, the po-
lice power is viewed as reserved to the states. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 23-
24 (1972). In this sense the police power is difficult to define, but: 
[i]t is used by the courts to identify those state and local government restrictions 
and prohibitions that are valid and that may be involved without payment of 
compensation. In its best known and most traditional uses, the police power is 
employed to protect the health, safety, and morals of the community. 
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964); see also C. RHYNE, W. 
RHYNE & P. AscH, MUNICIPALITIES AND MULTIPLE RESIDENTIAL HOUSING: CONDOMINIUMS 
AND RENT CONTROL 6-16 (National Inst. of Mun. Law Officers Research Report No. 158, 
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such legislation apply a rational relationship test. So long as the 
statute bears a rational relationship to the proper objectives of a 
police power enactment, the law will be sanctioned. 72 By at-
tempting to safeguard preconversion tenants, condominium con-
version regulations directly address problems related to rental 
housing shortages. Accordingly, these regulations may be viewed 
as enacted for the proper public purpose of promoting the gen-
eral welfare of the populace. In reality, the judicial system long 
ago withdrew from intensively investigating claims of substan-
tive due process abuse. A legislative measure is generally ac-
corded a presumption of validity. This approach has been finely 
tuned in the areas of economic and social legislation, 73 including 
legislative pronouncements concerning land use, rent control, 
and housing matters.74 Courts administering the rational rela-
tionship test avoid application of the more constraining strict 
scrutiny test and only reluctantly question the wisdom prompt-
ing such legislative acts. As a result, most courts affix a stamp of 
approval upon those issues considered best reserved for local at-
tention. 711 Regulation of condominium conversion falls within 
1976) (discussing the relationship between the police power and condominium conver-
sion laws). 
72. See infra notes 74-75. 
73. A review of decisions ranging from West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937) to Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955), 
prompted the statement that Williamson "suggests that the Court will not only presume 
that a legislature had a reasonable basis for enacting a particular economic measure, but 
also will hypothesize reasons for the law's enactment if the legislature fails to state ex-
plicitly the reasons behind its judgment." J. Now AK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK 
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446 (2d ed. 1983). 
74. The exercise of the police power is well-settled in the zoning area. See Goldblatt 
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (validating zoning ordinance that deprived 
the owner of the property's beneficial use); Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926) (validating industrial zoning). The rational relationship test has also 
been applied to uphold rent control and eviction regulations. See Edgar A. Levy Leasing 
Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) (upholding a statute that placed limits upon a land-
lord's right to recover possession from holdover tenants during a housing shortage); 
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (validating ordinance that permitted tenants a right· 
of continued occupancy following the expiration of their leases during a housing 
emergency). 
75. P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND UsE CONTROLS § 35:04(1) (1984) ("Because of the 
strong presumption in favor of validity, a zoning ordinance will be struck down only if 
that presumption is overcome by a clear, affirmative showing that the law is arbitrary or 
unreasonable."). 
The California Supreme Court avoided a strict scrutiny level of review when it consid-
ered the validity of an ordinance prohibiting removal of rental units from the housing 
market by conversion or demolition without a municipally issued removal permit. A 
landowner argued that his "fundamental right" to cease doing business as a landlord was 
infringed upon and "that this is constitutionally impermissible, absent a compelling in-
terest .... " The court indicated that even if it accepted the landowner's theory, "we 
would be hard pressed to say that there is no compelling governmental interest in the 
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this established perimeter of a rational relationship test. Few lit-
igants have chosen to raise an argument of violation of substan-
tive due process rights,76 probably because improper legislative 
purpose is virtually impossible to establish in this context. A 
plaintiff-landowner must therefore establish a different basis for 
overturning condominium conversion legislation. 
B. Condominium Conversion Laws as a Constitutionally 
Prohibited "Taking" 
The fifth amendment's prohibition against the uncompen-
sated taking of private property for public use serves as a deter-
rent to the exercise of eminent domain powers for private gain.77 
Case law development of the "takings clause" indicates that an 
overly restrictive regulatory use of the police power will lead to 
complaints of an uncompensated taking. In this context, Justice 
Holmes' "sliding scale" analogy in Pennsylvania Coal Company 
v. Mahon78 set the stage for numerous subsequent claims that an 
preservation of scarce rental housing against destruction." Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 
37 Cal. 3d 97, 103-04, 688 P.2d 894, 899, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 290 (1984), appeal dis-
missed, 470 U.S. 1046 (1985). The California Supreme Court also denied the property 
owner's claim of involuntary servitude because a fair return in investment had been leg-
islatively guaranteed and the owner could "minimize his personal involvement by dele-
gating responsibility for rent collection and maintenance . . . . He remains free under 
the ordinance to withhold rental units from the market as they become vacant. And, he 
remains free to sell his property and invest the proceeds elsewhere." Id. at 103, 688 P.2d 
at 898, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 289. This procedure appears also to be available to unit owners 
under most challenged bylaws or ordinances. 
76. See, e.g., Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, 490 F. Supp. 706 
(D.N.J.) (invalidating an ordinance on a state preemption basis despite an assertion that 
a local regulation violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights by improperly distin-
guishing between forms of ownership), aff'd, 633 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1980); Griffin Dev. Co. 
v. City of Oxnard, 39 Cal. 3d 256, 703 P.2d 339, 217 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985) (en bane) (ad-
judging an alleged substantive due process violation, based upon a community's require-
ment that a special permit be obtained in order to allow condominium conversion of an 
apartment building, as without merit). 
77. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (seriatim opinion); L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-2 (2d ed. 1988). 
The fifth amendment prohibition against the "taking" of private property for public 
use without just compensation applies to the states through the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); 
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). 
78. 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922). The often cited Mahon case is considered to be the 
landmark "takings" decision. Justice Holmes authored the majority opinion that viewed 
the difference between a valid regulation and an impermissible taking as a matter of 
degree. Because the opinion did not offer a precise "taking" formula, each future adjudi-
cation must be addressed on its specific facts. For a detailed discussion of the decision, 
see F. BossELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING lssuE 124-38 (1973); Rose, Mahon 
Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984). 
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excessive use of the police power amounts to an inverse condem-
nation of the property interest. 79 These cases adopt a balancing 
test similar to that expected of a legislative body. Among other 
factors, courts consider the public benefit to be gained versus 
the degree of restriction endured by the landowner subjected to 
the regulation.80 
The taking issue has proven to be an opaque topic for both 
the United States Supreme Court and a multitude of commenta-
tors. 81 The Court readily acknowledges that no precise formula 
Another Mahon-like factual situation was recently presented to the United States Su-
preme Court. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 
(1987), the Court considered the validity of a Pennsylvania statute requiring that a per-
centage (i.e., 50%) of the coal deposit located below certain structures (e.g., residences, 
hospitals) must be left in place to prevent subsidence damage resulting from mining 
activity. Id. at 1237-38. The Keystone Court declared that the Subsidence Act did not 
constitute a taking because it protects and benefits the public, unlike the invalidated 
statute in Mahon that was adjudged to have been enacted only for the benefit of private 
owners of certain surface estates. Id. at 1242-46. 
The Supreme Court also indicated that it was unlikely that a "taking" would result 
from a facial challenge to a land use regulation. The Court emphasized that it would 
require claimants to show that the regulation applied specifically to their property before 
it would consider it a taking. Id. at 1247-51. 
Finally, the Court stressed that a determination of "reasonable use" remaining in 
property required an evaluation of the challenged regulation's impact upon the totality 
of the property interest. Thus Keystone prohibits a landowner from focusing attention 
on one straw in the bundle of property rights and thereby claiming a taking of that 
particular aspect of property interest. As a result, the coal company could not success-
fully claim that the support estate was a separate segment of property for takings law 
purposes. Id. at 1248-51. 
79. Many of the relevant cases are collected in 1 P. NICHOLS, NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 1.42 (rev. 3d ed. 1987). 
80. See, e.g., Western Int'! Hotels v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 387 F. Supp. 
429, 436 (D. Nev. 1975), modified sub. nom. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 558 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1977) (weighing the public gain against the detriment to 
the affected party), modified sub. nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Pope v. City of Atlanta, 418 F. Supp. 665, 668 
(N.D. Ga. 1976) (examining the nature of the conduct barred by the enactment), aff'd, 
575 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978); County of San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 691, 532 P.2d 
139, 143, 119 Cal. Rptr. 491, 495 (1975) (en bane) (expressing concern for the affected 
property owner's expectations). 
81. The confusion engendered by "takings" case law prompted a noted commentator 
to refer to the relevant Supreme Court decisions as a "crazy-quilt pattern." Dunham, 
Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropria-
tion Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 63. 
For a diverse sampling of germane publications, see generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Prob-
lem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165 (1974); Bozung, Judicially Created Zoning with Compensa-
tion: California's Brief Experiment with Inverse Condemnation, 10 ENVTL. L. 67 (1979); 
Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole Equal to the Sum of Its 
Parts, 15 URB. LAW. 447 (1983); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments 
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); 
Sax, supra note 71. 
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has been devised for solution of these cases. 82 The "sliding 
scale" test of Mahon is premised upon Justice Holmes' observa-
tion that if a regulation goes too far it "will be recognized as a 
taking."83 This raises the twofold question of whether a police 
power enactment can ever constitute a taking or whether Justice 
Holmes "used the word 'taking' not in the literal Fifth Amend-
ment sense, but as a metaphor for actions having the same effect 
as a taking by eminent domain."84 If used in the metaphorical 
sense, an overly regulatory land use enactment would violate a 
landowner's due process rights and would not constitute a fifth 
amendment violation.86 
The Supreme Court recently addressed this question di-
rectly. 86 In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles,87 the Court announced that extreme reg-
ulation amounting to a taking violates a landowner's fifth 
amendment rights and entitles the landowner to a damage 
award arising from the self-executing remedial nature88 of the 
fifth amendment's just compensation provision. Although First 
82. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). 
83. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
84. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 
198 (1985). The Williamson decision is discussed infra note 86. 
85. Id. 
86. An earlier Supreme Court decision avoided the damages-compensation issue, de-
spite a strong dissenting opinion urging the award of compensatory payments in those 
instances where inverse condemnation is determined. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636-61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a detailed 
analysis of the decision, see Note, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego: 
Blueprint for a New Terminable Inverse Condemnation?, 8 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 211 
(1982). 
Two later decisions also avoided the damage-compensation issue by ruling that a final, 
reviewable decision had not been presented to the Court. See MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning 
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
The damage-compensation topic has been the subject of significant scholarly commen-
tary. See, e.g., Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A 
Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of 
Property, 19 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 685 (1986); Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" and Just Com-
pensation: The Supreme Court's Search for a Solution Continues, 18 URB. LAW. 635 
(1986); Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction 
Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984). 
87. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). First English concerns the rights of a property owner 
allegedly denied all use of property following enactment of an interim zoning ordinance. 
The ordinance was adopted as a legislative response to a devastating flood that destroyed 
all structures located on the plaintiff's property. Id. at 2381. For purposes of reviewing 
the sufficiency of the complaint, the United States Supreme Court assumed that the 
legislation denied all property use. Id. at 2384. The Court remanded the case for a deter-
mination of the actual facts. Id. at 2389. 
88. Id. at 2386 n.9. In addition to declaring the self-executing remedial nature of the 
fifth amendment, the Court offered the following insight and ruling: 
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English provides a response to a longstanding controversy, the 
opinion fails to offer fresh insight concerning the "takings" test. 
Lower courts must continue to interpret confusing precedent. 
The guiding opinions all too often do not significantly reduce 
the haze that presently shrouds the taking issue. Recent years 
have witnessed only a small number of courtroom confrontations 
where the claim of a fifth amendment taking has been lodged 
against condominium conversion legislation.89 Challenged regu-
lations most often fall into categories requiring that affected 
tenants be notified of the conversion plan, permitted an oppor-
tunity to purchase their unit, or afforded relocation expenses. 00 
Converters in litigation usually do not seek to overturn the 
basic notion of tenant protections, focusing rather upon the 
length of the statutory term within which the tenant may con-
tinue to reside in the apartment.91 Complaints most commonly 
allege a taking because the term is excessive or the ability to 
remove units from the rental housing supply is overly regulated. 
Although the challenged legislation will not explicitly prohibit 
conversion, complainants may claim that regulations effectively 
prohibit conversion, thereby infringing upon the owner's prop-
erty interest (i.e., the owner's right to possess, to exclude others, 
and to alienate). 
Analyzing existing case law on this particular issue provides a 
deeper understanding of the constitutional limits to condomin-
ium conversion regulation. Some of these decisions focus upon a 
balancing or sliding scale approach, though others emphasize the 
recently revived physical occupancy test. 
1. Balancing test- Since the Mahon decision,92 the Su-
preme Court has periodically decided major cases relating the 
taking issue to land use laws. 93 In general, these decisions illus-
trate the ambiguity and confusion surrounding this topic. 
Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government re~ins the 
whole range of options already available-amendment of the regulation, with-
drawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain .... We 
merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked a taking 
of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of 
the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was 
effective. 
Id. at 2389. 
89. See infra notes 103-17, 126-35 and accompanying text. 
90. For a detailed discussion of these legislative provisions, see infra notes 201-267 
and accompanying text. 
91. E.g., infra notes 103-04, 110-13 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra note 78 and accompanying text, 
93. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); First English Evangelical Lu-
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Penn Central Transportation Co. u. New York City,94 a major 
decision relating to landmark preservation, provides the most 
guidance as to what constitutes a taking. In that case, the Court 
reviewed the constitutionality of a local decision prohibiting 
erection of a commercial structure above Grand Central Station. 
Justice Brennan's majority opinion reiterates the difficult nature 
of such cases and provides insight regarding the balancing pro-
cess in "takings" determinations. In addition to ascertaining a 
law's economic impact upon the property and the degree of reg-
ulatory interference with the claimant's investment expecta-
tions,911 a court should weigh the character of the governmental 
activity,96 the public purpose motivating the regulation,97 the 
treatment accorded similar parcels,98 and any counterbalancing 
benefits to the property owner.99 After weighing these considera-
tions, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. 
Agins u. City of TiburonI00 essentially repeated the message of 
Penn Central in upholding the constitutionality of large lot 
zoning.IOI 
These cases summarize the somewhat vague balancing formula 
for "takings" delivered to the lower courts. An aggrieved owner 
of residential rental property, asserting that a condominium con-
theran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (subdivision proposal); Williamson County 
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (cluster zoning); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); San Diego Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (open space zoning); Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (large lot residential zoning); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (historic preservation regulations), reh'g denied, 
439 U.S. 883 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (gravel min-
ing ban). Four of these decisions are discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 94-
102, 119-25, 136-41. The relevance of MacDonald, Williamson, and San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co. is discussed supra note 86. The Keystone decision is discussed supra note 
78. 
94. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
95. Id. at 124-25. 
96. Id. at 124. 
97. Id. at 125, 129. 
98. Id. at 133 n.29. 
99. Id. at 137. In Penn Central, the owners were entitled to legislatively-prescribed 
developmental air rights that were transferable to permit development on at least eight 
nearby parcels. Id. 
100. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In Agins, the owners of a five acre parcel of unimproved 
land initiated suit against the defendant municipality after the city rezoned the parcel so 
that no more than five residences could be built on the land. A unanimous Court deter-
mined that the ordinance did not prevent the best use of the land nor extinguish any 
fundamental attribute of ownership. Id. at 258-59. · 
101. Agins achieved considerable notoriety due to the Court's avoidance of a central 
issue-whether a claimant may recover damages for inverse condemnation if the land use 
regulation equals a taking. See supra note 86. 
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version statute violates the fifth amendment taking clause, must 
construct an effective argument based upon these guidelines. Be-
cause few judicial decisions have determined the constitutional-
ity of condominium conversion laws, such a balancing test has 
rarely been adopted. Indeed, most of the pertinent state and 
federal case law using this standard arises from challenges to the 
regulatory enactments of several Massachusetts municipalities. 
A review of the litigation under these local laws is worthwhile 
because they are representative of the most stringent regulations 
in the field of condominium conversion. 102 
In Grace v. Town of Brookline, 103 a property owner challenged 
a municipal conversion bylaw. The bylaw basically provided 
tenants in rent controlled apartments six months to move out if 
the apartment building was converted into condominiums. The 
six month stay could be extended an additional six months if a 
local rent control board determined that a hardship existed.10" 
After eliminating several of the property owner's claims, 1011 the 
Massachusetts court considered the takings argument. The 
plaintiffs contended that a taking results because the "Six Plus 
Six Amendment" "transfer[s] the right to possess from the 
owner to the tenant and compel[s] the condominium owner to 
become a landlord."106 The court ruled that attempting to mini-
mize adverse effects upon tenants during a housing shortage 
through a regulatory term of possession constituted a reasonable 
exercise of the police power.107 Conceding that the owner's right 
of possession had been legislatively transferred to the tenant, 
the court likened the transfer to the reallocation of rights gener-
ally resulting from rent and eviction controls. 108 The "period of 
delay" was not confiscatory because the owner was "eventually" 
entitled to possess the unit. During the interim period, the 
102. Certain rental housing units in the Town of Brookline and the City of Cam-
bridge are subject to condominium conversion regulations. See supra note 56. The sub-
ject units and the various tenant/rental housing supply protections are enumerated in 
the local bylaws and ordinances. Brookline, Mass., Bylaws art. 38 (Dec. 16, 1975); Brook-
line, Mass., Bylaws art. 39 (June 16, 1980); Cambridge, Mass., Ordinance No. 966 (June 
29, 1981); Cambridge, Mass., Ordinance No. 980 (Apr. 26, 1982). 
103. 379 Mass. 43, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979). 
104. Id. at 46 & n.8, 399 N.E.2d at 1040 & n.8. The board had adopted a regulation 
governing procedures for determining "hardship." Brookline, Mass., Bylaws art. 38, 
§ 9(a)(8) (Aug. 29, 1980). 
105. The rejected claims included assertions that the bylaws conflicted with state 
laws and denied equal protection. Grace, 379 Mass. at 49-55, 57-59, 399 N.E.2d at 1042-
45, 1046-47. 
106. Id. at 55, 399 N.E.2d at 1045. 
107. Id. at 56, 399 N.E.2d at 1045-46. 
108. Id. at 56, 399 N.E.2d at 1045. 
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owner was statutorily entitled to a "fair net operating in-
come."109 This relatively brief judicial analysis signaled a will-
ingness to sanction a legislatively prescribed one year maximum 
term for protected tenants. 
The "Ban Amendment" was subsequently enacted and consti-
tuted a more extreme form of regulation in this same Massachu-
setts municipality. Simply stated, the Ban Amendment entitled 
a preconversion tenant occupying a rent-controlled unit to a life 
tenancy unless the tenant provided the landlord with a basis for 
eviction. 110 In Loeterman v. Town of Brookline, m the plaintiffs 
purchased a tenant-occupied condominium unit after the Ban 
Amendment's effective date. 112 The purchasers claimed that the 
amendment effectively redistributed a major property ownership 
right (i.e. the right to possess) because an owner may be perpet-
ually prohibited from occupying the unit. Focusing mainly upon 
the Penn Central guidelines, the court found that the Ban 
Amendment served a valid public purpose by slowing the loss of 
rental housing units while the town searched for long-range solu-
tions. 113 Although recognizing that the right to exclude others is 
incident to property ownership, the court did not view the 
Brookline law as interfering with the owner's investment expec-
tations because, at the time of condominium purchase, the liti-
109. Id. at 57, 399 N.E.2d at 1046. 
110. The "Ban Amendment" replaced the "Six Plus Six Amendment" and indicates 
that the landlord may remove the unit from the rental market if 
the landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith for use and occupancy of 
himself or his children, parents, brother, sister, father-in-law, mother-in-law, 
son-in-law, or daughter-in-law, except that no action shall be brought under this 
paragraph to recover possession of a condominium . . . unit from a tenant who 
has occupied the unit continuously since a time prior to the recording of the first 
unit deed for that unit following the recording of any master deed for the condo-
minium .... 
Brookline, Mass., Bylaws art. 38, § 9(a)(8) (Aug. 29, 1980). 
Permissible bases for eviction of a particular tenant include: failure to pay rent; com-
mitting or permitting a nuisance to exist in the rental unit; conviction of using the unit 
for any illegal purpose; refusal to allow the landlord reasonable access to the unit for the 
purpose of inspection, repair, or other specified legitimate reason. Id. § 9(a)(l)-(6). 
111. 524 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Mass. 1981), vacated as moot, 709 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 906 (1982). The First Circuit vacated the district court on 
jurisdictional grounds and did not reach the merits. 709 F.2d at 117. 
112. The court emphasized that the opinion would not consider the constitutional 
ramifications of applying the Ban Amendment to a unit purchaser who acquired title 
prior to the legislation's effective date. Loeterman, 524 F. Supp. at 1326. This precise 
issue had been presented to the same federal judge on an earlier date, and the court 
denied preliminary injunctive relief against the Town. See Chan v. Town of Brookline, 
484 F. Supp. 1283 (D. Mass. 1980). Chan was dismissed for mootness when the tenant 
occupying the Chan's unit voluntarily vacated the apartment. See Loeterman, 524 F. 
Supp. at 1326. 
113. Loeterman, 524 F. Supp. at 1329. 
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gants were aware of the regulatory restriction on their ability to 
possess the unit.114 The court noted that the Ban Amendment 
did not deny the owners an economically viable use of the prop-
erty.116 Further, the legislation was not permanent-the town 
could revoke it at any time.116 Applying Loeterman, unit pur-
chasers may never have the right to possess condominium units 
given an appropriate justification for the enactment.117 
The Loeterman decision illustrates how the balancing test 
tilts in favor of the enacting legislative body. Under this ap-
proach to the "takings" issue, an individual purchasing a tenant-
occupied condominium unit may have to wait until the tenant's 
voluntary departure or death before occupying the property. 
This result follows from a determination that the public benefit 
arising from the legislation outweighs the hardship experienced 
by the unit owner. 
2. Physical occupancy test- In addition to acts of express 
appropriation, a governmental unit's unauthorized and perma-
nent occupation of private property will always be deemed a 
114. Id. 
115. The economic benefit is premised upon the rent control bylaws mandating a 
"fair net operating income" to the unit owners. Id. 
116. In reference to the possibility of revocation, the Loeterman court noted that 
"[w]hether or not such an eventuality comes to pass, the permanence of the prohibition 
... does not render the amendment unconstitutional as applied to the [plaintiffs]." Id. 
at 1330. The town's failure to establish a definite date for expiration of the law does not 
prove fatal because the regulation is implicitly coextensive with the emergency rental 
housing shortage. Id.; cf. Newell v. Rent Bd. of Peabody, 378 Mass. 443, 448-49, 392 
N.E.2d 837, 840 (1979) (same reasoning applied to rent control regulations). 
117. In Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981), the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the constitutionality of a "Ban Amend-
ment" condominium conversion ordinance as applied to all owners of those Cambridge 
condominiums subject to local rent control laws. Similar to the Loeterman decision, the 
Flynn court validated the ordinance as relating to condominium owners purchasing their 
units after the conversion regulation's effective date. Id. at 159-60, 418 N.E.2d at 339. 
The court then adopted the rationale of the United States Supreme Court's Penn Cen-
tral decision to uphold the application of the challenged ordinance to the unit owners 
acquiring title prior to the adoption of the law. Flynn holds that the ordinance did not 
interfere with the preregulation buyers' primary expectation concerning property use. 
Because certain units were already serving as rental housing on the effective date of the 
ordinance, the court determined that the local law merely perpetuated this use and 
thereby reaffirmed a unit purchaser's primary expectation concerning property use. Id. 
at 160-61, 418 N.E.2d at 339-40. 
The Flynn decision's rationale seems flawed to the extent that it depends upon a "pri-
mary expectation" justification. Although the subject condominium units comprised a 
portion of the city's rental housing stock at the time of purchase, it seems a quantum 
leap to .conclude that this was a unit buyer's primary investment-backed expectation 
relative to use. A unit owner may have purchased in reliance upon an earlier ordinance 
offering a unit owner the legal right to remove a tenant from a condominium following 
expiration of a prescribed possessory term. 
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taking. Numerous examples abound.118 In a sense, the physical 
occupancy test offers an attractive method for deciding the le-
gality of certain governmental action. But application of this de-
ceptively simplistic test engenders a host of legal complexities. 
The United States Supreme Court's most recent and explicit 
restatement of the test appears in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 119 where the Court considered a "tak-
ings" challenge in light of a statutory enactment aimed toward 
assisting residential tenants seeking access to cable television. 
The statute provided that a landlord could not "interfere with 
the installation of cable television facilities upon his prop-
erty. "120 The statute also limited the landlord's compensation 
for the placement of cable equipment upon the apartment build-
ing to an amount determined by a state regulatory agency.121 
The Court invalidated the statute, casting aside the balancing 
test and adopting the concept of a permanent physical occupa-
tion standard. The former test would have applied if the place-
ment of cables and related equipment were viewed as temporary 
in nature.122 Despite criticism that the distinction between per-
manent physical occupation and a temporary physical invasion 
may be difficult to apply,123 the Court reasoned that, under state 
law, as long as the building housed tenants, a cable company's 
occupancy of the property amounted to a permanent intru-
118. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (finding government's impo-
sition of a navigational servitude requiring public access to a pond results in an actual 
physical invasion); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (holding govern-
ment's seizure and direction of operation of a coal mine amounts to a physical invasion); 
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding frequent flights of government 
airplanes over private property constitutes a physical invasion); Western Union Tel. Co. 
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904) (finding construction and operation of tele-
graph lines over a railroad's right of way constitutes an invasion amounting to a compen-
sable taking). 
119. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
120. Id. at 423. 
121. The New York State Commission on Cable Television had ruled that a "one-
time $1 payment is the normal fee to which a landlord is entitled." Id. The state legisla-
ture had attempted to "'prohibit gouging and arbitrary action' by 'landlords [who] in 
many instances have imposed extremely onerous fees and conditions on cable access to 
their buildings.'" Id. at 444 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 1'.?.1, 141, 4'..!:3 N.E.2d 320, 328, 440 
N.Y.S.2d 843, 851 (1981)). 
122. As the Court noted, "The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical 
occupation distinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude. . . . 
[T]emporary limitations are subject to a more complex balancing process .... " Id. at 
435 n.12. 
123. Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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sion.12" The Court indicated that the rights to possess, control 
the use, and dispose of property had been trampled upon by the 
statutorily authorized permanent cable placement. Yet the 
Court sought to dispel any belief that the Loretto decision cast a 
shadow upon future governmental regulation of landlord-tenant 
relationships. The majority opinion asserted that only a third 
party's (i.e. the cable company's) permanent physical occupation 
of private property under the guise of regulation would amount 
to a per se taking. The Court admitted that the balancing test 
would ordinarily be applied with respect to housing-related en-
actments not involving permanent physical occupation. m 
What is the impact of Loretto upon condominium conversion 
regulations? Existing case law indicates that a balancing test will 
generally uphold such regulations. But is a different result likely 
to obtain under the physical occupancy test? Several more re-
cent judicial decisions suggest that the physical occupancy test 
would yield the same result as the balancing test. 
The Loeterman case126 was subsequently reconsidered in light 
of Loretto. On reconsideration, the district court did not view 
the protected tenant as analogous to the fixed structure in 
Loretto, because the tenant occupied the apartment prior to the 
owner's purchase of the building and the plaintiff landowner 
also was aware of the Ban Amendment upon purchase of the 
property.127 Realizing that the tenant's legal right to possess the 
unit on an extremely prolonged basis might strike the sensibili-
ties of some as a "permanent physical occupation," the court ob-
served that the occupation was not permanent due to the munic-
124. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, also argued that the Court's definition of perma-
nence did not coincide with a true concept of permanence because the regulation only 
applies as long as the property is used for rental housing. Id. ("[T]he Court presumably 
describes a government intrusion that lasts forever. But as the Court itself concedes, [the 
statute] does not require appellant to permit cable installation forever, but only '[s)o 
long as the property remains residential and [the cable] company wishes to retain the 
installation.' ... This is far from 'permanent.' "). 
125. After citing prior decisions requiring landowner compliance with fire regulations, 
rent control, and housing emergency laws, the Court opined that "[s)o long as these regu-
lations do not require the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his 
building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally 
applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity." Id. at 440. 
126. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text. The Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit remanded the case for findings and rulings concerning the relationship of 
Loretto to Loeterman. Loeterman v. Town of Brookline, No. 81-1857, slip op. (1st Cir. 
July 28, 1982). 
127. Loeterman v. Town of Brookline, No. 80-670-MC, slip op. at 1-2 (D. Mass. Dec. 
1, 1982). 
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ipality's ability to repeal the amendment, the tenant's ability to 
vacate, or the eventual demise of the tenant. 128 
Troy, Ltd. v. Renna, 129 a decision considering the constitution-
ality of a New Jersey statute offering certain preconversion 
tenants an extended term of occupancy, adopted a similar argu-
ment.130 The Third Circuit distinguished the Loretto require-
ment of permanent occupation by noting that most tenants of-
fered long-term protection under the New Jersey statute were of 
advanced age. The court asserted that within this tenant group 
the regulatory enactment could not be viewed as authorizing 
permanent occupation. Like Loeterman, the court argued that 
"the tenancies may terminate by virtue of changing income 
levels or principal residences, and tenants may be evicted on any 
of thirteen grounds."131 The Troy Ltd. court also distinguished 
Loretto as involving a taking for a "public use." Because the 
Troy Ltd. court concluded that the Tenancy Act did not involve 
a "public use" of private property, a consideration of the taking 
argument was inappropriate.132 
The success of a plaintiff's takings claim hinges upon proving 
that a regulation establishes a tenant's permanent physical occu-
pancy. It is difficult to prove such occupancy in most condomin-
ium conversion situations. Reference to a summary affirmance 
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Fresh Pond 
128. Id. at 2. The same federal district judge evidenced a contrary sentiment when 
ruling against the issuance of injunctive relief in Chan v. Town of Brookline, 484 F. 
Supp. 1283 (D. Mass. 1980). In Chan, the court acknowledged that the town's Ban 
Amendment might "constitute [a] redistribution of [property]" such that "it amounts to 
a taking without compensation." Id. at 1286. The court further acknowledged its aware-
ness that an occupying tenant might voluntarily vacate, but argued that "this would 
restore the use to the plaintiffs by reason of an eventuality extraneous to the Amend-
ment itself." Id. 
129. 727 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1984); see Comment, Protecting the Elderly from Dis-
placement by Condominium Conversions: Troy, Ltd. v. Renna, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & 
CoNTEMP. L. 275 (1986). 
130. In July 1981, the New Jersey legislature enacted the Senior Citizens and Dis-
abled Protected Tenancy Act. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.22-.39 (West 1987). This 
Act provides to some elderly and disabled persons the right to remain as tenants in a 
converted unit for up to 40 years beyond any period authorized by other state statutes. 
131. Troy, Ltd., 727 F.2d at 301. 
132. The Troy Ltd. court stated that the New Jersey Tenancy Act "did not put the 
plaintiffs' property to public use, but rather regulated its use .... " Id. at 302. The 
court also noted that "[t]he installation at issue in Loretto is the exemplar of a public 
use. The challenged New York law authorized an occupation of private property by a 
common carrier .... " Id. at 301. 
The Troy Ltd. court also ruled that the subject New Jersey legislation did not uncon-
stitutionally impair contract rights between private parties. The court found the contract 
clause not 'to be a serious obstacle to state economic and social laws as affecting private 
contracts. Id. at 295 (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)). 
For a more detailed discussion of the contract clause, see L. TRIBE, supra note 77, § 9-9. 
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Shopping Center, Inc. v. Rent Control Board133 supports this 
conclusion. In Fresh Pond, the plaintiff alleged that a Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts ordinance authorized a residential tenant 
of the shopping center to remain indefinitely within a rental 
unit. The lower court ruled that no taking occurred and the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed. 134 A single dis-
senter to the dismissal of the appeal by the United States Su-
preme Court likened the tenant's presence to the permanency of 
the cable's placement in Loretto, 1311 but the Court declined to 
embrace this analogy. 
133. 388 Mass. 1051, 446 N.E.2d 1060 (affirming the Superior Court by an equally 
divided court), appeal dismissed sub nom. Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Calla-
han, 464 U.S. 875 (1983) (dismissing for lack of substantial federal question). 
134. In Fresh Pond, a shopping center purchased a nearby apartment building with 
the intent of demolishing the building and utilizing the site as a parking area. Only one 
of the building's six units was occupied. But a local ordinance required the landowner to 
receive permission from the Cambridge Rent Control Board in order to remove the 
apartments from the rental market. When the Board denied the removal application, the 
landowner alleged that a 'taking' had occurred. An equally divided Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court summarily affirmed a lower court holding that the restrictions were 
constitutional. Fresh Pond, 388 Mass. at 1051, 446 N.E.2d at 1060. 
In order to determine the precise legal issues that the United States Supreme Court 
had summarily dismissed in Fresh Pond, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 303 (3d Cir. 1984), examined the jurisdictional state-
ment filed in Fresh Pond: 
[I]t appears that virtually the same taking issue was presented to the Court as is 
presented here. That question is whether the creation by state law of statutory 
tenancies after expiration of the tenants' leases amounts to a taking for which 
the state must provide compensation. The summary disposition of the appeal in 
Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. binds this court. 
For a discussion of Troy Ltd., see supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. 
135. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, observed that "[a)s in [Loretto,) the power to end 
or terminate the physical invasion is under the control of a private party." Fresh Pond, 
464 U.S. at 877 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He emphasized that there is no "foreseeable 
end to the emergency" housing conditions in Cambridge_. Id. at 878. The local legislative 
assurance of a "fair net operating income to the landlord does not change the result 
.... [W]e have recognized that property ownership carries with it a bundle of rights, 
including the right to 'possess, use and dispose of it.'" Id. The power under the ordi-
nance to exclude a tenant from a rental unit is impermissible, because "[n]othing in the 
rent control provisions require the Board to compensate appellant for the loss of control 
over the use of its property." Id. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, impressed by the Fresh Pond dissenting 
argument, recently likened the presence of the occupying tenant to an unpermitted 
physical occupation of private property, therefore constituting a "taking." The Ninth 
Circuit panel determined that a Santa Barbara, California ordinance requiring mobile 
home park operators to offer leases of perpetual duration may also amount to a "taking" 
as defined by Loretto and the dissent in Fresh Pond. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 
F.2d 198, 202-07 (9th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (reversing trial court's dismissal of case for 
failure to state an actionable claim and remanding to district court for further fact-find-
ing), republished as corrected, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 56 
U.S.L.W. 3134 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1987) (No. 87-220). 
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The Court's most recent pronouncement concerning Loretto 
appears in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 136 In Nol-
lan, the Court reviewed an administrative decision whereby the 
legal right to build a larger house on the subject site was condi-
tioned upon the property owners agreeing to grant a public ac-
cess way over a portion of their beachfront property. The major-
ity opinion cites the Loretto decision as authority that an 
outright "appropriation of a public easement across a land-
owner's premises" would constitute a permanent physical occu-
pation and taking.137 But the Court then questioned whether re-
quiring the conveyance as a condition for issuing the building 
permit would alter the outcome.138 The Court ultimately held 
that there was a taking because the Coastal Commission's rea-
sons139 for requiring the conveyance lacked the necessary nexus 
to the nature of the easement rights that were demanded. 140 
It seems unlikely that the Nollan opinion will significantly af-
fect the previously outlined judicial approach to determining the 
validity of condominium conversion regulations. The Loretto de-
cision stresses that its holding is not intended to upset the gov-
ernment's long-standing power to adjust landlord-tenant af-
fairs.1•1 Moreover, the Fresh Pond opinion seems to signal the 
Court's unwillingness to find a taking when a governmental reg-
ulation permits the tenant's long-term possession of an apart-
ment. It would be surprising if the Nollan decision is interpreted 
as a means to cast aside established principles and provide a 
new avenue for successful challenges to conversion laws. 
These decisions support the conclusion that even severely re-
strictive condominium conversion regulations will probably 
withstand constitutional attack. A state legislature, therefore, 
need not worry about avoiding constitutional pitfalls and should 
136. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
137. Id. at 3145-46. 
138. Id. at 3146. 
139. "The Commission argues that among these permissible purposes are protecting 
the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological 
barrier' to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion 
on the public beaches." Id. at 3147. 
140. The majority opinion notes: 
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on 
the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any ob-
stacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to 
understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public 
beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by 
construction of the Nollans' new house. 
Id. at 3149. 
• 141. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982). 
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fashion a condominium conversion law that directs appropriate 
attention to the needs of all concerned parties. The following 
proposed Model Act attempts to satisfy these criteria. 
IV. A MODEL ACT GOVERNING CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION 
SECTION A. STATE PREEMPTION 
It is the intent of the legislature to preempt the field 
of regulating the conversion of rental housing units to 
the condominium form of ownership. It is hereby de-
clared that every county ordinance and every munici-
pal ordinance or bylaw adopted prior to [insert effective 
date of statute] and relating to condominium conversion 
shall stand abrogated and unenforceable. No county, 
municipality, or consolid~ted county-municipal govern-
ment shall have the power to adopt any ordinance re-
lating to this subject on or after such effective date.142 
SECTION B. PREAMBLE 
The legislature hereby finds and declares that the 
conversion of residential real estate from rental status 
to condominium ownership is an effective method of 
preserving, stabilizing, and improving neighborhoods 
and the supply of sound housing accommodations; that 
it is sound public policy to encourage such conversions 
while, at the same time, protecting tenants who do not 
desire or who are unable to purchase the units in 
which they reside from being coerced into vacating 
such units by reason of deterioration of services or 
otherwise or into purchasing such units under the 
threat of imminent eviction. The position of 
nonpurchasing tenants is worsened by a serious public 
emergency characterized by an acute shortage of 
housing accommodations. The position of nonpurchas-
ing tenants who are sixty-two years of age or older is 
particularly precarious by reason of the limited finan-
142. The proposed provision is based upon the terminology of a Florida statute pre-
empting local regulation of obscene literature. FLA. STAT. § 847.013(4) (1985). 
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cial resources of many such persons and the physical 
limitations of many such persons. Preventive action by 
the legislature in restricting rents and evictions during 
the process of conversion from rental to condominium 
status is imperative to assure that such conversions 
will not result in unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive 
rents and rental agreements affecting nonpurchasing 
tenants especially those who are sixty-two years of 
age or older. The necessity in the public interest for 
the provisions hereinafter enacted is hereby declared 
as a matter of legislative determination.143 
SECTION C. DEFINITIONS 
(1) "Housing Accommodation" means any building, 
structure or part thereof or land appurtenant thereto, 
or any other real or personal property rented or of-
fered for rent for living or dwelling purposes, together 
with all services connected with the use or occupancy 
of such property, but not including the following: 
(a) housing accommodations in any hospital, convent, 
monastery, asylum, public institution, college, 
dormitory, and nursing or rest home for the aged; 
(b) housing accommodations in hotels, motels, inns, 
tourist homes, and rooming and boarding houses 
that are occupied by transient guests for a period 
of fewer than fourteen consecutive days.1"" 
(2) "Condominium Conversion Eviction" means: 
(a) An eviction, without just cause, of a tenant who 
was a resident of the housing accommodation at 
the time the Master Deed for the property 
wherein said housing accommodation is located 
was recorded pursuant to the provisions of [in-
sert the state condominium statute]. Such eviction 
does not include that of a tenant who is notified 
of the Master Deed recording and whose initial 
tenancy began after the recording of the Master 
Deed; 
143. The proposed Model Act's preamble or legislative finding is drawn from parallel 
terminology in a relevant New York statute. Act approved July 20, 1982, ch. 555, § 1, 
1982 N.Y. Laws 1474, 1474. 
144. Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 3(ii), (iv), 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 928. 
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0>) An eviction of a tenant by a landlord where any 
presumption of condominium conversion eviction 
applies and the landlord has failed to overcome 
such presumption.1411 
(3) "Presumption of Condominium Conversion Evic-
tion" arises if, within one hundred and eighty (180) 
days after a landlord terminates without cause a ten-
ancy interest located in a housing accommodation, the 
landlord duly records a Master Deed for the building 
in which the housing accommodation is located and the 
then current tenant, if any, has received notice of the 
conversion, or a third party has received an offer of 
sale.146 
(4) "Landlord" means the individual who holds title 
in any manner to any housing accommodation that is 
subject to this statute, including, but not limited to, a 
partnership, corporation, or trust. m 
(5) "Tenant" means a person entitled to occupy a 
rental housing accommodation and who has signed a 
rental agreement or agreed to the terms of an oral 
lease. For purposes of this Act, a tenant may be an as-
signee of an interest under a written rental agreement 
145. This subsection derives from Boston's conversion control regulations. Boston, 
Mass., Emergency Regulation 11: Condominium/Cooperative Notice and Eviction Regu-
lation § 3(0)(2)-(3) (July 9, 1987). Regulation 11 was adopted "to implement the provi-
sions and protections under" the city's condominium conversion ordinance. Id. § 1; see 
BOSTON. MASS., 10 ORDINANCES ch. 3 (1984). 
The subsection's reference to tenancies commencing after recording of the Master 
Deed is drawn from the New Jersey Condominium Act. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:18-61.l(l)(l) 
(West 1987). 
146. This provision is partially borrowed from the Boston conversion regulations. 
The regulations establish additional presumptions of condominium conversion evictions 
when either (1) another tenant in the building receives a notice of conversion or (2) the 
landlord offers to sell condominium units to investors. Boston, Mass., Eniergency Regu-
lation 11: Condominium/Cooperative Notice and Eviction Regulation § 8(A)(l)(d)-(e) 
(July 9, 1987). The landlord may rebut the presumption of a condominium conversion 
eviction by establishing "just cause" for removal of the tenant or by demonstrating that 
the tenant voluntarily vacated the rental unit within the one hundred eighty (180) day 
period preceding the recording of the Master Deed. See infra note 157 and accompany-
ing text. 
147. This subsection derives from Boston, Mass., Emergency Regulation 11: Condo-
minium/Cooperative Notice and Eviction Regulation § 3(N) (July 9, 1987). The proposed 
subsection omits the following sentence: "For purposes of this regulation, the rights and 
duties of the landlord hereunder shall be the obligation of anyone who manages, con-
trols, or customarily accepts rent on behalf of the landlord." Id. This extension of the 
term seems likely to engender confusion when establishing responsibilities and liabilities 
of the landlord. 
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or an oral lease. A subtenant is not included within the 
definition. 
(6) "Elderly Tenant" means a tenant who is sixty-two 
years of age or older on the date that notice of conver-
sion is received, with a current annual income of less 
than $40,000148 or the surviving spouse of such a ten-
ant if the tenant should die after the tenant receives 
notice of conversion and the surviving spouse is sixty-
two years of age or older when the tenant dies, and the 
spouse's tenancy is subject to the terms of the de-
ceased tenant's protected tenancy;149 provided that the 
building or structure has been the principal residence 
of the elderly tenant and the spouse for at least one 
year immediately preceding the receipt of notice of the 
conversion. 
(7) "Handicapped Tenant" means a tenant with a 
current annual income of less than $40,000, who has 
an impairment that results from anatomical, physio-
logical, or psychological conditions, other than addic-
tion to alcohol, gambling, or any controlled substance, 
that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and that are ex-
pected to be permanent and prevent the tenant from 
engaging in any substantial gainful employment on the 
date that notice of conversion is received; provided that 
the building or structure has been the principal resi-
dence of the handicapped tenant for at least one year 
immediately preceding the receipt of notice of 
conversion.160 
(8) "Low Income Tenant" means a tenant with a cur-
rent annual household income for the twelve months 
immediately preceding the receipt of notice of conver-
sion that is less than seventy percent of the median in-
come for the area set forth in regulations promulgated 
from time to time by the Dep·artment of Housing and 
148. The District of Columbia also offers eviction protection to elderly tenants with 
an annual household income of less than $40,000, unless the landlord can establish an 
independent basis of eviction. D.C. CooE ANN. § 45-1616(a) (1986); see also infra note 
282. 
149. The spousal protection provision of the Model Act is based upon the relevant 
Michigan statute. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.204b(9) (West Supp. 1987). 
150. This detailed provision is derived from the General Business Laws of New York 
State. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(l)(g) (McKinney 1984). The Model Act's definition 
should be compared with the somewhat vague definition enacted by the Maryland legis-
lature. See infra note 278. 
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Urban Development pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-
1437r1111 provided that the building or structure has 
been the principal residence of the low income tenant 
for at least one year immediately preceding the receipt 
of notice of conversion. 
(9) "Master Deed" means any instruments and 
amendments that create a condominium according to 
the provisions of [insert the state condominium 
statute ).1112 
(10) "Tenant's Annual Income" means the total in-
come from all sources during the last full calendar 
year for the tenant who resides in the housing accom-
modation at the time that notice of conversion is 
received.163 
SECTION D. NOTICE OF CONDOMINIUM 
CONVERSION 
(1) If a landlord who converts a rental housing ac-
commodation to a condominium, offers to transfer title 
to the rental housing accommodation, or acts without 
just cause and commences any action or performs any 
act or deed to recover possession of it from a tenant 
who resided in the housing accommodation when the 
Master Deed was duly recorded, then the landlord 
must comply with the following provisions: 
(a) The landlord who converts a rental housing ac-
commodation shall give notice of conversion to 
each tenant. The notice shall provide that each 
151. Although a Massachusetts statute serves as a guideline for this provision, the 
Model Act has deleted a section of the Massachusetts law. The Massachusetts statute 
views a "low or moderate income tenant" as "a person or a group of persons residing in 
the same housing accommodation so long as the total income for all such tenants . . . is 
less than eighty percent of the median income for the area." Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, 
ch. 527, § 3, 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 928 (emphasis added). The Model Act is not designed 
to benefit apartment residents who do not qualify as tenants. See infra notes 230-33 and 
accompanying text. 
152. It is a state condominium act, and not a state condominium conversion act, that 
will provide information concerning the necessary components of a Master Deed. The 
purpose of the Master Deed is to create a condominium. The document will contain a 
listing of unit boundary limitations, a schedule of common area percentage ownership 
interests, and other related topics. See CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 
3.02; see also infra note 190. 
153. The Model Act provision is a modified version of the relevant New Jersey stat-
ute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.24(c) (West 1987). 
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tenant has 365 days from the date of receipt of 
such notice before the tenant is required to 
vacate. 
(b) At the same time a landlord gives notice of con-
version to a tenant, the landlord must deliver a 
complete copy of the Model Act to the tenant. 
(c) Whenever a landlord who converts a rental hous-
ing accommodation is required to give notice as 
provided for in this section, the period of notice 
shall not be less than the remaining ·term of any 
rental agreement that governs the use and occu-
pancy of said housing accommodation or 365 days 
from the date the tenant of such housing accom-
modation is given said notice of intent, whichever 
is greater. 
(d) If a tenant is elderly, handicapped, or low-in-
come, then the term 730 days shall be inserted in 
place of the term 365 days as it appears in this 
section. 
(2) Leases that expire during the notice period are 
automatically extended to the end of the notice period. 
The landlord may not alter any term of the rental 
agreement,1M except the annual rent. Any increase in 
the annual rent shall not exceed the percentage in-
crease in the Consumer Price Index during the calen-
dar year immediately preceding the date of notice of 
such rent increase. 11111 
(3) A rental agreement subject to a period of exten-
sion shall not be assigned, devised, subleased, or trans-
ferred by a tenant. m 
(4) No landlord shall bring any action seeking a con-
dominium conversion eviction until the expiration of 
the notice period specified in this Act, except that a 
tenant may be required to vacate by reason of nonpay-
ment of rent, commission of waste, or conduct that dis-
154. For example, the Uniform Condominium Act forbids any change of the rental 
terms during the extended period. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 4-112(a) (1980). 
155. This formula for determining a permissible rent increase is based upon the City 
of Boston's conversion ordinance. Boston, Mass., Emergency Regulation 11: Condomin-
ium/Cooperative Notice and Eviction Regulation § 4(F)(2) (July 9, 1987). 
156. Accord MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.204b(8) (West Supp. 1987). 
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turbs other tenants' peaceful enjoyment of the 
premises. 1117 
(5) If a notice of conversion specifies a date by which 
a housing accommodation must be vacated, and other-
wise complies with the provisions of [insert the state 
summary process statute], the notice provided under 
this section also constitutes a notice to vacate specified 
by that statute.1118 
(6) Any notice or other materials required under this 
Act to be served upon a tenant by a landlord shall be 
served either personally upon the tenant or by leaving 
the notice or materials at the tenant's housing accom-
modation with some member of the tenant's family 
above the age of 14 years, or by certified mail; if the 
certified letter is not claimed, notice shall be sent by 
regular mail. 
Any notice or other materials required under this 
Act to be served upon a landlord by a tenant shall be 
served either personally upon the landlord, or by leav-
ing the notice or materials at the landlord's address 
with an employee of the landlord or a member of the 
landlord's family above the age of 14 years, or by cer-
tified mail; if the certified letter is not claimed, notice 
shall be sent by regular mail.1119 
(7) Whenever a landlord who converts a rental hous-
ing accommodation is required to give notice as pro-
vided for in this section, the landlord shall additionally 
provide the tenant with written notice of the landlord's 
address for purposes of tenant service of notice or 
other materials upon the landlord. 
SECTION E. TENANT RIGHT TO PURCHASE 
(1) Any tenant entitled to notice of conversion shall 
have an exclusive right to contract for the purchase of 
the housing accommodation that the tenant occupies on 
157. E.g., Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 4(a)(iii), 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 929; 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3410(a) (Purdon Supp. 1987); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT§ 4-112(a) 
(1980). 
158. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1604-lll(d) (Supp. 1986); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT 
§ 4-112(d) (1980). 
159. Section 0(6) of the Model Act is generally based upon a relevant New Jersey 
statutory provision. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.2 (West 1987). 
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the date of receiving notice of conversion, provided that 
the unit is to be retained without substantial alteration 
in the physical layout. The tenant inay purchase the 
unit on the terms and conditions as set forth in a 
purchase and sale agreement duly executed by the 
landlord and accompanying the notice of conversion. 
Such tenant may exercise a right to contract to 
purchase such housing accommodation by executing 
and returning the purchase and sale agreement to the 
landlord prior to the expiration of thirty (30) days af-
ter receiving the purchase and sale agreement. The 
landlord must permit such tenant a period of one hun-
dred and five (105) days following tenant's receipt of 
the proposed purchase and sale agreement in which to 
purchase the housing accommodation. 
(2) If there is more than one tenant leasing a housing 
accommodation, then each such tenant shall be entitled 
to contract for the purchase of a proportionate share 
of the housing accommodation and of a proportionate 
share of any other tenant leasing that housing accom-
modation who elects not to purchase. In no case shall 
this provision be deemed to authorize the purchase of 
less than the entire interest in the unit to be 
conveyed.160 
(3) The landlord's offer of sale to the tenant shall not 
require the tenant to pay a deposit exceeding five per-
cent (5%) of the contract sale price. The landlord's of-
fer of sale shall also inform the tenant that the tenant 
may include in the contract of sale a provision that lim-
its damages for tenant's breach of contract to the 
amount of the deposit. Award of the deposit amount to 
the landlord will serve as the landlord's sole remedy 
for tenant's breach of contract, at law or equity. The 
landlord's offer of sale shall also inform the tenant that 
the tenant may include in the contract of sale a financ-
ing contingency provision. 
The tenant's right to purchase is subject to terms and 
conditions that are substantially the same as or more 
favorable than those that the landlord offers to the 
160. This provision establishing the relationship between co-tenants and their 
purchase right of first refusal is drawn from a municipal conversion ordinance. See LAKE-
WOOD, Omo, BUILDING CODE § 1327.0G(i)(l)-(2) (1979). The provision is commented upon 
in Note, Conversion Condominium Development: An Issue of Tenants' Rights, 30 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 99, 125 (1981). 
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public for the period of seventy-five (75) days follow-
ing the expiration of the tenant's thirty (30) day exclu-
sive period for contracting to purchase the unit. 
(4) A tenant shall not assign, transfer, devise, or be-
queath the exclusive right to contract for the purchase 
of the housing accommodation that the tenant occupies 
on the date of receiving notice of conversion. Nor shall 
a tenant assign, transfer, devise, or bequeath any 
rights arising under an executed contract of sale for 
such housing accommodation. 
(5) A tenant's exclusive right to contract for the 
purchase of the tenant's housing accommodation termi-
nates upon: 
(a) written waiver of the right by the tenant, if the 
waiver is executed subsequent to the date upon 
which the tenant received the notice of conver-
sion and the exclusive right to contract; or 
(b) the expiration of the tenant's thirty (30) day pe-
riod within which the tenant may contract to 
purchase the unit. 
In the event of written waiver under subsection 
(5)(a), a landlord shall not oft'er the housing accommo-
dation for sale to the public prior to the expiration of 
thirty (30) days from the date upon which the tenant 
received notice of conversion and received the exclu-
sive right to contract for the purchase of the tenant's 
housing accommodation.161 
SECTION F. TENANT RELOCATION 
COMPENSATION 
( 1) Any tenant who receives or is entitled to receive 
a condominium conversion eviction notice or who en-
ters into a rental agreement subsequent to the land-
lord's recording of a Master Deed without being noti-
fied of the intended conversion, and who chooses not to 
exercise the right to purchase pursuant to section E, or 
does not purchase another dwelling unit or units in the 
same building, shall upon vacating the housing accom-
modation within the appropriate notice period or any 
161. Paragraphs 5(a) and (b) are based upon the Florida condominium conversion 
statute. FLA. STAT. § 718.612(4) (1985). 
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extension thereof, receive from the landlord who con-
verts the rental housing accommodation, a relocation 
expense allowance of $750 per housing 
accommodation.162 
(2) No tenant shall be eligible for such relocation ex-
pense allowance unless all rent due and payable for 
the unit under the rental agreement or extension of 
such agreement, if any, has been paid by the tenant 
prior to the date on which the housing accommodation 
is vacated. The landlord who converts the rental hous-
ing accommodation is not required to pay a relocation 
expense allowance to a tenant against whom the land-
lord has obtained a judgment for possession of the 
unit.16a 
(3) The landlord who converts the rental housing ac-
commodation must deposit the relocation expense al-
lowance with the [insert name of designate municipal 
board or department] (a) within three (3) days of com-
plete vacation of the housing accommodation by the 
tenant(s), or (b) no later than three (3) days prior to 
the conveyance of a tenant-occupied housing accommo-
dation to a grantee other than the tenant, whichever 
occurs first. The landlord must pay by certified, cash-
ier's, or bank check payable to the order of the eligible 
tenant(s ), and the landlord who converts the rental 
housing accommodation must simultaneously furnish 
the [insert name of designated municipal board or de-
partment] with the names of any tenant of the housing 
accommodation entitled to receipt of a relocation ex-
pense allowance. The expense allowance is payable to 
the tenant within six (6) days following the complete 
vacation of the housing accommodation by the ten-
ant(s) and upon presentation of a statement signed by 
the landlord, or other acceptable proof, indicating that 
the housing accommodation is vacant. 
( 4) Where a rental unit is occupied by two or more 
co-tenants, any one of whom is a qualified tenant, each 
co-tenant of the unit shall be paid a pro rata share of 
162. The latter portion of Paragraph (1) is based upon the relevant City of Boston 
ordinance. Boston, Mass., Emergency Regulation 11: Condominium/Cooperative Notice 
and Eviction Regulation § 4(F)(4)(a)(i) (July 9, 1987). 
163. This subsection is based upon statutory provisions in the District of Columbia 
and Massachusetts. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1621(d)(2) (1986); Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, 
ch. 527, § 4(c), 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 930-31. 
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the relocation expense allowance in accordance with 
the provisions of section F( 3 ). In no event shall the 
landlord who converts the rental housing accommoda-
tion be liable to pay a greater relocation expense al-
lowance than that payable if the housing accommoda-
tion were occupied by one qualifying tenant.16" 
(5) The relocation expense allowance shall be in ad-
dition to any damage, deposit, or other compensation 
or refund to which the tenant is otherwise entitled. 
(6) If the tenant(s) fail to vacate the housing accom-
modation in accordance with the provisions of this Act, 
then the relocation expense allowance shall be re-
turned to the landlord who deposited the allowance. 
SECTION G. "SPECIAL TENANT" PROVISIONS 
(1) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the notice 
of conversion, any tenant who satisfies the require-
ments of an elderly, handicapped, or low income tenant 
(hereinafter special tenant) shall so notify the landlord 
and shall provide the landlord with written proof of 
eligibility .1611 
(2) The protected tenancy status shall terminate im-
mediately upon determination that: 
(a) the housing accommodation is no longer the prin-
cipal residence of the special tenant; 
(b) the elderly or handicapped tenant's annual in-
come exceeds $40,000; or 
(c) the low income tenant's annual income exceeds 
· the limits prescribed by section C(8) above. 
(3) Upon the termination of the protected tenancy 
status, the special tenant may be removed from the 
housing accommodation pursuant to [insert citation to 
state summary process statute], except that all notice 
and other times set forth therein shall be calculated 
164. This subsection is drawn from the condominium conversion ordinance of Lake-
wood, Ohio. Lakewood, Ohio, Ordinance 73-80 (Nov. 3, 1980) (supplementing Chapter 
1327 of the Building Code of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Lakewood.) The 
ordinance provision is reprinted in Note, supra note 160, at 128 n.142 (1981). 
165. This provision derives from PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3410(0 (Purdon Supp. 
1987); accord CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-23c(d) (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. § 
515A.4-110(a) (1982). It is essential that the proposed Model Act provide that a land-
lord's notice of condominium conversion to a special tenant must contain an explicit 
statement of the additional benefits offered to these tenants. 
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and extend from the date of the expiration or termina-
tion of any other period of tenancy authorized by this 
Act or the date of the expiration of the last lease en-
tered into with the special tenant, whichever shall be 
later.166 
SECTION H. TENANT STATUTORY RIGHTS 
(ANTI-WAIVER PROVISION) 
(1) Any provision in a rental agreement in which a 
tenant agrees to terminate or not renew a tenancy for 
other than good cause, or in which the tenant waives 
any other rights under this Act shall be deemed 
against public policy and unenforceable.167 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in 
any course of conduct, including but not limited to in-
terruption or discontinuance of essential services, 
which substantially interferes with or disturbs the 
comfort of any tenant's use or occupancy of the ten-
ant's housing accommodation or related facilities. 
(3) The district attorney or attorney general may ap-
ply to a court of competent jurisdiction for an order re-
straining conduct prohibited in this section. Nothing 
contained in this section shall preclude the tenant from 
applying on his or her own behalf for similar relief.168 
SECTION I. OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY, FILING, 
AND RECORDING REQUIREMENTS 
(1) The state legislature shall designate county or 
municipal offices, departments, or agencies (hereinaf-
ter designated oversight authority) to be responsible 
for carrying out the provisions of this section. The 
state legislature shall promulgate such policies, rules, 
and regulations as will further the provisions of this 
section. 
166. The bases for termination of protected tenancy status are drawn from the rele-
vant New Jersey statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.32 (West 1987). 
167. The prohibition against a rental agreement containing a tenant waiver of rights 
is based upon New Jersey law. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.4 (West 1987). 
168. The anti-harassment provision is drawn from the relevant New York statute. 
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(4) (McKinney 1984). 
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(2) Once a landlord who converts a rental housing 
accommodation has served a tenant with a notice of 
condominium conversion, a notice of terminating ten-
ancy, a copy ·of the Model Act, and a binding purchase 
and sale agreement, all as provided for in this Act, the 
landlord shall file with the designated oversight au-
thority an affidavit of service that shall include among 
other relevant information: 
(a) the name and address of the tenant; 
(b) the time and date of service to the tenant; 
(c) the method of service upon the tenant as set forth 
in section D(6) of this Act; 
(d) the name and current address of any tenant for-
merly residing in the rental housing accommoda-
tion and vacating the rental housing accommoda-
tion within a period of one hundred eighty (180) 
days prior to the recording of the Master Deed. 
The landlord must indicate the reason or circum-
stances surrounding the tenant's removal from 
the housing accommodation; and 
(e) a statement signed under the pains and penalties 
of perjury that the landlord has complied with 
the requirements of this Act pertaining to the 
service upon the tenant of all materials required 
under this Act.169 
(3) The landlord who converts a rental housing ac-
commodation shall file, along with the affidavit of ser-
vice, a copy of all materials served to the tenant within 
seven (7) days of service upon the tenant. 
(4) Within three (3) days following receipt of the 
landlord's affidavit of service, the designated oversight 
authority shall notify the tenant of the filing. 
(5) The landlord who converts a rental housing ac-
commodation shall file, with the designated oversight 
authority, any available written statement of the ten-
ant indicating that the tenant's purchase rights under 
section E(l) are freely released. Otherwise, the land-
lord shall file a written statement signed by the land-
lord under the pains and penalties of perjury stating 
that the time period provided for under this Act for 
169. Section 1(2) of the Model Act is based upon a parallel provision in the City of 
Boston's conversion regulations. Boston, Mass., Emergency Regulation 11: Condomin-
ium/Cooperative Notice and Eviction Regulation § 5(G) (July 9, 1987). 
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tenant execution of the purchase and sale agreement 
expired without the tenant's execution of the 
agreement. 
(6) The landlord who converts a rental housing ac-
commodation shall deliver to a prospective purchaser 
of the housing accommodation (other than the tenant) 
a copy of all written materials filed pursuant to this 
section. These materials shall be delivered at the time 
the landlord and prospective unit purchaser execute a 
purchase and sale agreement. 
(7) A landlord who converts a rental housing accom-
modation shall pay the designated oversight authority 
a certification fee. The fee shall be applied to the cost 
of administering this section of the Act. The amount of 
the fee as well as collection and disbursement proce-
dures shall be established by rules and regulations as 
provided for in subparagraph (1) of this section. 
(8) If following a facial review as to the sufficiency of 
the materials filed by the landlord, the designated 
oversight authority determines that a landlord com-
plied with the requirements of this section, the desig-
nated oversight authority shall issue the landlord a 
certificate of conversion compliance. Failure to comply 
with the requirements of this section will result in the 
denial of a certificate of conversion compliance. 
(9) The Registry of Deeds for the county within 
which the condominium is located shall not accept for 
recording purposes the initial deed to a converted con-
dominium unit unless a certificate of conversion com-
pliance is also presented for recording. Any subse-
quent deed conveying title or an interest in a 
converted condominium unit shall refer to the location 
in the Registry of Deeds of the previously recorded 
certificate of conversion compliance. 
(10) If a landlord who converts a rental housing ac-
commodation in violation of section E conveys the 
housing accommodation to a purchaser for value who 
has no knowledge of the violation, recording both the 
deed conveying the housing accommodation and the 
certificate of conversion approval extinguishes any 
right a tenant may have under section E to purchase 
that housing accommodation, but does not affect the 
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right of a tenant to recover damages from the landlord 
who converts the rental housing accommodation.170 
SECTION J. PENALTIES AND ENFORCEMENT 
(1) Failure to comply substantially with the provi-
sions of this Act may result in the initiation of criminal 
actions against any violator pursuant to Subparagraph 
(2) of this section. Other state and federal laws may 
also provide penalties for violations of the Act. 
(2) Upon a criminal conviction for violation of the 
provisions of this Act, the off ender shall be fined not 
less than $5000 or double the amount of gain from the 
transaction, whichever is larger, but not more than 
$50,000; or such person may be imprisoned for no more 
than six months; or both for each offense.111 
(3) A landlord who converts a rental housing accom-
modation and violates any provision of this Act shall 
be liable to any tenant injured by such violation in an 
amount equal to double the actual damages suffered or 
$5000, whichever is greater. A tenant who prevails in 
an action brought under this paragraph shall recover 
court costs and reasonable attorney fees.172 
(4) Prior to the conveyance of the converted condo-
minium unit to a prospective purchaser, a tenant alleg-
ing a landlord's violation of the terms of this Act may 
bring an action for equitable relief, including specific 
performance. Following a conveyance as provided for 
in section 1(10) of this Act, the tenant's sole remedy for 
such a violation shall be damages. In addition to any 
damages otherwise recoverable by law, the tenant 
shall be entitled to an amount equal to the difference 
between the price last offered in writing to the tenant 
pursuant to this Act and the price at which the unit 
was sold to a third party purchaser, plus court costs 
and reasonable attorney fees. 173 If the landlord who 
converts the rental unit failed to offer a purchase op-
portunity to the tenant, then the court may establish a 
170. See infra note 313. 
171. See infra note 313. 
172. See infra note 313 and accompanying text. 
173. Section J(4) of the Model Act is based upon a relevant Florida statute. FLA. 
STAT. § 718.612(2) (1985). 
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reasonable selling price for purposes of determining 
the amount of the tenant's damage recovery. 
(5) If a court determines that a unit purchaser had 
actual knowledge of the landlord's violation of the Act, 
then the court may set aside the conveyance and order 
the condominium unit conveyed to the tenant at the 
price last offered in writing to the tenant. If the land-
lord who converts the rental unit failed to offer a 
purchase opportunity to the tenant, the court may es-
tablish the terms and conditions, including unit price, 
for the conveyance to the tenant. The tenant shall re-
cover court costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
V. COMMENTARY ON THE MODEL ACT 
State preemptive legislation, controlling the conversion of 
rental housing to condominium ownership form, should ideally 
respond to issues and policy concerns prompted by the conver-
sion process. The following commentary on the proposed Model 
Act isolates and discusses various statutory provisions designed 
to address these concerns. 
The Model Act is more comprehensive than the existing Uni-
form Condominium Act that briefly highlights certain tenant-re-
lated issues arising from the conversion of apartment build-
ings. 174 In discussing the various sections of the Model Act, 
emphasis is directed toward the interrelationships among the 
provisions. 
A. Form of Enactment 
When a state legislature enacts laws regulating the conversion 
of rental housing units, the statute should be readily available to 
all interested parties. For this reason, most legislative bodies 
have incorporated conversion laws within their state's existing 
condominium statute.1711 A legislature should avoid the unfortu-
nate practice of segregating the conversion legislation as a sepa-
174. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 4-112 (1980). The Uniform Condominium Act dis-
cusses the tenant's right to a 120-day notice period prior to vacating and the opportunity 
to exercise a purchase right of first refusal regarding the converted rental unit. Id. § 4-
112 (a)-(b); see supra note 9. 
175. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-282 (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 
para. 330 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1604-111 (Supp. 1986); 
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rate act and not including it within the general laws of the 
state.176 The conversion act should also specifically refer to and 
cross-reference the earlier enacted statutes. For example, a state 
legislature may have previously established limitations upon a 
landlord's right of access to an occupied rental unit for purposes 
of showing the unit to a prospective purchaser. Although such 
regulation may be located within a state's landlord-tenant stat-
utes, it should also be mentioned within a conversion act. 177 The 
Model Act provides for such cross-references at appropriate 
places, though applications in each state will differ. Because this 
Article has argued that state legislation should govern condo-
minium conversion and should preempt the possibility of local 
controls, 178 the Model Act expressly states its preemptive effect 
in section A. 
B. Preamble or Statement of Purpose 
Few of the current condominium conversion statutes contain a 
preamble or introductory section. Although the police power 
serves as a legal basis for conversion control legislation, 179 a state 
should list the various factors prompting legislative action. Oth-
erwise, in the event of a challenge to the validity of the legisla-
tion, the underlying foundation for enactment must be gleaned 
from the less accessible legislative history of the statute. 
Some legislatures may purposely avoid an explicit statement 
of the factual findings (e.g., a shortage of available rental hous-
ing) that resulted in adoption of the conversion regulations, due 
to a fear that the legislation may be easily overturned if it is 
Mo. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-102.1 (Supp. 1987); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 4-112 
(1980). 
176. E.g., Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, 1983 Mass. Acts 926. This Act enables 
Massachusetts communities to regulate the conversion of residential property to the con-
dominium form of ownership. The Commonwealth's statute, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 183A 
(1986), providing for the creation of condominiums, regrettably omits reference to Mas-
sachusetts' conversion act. 
177. E.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 186, § 15B(l)(a) (1986) ("No lease relating to residential 
real property shall contain a provision that a lessor may, except to ... show the same to 
a prospective ... purchaser, ... enter the premises before the termination date of such 
lease."). The Massachusetts Legislature failed to insert a parallel provision within the 
Commonwealth's condominium conversion statute. See supra note 176. 
The Virginia legislature refers to the landlord's right of access in certain landlord and 
tenant statutes. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.18 (1986). It is also mentioned within the 
Commonwealth's condominium conversion statute. Id. § 55-79.94(6)(b) (Supp. 1987). 
178. See supra notes 42-66 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
688 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:3 
demonstrated at a future time that the conditions serving as jus-
tification for the act have been alleviated or removed. Another 
reason for failing to detail legislative findings or motivations 
may involve a belief that a definite date must then be estab-
lished for termination of the legislation or at least a date speci-
fied for reviewing the basic factual premises. 180 These concerns 
diminish when compared with the benefits derived by the inser-
tion of a preamble such as that set forth in section B. A pream-
ble offers an attractive opportunity for a legislative statement 
announcing, at a minimum, that due consideration of identifi-
able affected interests preceded enactment of the conversion 
control laws.181 
C. Definitions and Subject Property 
Most conversion statutes avoid a lengthy definitional section. 
This omission has produced confusion and uncertainty on how 
to interpret the statutory provisions. The legal heart of the 
Model Act rests within the statute's tenant protection package 
and enforcement mechanisms. The success of these measures de-
pends upon all parties to the conversion process being fully ap-
prised of personal rights and responsibilities arising under the 
legislation. A concise and unambiguous definitional section such 
as provided in section C aids in removing misunderstandings. 
It is essential to define the roles of the various parties appear-
ing within the condominium conversion scenario. These include 
the creator of the condominium project and the landlord. Al-
though in many instances these labels will apply to the same 
individual, the distinction should be created by definition for 
cases where they are different.182 The term "tenant" should also 
be plainly defined. Clarity regarding this definition will elimi-
nate difficulty in determining the individuals entitled to the pro-
180. It is unnecessary for a legislature to establish a termination date for legislation 
so long as the law is reasonably related to the proper goal for which it was enacted. If the 
objective that motivated enactment has been satisfied or removed, the law must termi-
nate. Newell v. Rent Bd., 378 Mass. 443, 448-49, 392 N.E.2d 837, 840 (1979) (validation 
of rent control regulations); Judson, supra note 4, at 211. 
181. A preamble may indicate that a severe shortage of rental housing is further ex-
acerbated by condominium conversions and that lower income and elderly tenants are 
most adversely affected by this process. Furthermore, a preamble may state that tenants 
should be informed of the benefits and disadvantages of conversion, and that the regula-
tions are intended to bolster the public health, safety, and welfare. E.g., D.C. CooE ANN. 
§ 45-1601 (1986); BosTON, MASS., 10 ORDINANCES ch. 3 (Preamble) (1983). 
182. See infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text. 
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tections of the Act. "Elderly tenant," "handicapped tenant," and 
"low or moderate income tenant" are additional classifications 
indicating policy preferences. "Condominium conversion evic-
tion" is another phrase worthy of definition given the inevitable 
controversy concerning the reasons for a tenant's eviction. If an 
eviction relates to the condominium conversion process, then the 
tenant protection provisions of the act should be triggered. De-
fining those actions constituting a "condominium conversion 
eviction" may result in less confrontation between landlord and 
tenant. 183 
The state legislature must also determine the nature of the 
property subject to the condominium conversion act. The legis-
lature should tightly draft a provision noting the specific type of 
"housing accommodation" falling within the ambit of the legisla-
tion. Certain forms of housing such as dormitories, motels, or 
boarding houses are excluded by the Model Act. Short-term or 
transient occupants of such structures should not be offered ex-
tended terms of possession, purchase options, and other benefits 
of a state condominium conversion statute. More importantly, a 
legislature must decide whether all rental housing, regardless of 
the number of units within the structure, is to be covered by the 
state act. Some states exclude housing accommodations in build-
ings containing fewer than four housing accommodations184 or 
buildings having ten or less than ten dwelling units. 1811 These 
states offer no legislative explanation for this limitation; how-
ever, a lobbying effort by owners of smaller apartment buildings 
probably produced this result. A defense of such a limitation 
may be that structures containing a smaller number of rental 
units are often owner-occupied. Within this setting, the frequent 
interaction between owner and tenants may provide a climate 
more conducive to a conversion-minded owner who willingly and 
spontaneously offers tenant protections.186 When considering the 
exemption of smaller structures, however, a legislature should 
183. See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text. 
184. Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 3, 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 928 ("any build-
ing, . . . but not including ... buildings containing fewer than four housing accommo-
dations"); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:18-61.8 (West 1987); Id. § 55:13A-3(k) (West Supp. 1987). 
185. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 356-C:2(1)(a) (1984). 
186. A similar perception may result in a court upholding an exemption of owner• 
occupied two- and three-family dwellings from local rent control regulations. Marshal 
House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd., 358 Mass. 686, 695, 266 N.E.2d 876, 883 (1971) ("Land-
lords who live with only a few tenants and have to get along with them on a day to day 
basis might well have been thought to be less likely to raise rents to an exorbitant 
level."); accord AMN, Inc. v. South Brunswick Township Rent Leveling Bd., 93 N.J. 518, 
526-27, 461 A.2d 1138, 1142 (1983); Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 572-74, 
342 A.2d 529, 531-32 (App. Div. 1975). 
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realize that almost sixty percent of all rental units are located in 
structures containing fewer than five units. 187 Section C(l) of the 
Model Act adopts the position that the term "housing accommo-
dation" should not set adrift, without legislatively prescribed 
protections, those tenants residing in smaller buildings. But it 
excludes structures housing members of religious orders, stu-
dents, or patients. Such individuals, given the special nature of 
their housing, should not be entitled to the benefits of a condo-
minium conversion act. 
D. Achieving Compliance with the Objectives of the Model 
Act 
The Model Act rectifies a number of deficiencies in existing 
statutes. In one of their most glaring omissions, extant laws fail 
to set forth a means of determining which residential tenants 
fall under the protection of the conversion statute. If this issue 
is resolved, the rights, duties, and liabilities flowing from the leg-
islative provisions may be more easily allocated to a particular 
condominium conversion project. Many current conversion con-
trol statutes afford strong protections to tenants confronted by a 
conversion plan. But the regulations engender confusion con-
cerning when and to whom the protections must be offered. 
Some owners of rental housing, lured by the potential profits 
of selling condominiums, may attempt by various methods to 
circumvent the requirements of state legislation. Although many 
legislatures have considered some of the issues arising in the 
condominium conversion setting, they generally fail to address 
effectively the problem of such "conversion act avoidance."188 
This is particularly pervasive if owners believe that the regula-
tory requirements are too onerous. Faced with these perceived 
burdens, 189 property owners may desire to terminate lessees' 
187. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
188. The lack of legislative attention concerning this issue extends to the Uniform 
Condominium Act. Although the Act defines a "conversion building" as "a building that 
at any time before creation of the condominium was occupied wholly or partially by 
persons other than purchasers and persons who occupy with the consent of purchasers," 
the protections of the Act seem only to focus upon those tenants occupying a converted 
unit when the declarant "intends to offer units" (i.e. after recording of the declaration 
creating the condominium). UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT §§ 1-103(8), 4-112(a) (1980) (em-
phasis added). Thus the Act does not deal with the developer's removal of tenants, prior 
to recording of the declaration, in order to avoid the Act's requirements. 
189. The most extreme form of regulation appears to be a legislatively prescribed life 
tenancy, intended to benefit the occupant of a converted rental unit. Such a regulation 
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rental agreements, require tenants to vacate their units, and 
then convert the building. These approaches avoid the spirit of 
the various state acts; the Model Act devises legal barriers to 
this type of activity. , 
A condominium is usually created by the recording of a Decla-
ration or a Master Deed.190 Merely stipulating that those tenants 
residing in rental units upon the date of document recording 
should be protected by the Act will not achieve the desired ob-
jective of thwarting avoidance of the Act. For instance, under 
such statutory terminology an owner could remove all tenants 
from their units in accordance with the terms of their rental 
agreements and then record the Master Deed. Perhaps fearful of 
this tactic, New Hampshire has required that: 
No conversion subject to this chapter shall be effected 
until: 
(a) The owner . . . has mailed to each tenant . . . a 
notice of intent to convert no earlier than 120 days 
before the date of filing an application for registra-
tion [under the state's condominium act].191 
Although this approach seems to achieve the objective of ten-
ant notification, the owner apparently can still avoid the effect 
of this provision by terminating tenancies and removing all 
tenants no later than 120 days before creating the condominium. 
To combat such tactics, Massachusetts requires that an owner 
must comply with the condominium conversion act if "a build-
ing . . . has been used in whole or in part for residential pur-
poses within one year prior to the recording of a master deed 
creating a condominium."192 Simply stated, this statute requires 
a building to be vacant for a minimum of one year prior to creat-
ing the condominium. This approach may also be criticized, be-
cause the law does not create a clear penalty if the owner vio-
lates the one-year rule. It also does not offer direction 
concerning the possible statutory rights of those tenants ordered 
to vacate their units during this one-year period. In one respect, 
the Massachusetts statute fosters a compelling need for compli-
was challenged and upheld in Loeterman v. Town of Brookline. For a discussion of this 
case, see supra notes 111-16, 126-28 and accompanying text. 
190. A declaration "means any instruments, however denominated, that create a con-
dominium, and any amendments to those instruments." UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-
103(10) (1980). The term Master Deed is often used analogously. CONDOMINIUM LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 4, §§ 3.02 n.9, 7.02(1). 
191. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-C:3(l)(a) (1984). 
192. Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 4(a), 1983 Mass. Act 926, 929. 
692 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:3 
ance because, except for property requiring significant rehabili-
tation, most apartment building owners cannot shoulder the loss 
of rental income associated with the requirement of leaving a 
building vacant for one year. But the significant legislative omis-
sions concerning an owner's liability for a statutory violation and 
the rights, if any, of aggrieved tenants offset this positive aspect 
of the statute. 
A comprehensive definition of a "condominium conversion 
eviction" such as given in section C(2) of the Model Act provides 
one method by which a legislature may better achieve owner 
compliance. By carefully defining this term, the statutory pro-
tections inuring to the benefit of tenants would more likely be-
come a reality. 
Section C(2)(a) of the Model Act expresses a legislative desire 
that a tenant, residing in a housing accommodation at the time 
that the Master Deed is recorded, should benefit from the stat-
ute if the landlord terminates the tenancy without cause. Most 
states have chosen to indicate that, in the context of a condo-
minium conversion, a tenant may still be evicted for just 
cause.193 
Note that under the Model Act neither a voluntary termina-
tion of tenancy by a tenant or the landlord's mere act of record-
ing a Master Deed trigger application of the statute. A landlord 
should be entitled to record a Master Deed and be permitted to 
refrain from immediately offering the statute's protective bene-
fits to a tenant residing in a unit on the date of recording. Stat-
utes often require that when a landlord notifies a tenant of an 
impending conversion, the tenant should have the opportunity 
to purchase the unit in which the tenant resides.194 A landlord 
should not to be forced to notify tenants and to sell units merely 
upon the recording of a Master Deed. The creation of a condo-
minium on paper does not always signify a landlord's interest in 
immediately selling units. For example, co-owners of an apart-
193. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.204(2)(c) (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. § 
515A.4-110(d) (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 448.4-112(7) (Vernon 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-
36.1-4.12(0 (1984). 
Expansion of this term by use of examples would be helpful to landlords. One well-
drafted statute indicates that a "for cause" termination would permit a landlord to evict 
a tenant and deny the protections of the conversion act if the tenant fails to pay rent due 
under the rental agreement, is so disruptive as to significantly infringe upon the quiet 
enjoyment of other residents, or continues after written notice to cease to violate sub-
stantially any of the landlord's rules and regulations governing the premises. N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:18-61.l (West 1987); see also supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
194. The "right of first refusal" is reviewed infra notes 234-54 and accompanying 
text. 
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ment building may desire a condominium format in order to 
separate ownership of units for purposes of obtaining cash 
through refinancing. Also, a Master Deed may be recorded for 
the purpose of achieving protective status from any subse-
quently enacted conversion controls.1911 
A desirable consequence of Section C(2)(a) of the Model Act 
is that a tenancy created after the recording of the Master Deed 
is not subject to the statute if the incoming tenant is notified of 
the. conversion prior to entering into a rental agreement. Here 
the incoming tenant cannot object to a future relocation due to 
an unexpected condominium conversion; however, such a ten-
ancy should only be terminated in accordance with the lease 
terms and any relevant landlord-tenant regulations. But the 
Model Act as presented in section C(2)(a) fails to consider the 
consequences of a landlord's attempt to remove tenants prior to 
the recording of a Master Deed. 
Section C(2)(b) of the Model Act anticipates a landlord-initi-
ated action to evacuate a rental unit in contemplation of con-
verting the building. Listing a series of scenarios that would 
raise a presumption of condominium conversion eviction defends 
effectively against such improper tactics. To allow a fair degree 
of landlord flexibility and simultaneously guard against a land-
lord abusing the process, a legal presumption anticipates that 
there will be instances when the landlord is justified in evicting 
a tenant and can thereby rebut the presumption.196 
Section C(3) establishes such a presumption. The legislatively 
crafted presumption of condominium conversion eviction is de-
sirable for several reasons. First, the sole act of recording a 
Master Deed should not serve as a point of reference for auto-
matic application of the act.197 Under the Model Act, a landlord 
may terminate a tenancy in accordance with rental agreement 
terms,198 then record a Master peed within 180 days of termi-
nating the tenancy and avoid liability for violating the Act. But 
if a landlord follows these steps and, within the original 180 day 
span, either (a) subsequently rents the unit and provides the 
195. These and additional underlying motivations are presented in Graff, Minnesota 
Uniform Condominium Act: The View of Developers' Counsel, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
71, 82 (1984). 
196. See supra notes 157, 193 and accompanying text. 
197. See Model Act § D(l), supra Part IV; supra notes 145-46 and accompanying 
text; infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text. 
198. It should be reiterated that the landlord is not terminating the tenancy due to a 
tenant's violation of the rental agreement. To the contrary, a landlord is either awaiting 
the natural expiration of the tenant's term (i.e., an estate for years), or terminating the 
tenancy with proper notice (i.e., a periodic tenancy or a tenancy at will). 
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new tenant with notice of conversion or (b) offers the unit for 
sale to a third party, then the original tenant is deemed ousted 
due to a condominium conversion eviction. Although a landlord 
choosing option (a) may technically be complying with the Act 
by giving notice to a tenant residing in the unit when the Master 
Deed was recorded, the Model Act establishes that the rights of 
the ousted tenant have been infringed and that this injury must 
be compensated. 199 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that tightly-drafted 
and unambiguous provisions will aid in assuring that a landlord 
adheres to the conversion act's mandates. But it is fanciful to 
imagine that well-defined terminology will resolve all difficulties. 
The definitional section of a statute must be complemented by a 
strong oversight and enforcement mechanism.200 
E. Rights, Duties, and Liabilities Under the Act 
The Model Act attempts to blend substantive and procedural 
requirements to achieve an equitable resolution of the tenant-
related issues associated with the conversion of a multifamily 
rental structure. The label "tenant protection package" is an ap-
propriate sobriquet for this aspect of the Model Act. 
1. Notice: Landlord and tenant- Too many state statutes 
plunge quickly into a recitation of protections afforded to ten-
ants affected by condominium conversions without identifying 
clearly the individuals upon whom the task of notification falls. 
Moreover, uncertainty surrounds the selection of those residen-
tial occupants entitled to the benefits of the statute. Protection 
means little if it is unclear who is to be protected. 
Existing conversion laws also often define terms such as 
owner,201 developer,202 and tenant,203 in a confusing and overlap-
199. See infra notes 312-13 and accompanying text. 
200. See infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of oversight and 
enforcement under the Model Act. 
201. In the District of Columbia, an owner is "an individual, corporation, association, 
joint venture, business entity and its respective agents, who hold title to the housing 
accommodations unit." D.C. CooE ANN.§ 45-1603(14) (1986). An "owner" in the District 
of Columbia could be the developer converting the apartment building or a market pur-
chaser of a condominium unit. Although the Massachusetts conversion statute consist-
ently refers to an "owner," the term is undefined. Apparently, the Massachusetts legisla-
ture views an "owner" for purposes of the conversion statute as the converter of the 
structure and not a market purchaser. Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 4(b), 1983 
Mass. Acts 926, 930 ("[a]ny owner of residential property who converts such property") 
(emphasis added). 
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ping manner. A legislature should fashion the exact nature of a 
desired tenant benefit and then fully define those terms that are 
necessary to assure that the benefit is transmitted. Because ten-
ant notification is imperative, the responsibility for giving notice 
should be assigned to the person initiating the conversion pro-
ject. The owner of rental property creates a condominium by re-
cording a Master Deed. The owner or declarant also serves as 
the landlord of the rental property. Established definitions of a 
declarant may be overly broad for purposes of the conversion 
acts.20" Therefore, the landlord, as defined by section C(4) of the 
Model Act, seems the proper party to fulfill the duty of notifying 
tenants. 
Because all tenant notification requirements under the Model 
Act must be fulfilled before a third party receives title to the 
condominium, the Model Act does not seek to impose such a 
duty, or accompanying liability for violation thereof, upon a 
third party. Accordingly, the burden of complying with statutory 
tenant notification requirements falls upon the landlord who 
converts rental property to a condominium form of ownership. If 
a landlord or converter attempts to convey either the entire 
structure or an individual unit to a third party grantee, the 
transaction may be invalidated if the tenant notification require-
ments have not been fulfilled. 20~ By premising a valid unit title 
202. Maryland defines a "developer" as a "person who subjects his property to the 
condominium regime established by this title." Mo. REAL PROP. CooE ANN. § 11-l0l(g) 
(Supp. 1987). But if a "developer" sells the apartment building to a purchaser, is the 
purchaser also a "developer"? The Illinois statute defines the term as a person "who 
offers units legally or equitably owned by him for sale in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness, including any successor or successors to such developers' entire interest in the 
property other than the purchaser of an individual unit." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 
302(q) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). 
203. In the District of Columbia, a "tenant" means a "tenant, subtenant, lessee, sub-
lessee, or other person entitled to the possession, occupancy or benefits of a rental unit 
within a housing accommodation." D.C. CooE ANN.§ 45-1603(17) (1986). Many conver-
sion statutes repeatedly use the undefined term "tenant." The definitional section of the 
Uniform Condominium Act also reflects this omission. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 1-103 
(1980). 
204. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 1-103(9) (1980) (providing an alternative, part (iii), 
for interested jurisdictions): 
"Declarant" means any person or group of persons acting in concert who (i) as 
part. of a common promotional plan, offers to dispose of his or its interest in a 
unit not previously disposed of, [or] (ii) reserves or succeeds to any special de-
clarant right[, or (iii) applies for registration of a condominium under Article 5.] 
Parts (i) and (iii) are relevant for determining the individual(s) responsible for offering 
tenant protections under a conversion statute, but Part (ii) does not directly concern 
tenants' rights issues. 
205. See infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text; see also Model Act § J, supra 
Part IV. 
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transfer upon prior satisfaction of the Model Act's tenant-re-
lated requirements, a true third party grantee or devisee will be 
free from notification requirements. But in the event that a ten-
ant is still residing in a converted condominium unit after the 
title has validly transferred to a third party, the new owner will 
be deemed a landlord for other purposes of the Model Act206 or 
relevant statutes and ordinances. 
Section C(5) defines a tenant for purposes of the Model Act. 
An intentionally narrow classification that may not include all 
individuals occupying a rental unit, this definition applies to 
those occupants obligated to the landlord under a written or oral 
rental agreement. This restricted definition is preferable because 
only those individuals with a significant possessory interest 
should receive notification of conversion, an opportunity to 
purchase their unit, and the other benefits conferred under the 
Model Act. 201 
2. Notice: Method of notification- The section D(6) re-
quirement of tenant notification accomplishes the dual functions 
of alerting a tenant to the conversion effort and setting forth a 
tenant's rights and duties under the statute. State legislation 
generally provides for notification consisting of the intrinsically 
unreliable practice of hand delivery to a unit or notice by 
mail.208 A more refined process, such as found in New Jersey,209 
would provide greater likelihood that the notice would actually 
be received. Section D(6) of the Model Act adopts the New 
Jersey legislative format that sets forth several acceptable meth-
ods, including: personal service, leaving a copy at the tenant's 
206. See infra text accompanying notes 305-08, 314. 
207. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of notifica-
tion of subtenants. See also Belmont East Co. v. Abrams, 123 Misc. 2d 404, 408, 473 
N.Y.S.2d 676, 679 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (determining that a "tenant" for purposes of a cooper-
ative conversion plan "is the person named in the lease and who pays the rent, even 
when a spouse or other member of the family is in residence"). 
208. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1604-lll(a) (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 
448.4-112(1) (Vernon 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.12(a) (1984); Act approved Nov. 
30, 1983, ch. 527, § 4(a)(iii), 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 929; UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT§ 4-112(a) 
(1980). 
A Connecticut decision established that a statute requiring a tenant to receive "hand-
delivery" of a notice of condominium conversion means that delivery must be "made 
personally to each tenant" and not "hand-delivered to the unit." Glenn Chaffer, Inc. v. 
Kennedy, 37 Conn. Supp. 654, 656, 433 A.2d 1018, 1020 (Super. Ct. 1981). 
In Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1982), the United States Supreme Court 
held a state statute violated due process by permitting service of process for eviction 
purposes to be made by posting a summons on the tenant's apartment door. The Court 
ruled that the statute violated the tenant's due process rights guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment. 
209. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.2 (West 1987). 
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usual place of abode with a member of the tenant's family, or 
use of certified mail. If the certified letter is not claimed, notice 
must be sent by regular mail.210 
In some instances, the Model Act requires a tenant to notify a 
landlord. Section G provides that elderly, handicapped, and low 
income tenants may be entitled to special legislative benefits. In 
order to be a member of the "special tenant" category, a tenant 
must notify the landlord of such eligibility.211 A simple and di-
rect method should also be adopted for this purpose. The Model 
Act provides that the tenant may serve written notice by per-
sonal service, leaving a copy at the landlord's address with an 
employee or family member, or by mailing.212 
3. When a landlord must provide notice of conversion-
Various state statutes dealing with condominium conversion re-
quire a landlord to provide a tenant with "notice of intent. to 
convert."213 Such vague terminology raises uncertainties as to 
the need to notify tenants if the landlord is merely contemplat-
ing a condominium conversion. This problem may be avoided by 
statutorily requiring a landlord to provide "notice of conver-
sion. "214 Because legislation can stipulate that notice of conver-
sion cannot be delivered until the recording of a Master Deed, 
the landlord avoids any liability for failing to notify tenants 
while conversion plans remain at the incubation stage. 2111 
210. Id. 
211. See Model Act § G(l), supra Part IV. 
212. See Model Act § D(6), supra Part IV. 
213. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 515A.4-110(a) (1982) ("A declarant ... shall give ... notice 
of ... the intent to convert .... ") (emphasis added); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.8 
(West 1987) ("Any owner who intends to convert a multiple dwelling ... shall give the 
tenants 60 days' notice of his intention to convert .... "). 
214. E.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 4-112(a) (1980) ("A declarant of a condominium 
... shall give each of the residential tenants ... notice of the conversion .... "). 
215. The following statutes seem to place a landlord in the precarious position of 
being required to give notice before recording of the document that creates the condo-
minium. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 330(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) ("Such notice 
shall be given at least 120 days, and not more than 1 year prior to the recording of the 
declaration .... "); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-102.l(a)(l) (Supp. 1987) ("Before 
(property] is subjected to a condominium regime, the owner ... shall give the tenant a 
notice .... "); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-C:3(1) (1984 & Supp. 1986) ("No conversion 
... shall be effected until: (a) [t)he owner ... has mailed to each tenant ... a notice of 
intent to convert no earlier than 120 days before the date of filing an application for 
registration . . . . "). 
A legislature should stipulate that notice of conversion may be delivered to a tenant 
only after recording of the Master Deed or Declaration. Without such a requirement, a 
court may not demand adherence to this practice. For example, in River Park Tenants 
Association v. 3600 Venture, 534 F. Supp. 45, 50-51 (E.D. Pa. 1981), tenants alleged 
landlord's failure to comply with the statute when he delivered conversion notice prior to 
recording the condominium constituent documents. The court ruled that statutory ter-
minology does not prevent such action. 
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Under the Model Act, the required tenant notification consists 
of far more than an announcement that a tenant may soon be 
residing in a rental unit under condominium ownership. The 
message would also provide a tenant with a purchase right of 
first refusal, the possibilities of an extended term of occupancy, 
and an award of relocation compensation. The creation of a con-
dominium should not necessarily entitle tenants automatically 
to the benefits of the Act.216 Recording the Master Deed does 
not change the status of preconversion tenants. Requiring a 
landlord who converts a rental apartment building to offer im-
mediately an extended lease term or a purchase option would be 
inequitable. For these reasons, the Model Act does not offer ten-
ant benefits upon recording of the Master Deed. 
The Model Act demands notification of conversion and the at-
tendant tenant benefits when the landlord who converts the 
building desires to recover possession of a condominium rental 
unit from a tenant or convey title to a tenant's unit.217 Some 
state statutes favoring this approach confuse the issue by requir-
ing tenant notification when the landlord desires to reclaim the 
unit (after the recording of the constituent documents) and by 
appearing uncertain about the possible collateral duty to notify 
subject tenants at the time of document recording. 218 This is 
troublesome because the converting landlord should not be 
forced to provide notice of conversion when the constituent doc-
uments are recorded. Furthermore, those tenants residing at the 
time of Master Deed recording may no longer be occupying units 
at the time recovery of possessiQn is sought. 
Section D(l) of the Model Act resolves this problem by pro-
tecting tenants who would otherwise be dispossessed as a result 
216. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point in 
the context of condominium conversion eviction. 
217. It is possible that a landlord, after recording the Master Deed may convey the 
entire apartment building to a purchaser. Although no effort may have been initiated to 
remove any tenants, the title to individual units has been transferred. Each tenant 
should have been notified of the conversion prior to the sale, because section E of the 
Model Act requires that a tenant be offered a purchase right of first refusal. See infra 
notes 234-53 and accompanying text. In contrast, a newspaper advertisement announcing 
the availability of condominiums, but not citing unit selling prices, does not trigger ten-
ant benefits under Pennsylvania's conversion act. Touraine Partners v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 
Super. 196, 482 A.2d 240 (1984). 
218. For example, the Massachusetts conversion statute indicates that notice must be 
delivered to tenants after the Master Deed is recorded. But the statute further stipulates 
that the notice shall state that "the owner has filed or intends to file a master deed 
.... " Act approved Nov: 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 4(a), 4(a)(i), 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 929. 
Thus, whether the recording of a Master Deed immediately awards certain benefits to 
tenants is unclear. 
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of an unanticipated conversion. The protected class does not in-
clude those individuals who are tenants when the Master Deed 
is recorded and then voluntarily vacate prior to receiving notice 
of conversion or those tenants aware of the conversion program 
who entered into rental agreements subsequent to the recording 
of documents creating the condominium. 
A landlord who converts rental units should not always be 
foreclosed from evicting tenants otherwise entitled to notice of 
condominium conversion. Section D(4) of the Model Act stipu-
lates that a tenant may be required to vacate the rental unit for 
failure to pay rent, commission of waste, or unacceptable 
conduct. 
The section D(l) reference to "just cause" provides the key to 
a landlord rightfully removing a tenant after recording of the 
Master Deed and prior to giving notice of conversion to the ten-
ant. But the term should be defined to exclude an attempt by a 
landlord, subsequent to Master Deed recording, to recover a 
rental unit when the only basis for recovery is the natural expi-
ration of the tenant's term. Upon expiration of the tenant's 
rental agreement, the Model Act confronts the landlord with the 
options of serving notice of conversion and its accompanying 
benefits or offering the tenant the right to remain in possession 
as a periodic tenant.219 The terms of the expired rental agree-
ment continue to control, except that section D(2) of the Model 
Act places a ceiling on the percentage of permissible rental in-
crease. 220 Without this ceiling, the landlord might compel a ten-
ant to vacate the unit by establishing a high rental charge. On 
the other hand, section D(3) prohibits the tenant from assigning 
or subletting the tenancy interest during this period. 
Without this "just cause" language of section D(l), a landlord 
could easily avoid giving notice of conversion to a tenant resid-
ing in a unit when the Master Deed was recorded. Because many 
residential rental agreements are on a month to month or year 
to year basis, the landlord could terminate the lease on the next 
appropriate date following the Master Deed recording and re-
move the tenant. Section D heightens the probability that a ten-
ant, residing in a rental housing accommodation when the 
Master Deed is recorded, will receive notice of conversion. Such 
219. A periodic estate is a tenancy that will continue for a year or a fraction of a year 
and for successive similar periods unless terminated by either party by proper notice. 
The most common types of periodic tenancies are those operating from year to year and 
from month to month. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 65 
(2d ed. 1988). 
220. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
700 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:3 
notice is not required if the tenant voluntarily vacates or pro-
vides the landlord with "just cause" for eviction. 
4. Notification of the tenant-The possibility of an ex-
tended possessory term- Notification alerting tenants of an im-
pending conversion project is the most frequent protection of-
fered by state and local governments.221 The Model Act requires 
a landlord to provide notice of conversion to a tenant residing 
within an apartment when the Master Deed is recorded, if the 
landlord is seeking removal of the tenant absent just cause. The 
suggested form of tenant notification requires that the landlord 
who converts rental property to a condominium form of owner-
ship must inform an appropriate tenant of an opportunity for 
continued residence within the unit, thereby supplying time for 
the tenant to evaluate future residential plans. The notice peri-
ods mandated by current state statutes range from unrealisti-
cally brief222 to overly lengthy terms; the most common term be-
ing 120 days.223 Under section D(l)(c) of the Model Act, if the 
termination date of the tenant's existing rental agreement ex-
ceeds the notification period, then the tenant would be entitled 
to possess the housing accommodation until the later date. Leg-
islation should clearly set forth the right of a tenant to remain in 
possession in this instance.m The Model Act's section D(l)(c) 
also illustrates that the tenant's residency may be extended be-
yond the termination date of the lease when the required period 
of notice prior to eviction causes an overlap. 
The common legislative approach permitting the extended oc-
cupancy of a tenant for a maximum period of 120 days does not 
appear to be an unreasonable burden upon the property owner, 
particularly when certain states and communities have extended 
this period to one year,2211 three years,226 and up to a life ten-
221. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at Xl-4, XII-8. 
222. For example, TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-27-123 (1982) allows tenants only two 
months actual notice of the conversion. 
223. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at Xl-4; e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 4-112(a) 
(1980). 
224. The following provision highlights this protection: the tenant shall have "[t]he 
right to remain in the unit of residence for 120 days after receipt of this notice, or until 
expiration of the term of the lease, whichever is longer." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
559.204(2)(c) (West Supp. 1987); accord PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3410(e)(l) (Purdon 
Supp. 1987); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 4-112(e) (1980). 
If a landlord and tenant enter into a new rental agreement after the expiration of the 
tenant's one-year notice period, the landlord is not required to give a second one-year 
notice to the tenant. Bernstein v. Towne Estates, Inc. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 907,462 N.E.2d 
1136 (1984). 
225. Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 5A, 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 932; PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 68, § 3410(a) (Purdon Supp. 1987). 
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ancy.227 Any protection beyond a term of one year appears to be 
extreme and may well curtail conversion efforts. An exception 
should be made for certain individuals, such as the elderly, the 
handicapped, and those with low income, who may require addi-
tional time to reach conclusions concerning their decision to 
purchase or to relocate. Extended notification or preeviction pe-
riods that benefit these groups may therefore be desirable. 228 
From the tenant's viewpoint, a notification requirement is the 
most basic conversion protection. This concept parallels existing 
safeguards in the landlord-tenant field. 229 A 120-day notice pe-
riod seems inadequate, particularly in a restricted rental market 
or at a time of high inflation. A one-year notice would appear to 
be better designed to protect most affected tenants. 
Section D of the Model Act attempts to insure that a tenant is 
guaranteed a minimum period of one year before being required 
to vacate, unless the tenant provides the landlord with cause 
justifying termination of the tenancy. The Model Act prevents a 
tenant from transferring the benefit of a statutorily extended 
term and permits a landlord's notice of conversion to serve as a 
notice to vacate upon the expiration of the rental agreement or 
the notice period, whichever is longer. Moreover, it allows con-
veyance of a housing accommodation to a third party while the 
tenant is in possession of the unit. But the opening of section 
D(4), "no landlord shall bring any action," prevents both land-
lords who convert rental units and market purchaser landlords 
from evicting tenants at a premature date. 
The Model Act's proposed definition of a tenant230 does not 
include a subtenant, though the Uniform Condominium Act re-
quires notification of such individuals. 231 Requiring notification 
of subtenants would be counterproductive because it raises is-
sues concerning a subtenant's right to an extended term and 
other benefits stipulated by the Model Act. Also, a subtenant 
226. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.l(k) (West 1987) (three year notice period must be 
provided when "(t]he landlord ... of the building ... is converting from the rental 
market to a condominium ... of two or more dwelling units .... "); see also N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:18-61.2(g) (West 1987). 
227. Brookline, Mass., Bylaws art. 38, § 9(a)(8) (Aug. 29, 1980). The text of this by-
law provision is reprinted supra note 110. 
228. .for a discussion of "special tenant" provisions of section G of the Model Act, see 
infra notes 268-97 and accompanying text. 
229. The notice period as established by a conversion statute may effectively extend 
a tenant's lease term while other statutes, wholly unrelated to the condominium conver-
sion process, may offer similar protections. 
230. See Model Act § C(5), supra Part IV; see also supra text accompanying note 
207. 
231. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 4-112(a) (1980). 
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acquires an interest in the housing accommodation through an 
agreement with a tenant. The legislature should not attempt to 
interfere with this preexisting contractual relationship. Because 
the nature of a sublease232 contemplates a sublessor retaining a 
reversionary interest, the Model Act names only the original ten-
ant or an assignee233 of the original tenant as beneficiary. 
5. Tenant right to purchase- A "right of first refusal" re-
quires a landlord to offer the first opportunity of unit purchase 
to the tenant occupant. The exclusive option generally lasts 
from 60 to 120 days.234 As current occupants, preconversion ten-
ants often desire to remain in possession and to purchase their 
units. In an apparent attempt to discourage a landlord from de-
manding an unreasonable selling price in light of a tenant's de-
sire to purchase, state regulations often require landlords to re-
frain from offering the unit on more favorable terms to others 
for a certain period following the expiration of the tenant's ex-
clusive purchase option.2311 Conversely, many landlords inter-
ested in securing tenant purchasers will often offer a discounted 
selling price to tenants as an incentive to purchase. 236 A high 
proportion of tenant purchasers, even at discounted rates, may 
benefit the developer. Tenant purchases may help the landlord 
to secure financing contingent on pre-sale requirements, to 
shorten the time period needed for conversion, and to aid in re-
paying any interim loans associated with the conversion. 237 The 
purchase of units by satisfied tenants also serves as advertising 
for the converter. The Model Act therefore establishes a tenant 
purchase option, but also anticipates likely problems or issues 
raised by the requirement of such a right. Many current state 
statutes direct only cursory attention toward this topic. 
Although statutes almost uniformly require that a tenant re-
ceive the right of first refusal contemporaneously with the notice 
232. In a sublease, the original tenant becomes the landlord of the transferee-subten-
ant. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.57 (A. Casner ed. 1952). 
233. "If the transfer is of all of the lessee's interest in the whole of the leased prem-
ises, it is referred to as an assignment." Id. § 3.56, at 294. 
234. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 330 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (120 days); Wis. 
STAT. ANN. § 703.08(1) (West 1981) (60 days); Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 
4(b), 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 930 (90 days); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 4-112(b) (1980) (60 
days). 
235. E.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 4-112(b) (1980) (If a tenant does not purchase 
the subject unit during the option period, "the offeror may not offer to dispose of an 
interest in that unit during the following (180] days at a price or on terms more 
favorable to the offeree than the price or terms offered to the tenant."). 
236. The discounts generally range from 10% to 20% of the purchase price. 1980 
HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at IX-2; see infra note 251. 
237. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at IIl-19. 
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of conversion, an issue arises concerning whether a landlord 
must notify and offer a purchase option to all tenants simulta-
neously. Existing state legislation does not offer a definitive an-
swer. The Model Act adopts the position that a landlord should 
not be compelled to provide notice of the condominium conver-
sion and to off er purchase rights to all tenants at the same time. 
A landlord should be allowed to determine the marketing sched-
ule of the various units. Once the landlord decides to remove a 
tenant from a rental unit or to offer the unit for sale, 238 and if 
the appropriate tenant still resides in the unit to be sold, then 
the tenant is entitled to notice of conversion and a right of first 
refusal. 
One state statute requires the offer of a purchase option only 
to tenants who have resided in a rental unit for a minimum pe-
riod. 239 Under the Model Act, any tenant residing in a rental 
unit at the time of Master Deed recording qualifies as a benefi-
ciary, regardless of length of residency. Another form of state 
regulation allows a landlord to avoid offering a right of first re-
fusal if the postconversion boundaries of a tenant's rental unit 
substantially differ from the dimensions prior to conversion. 2 ' 0 
Under these circumstances, a duty to offer a purchase opportu-
nity to a tenant would be impractical if an apartment has been 
subdivided or several apartments have been merged. Section E 
of the Model Act takes account of this problem not by requiring 
a right of first refusal, but by providing that a tenant of such 
unit receive notice of conversion and the opportunity for an ex-
tended tenancy. 
The Model Act's mandated interim period between a tenant's 
execution of the purchase contract and the actual conveyance, 
provided in section E(l), is designed to permit a reasonable time 
period for a tenant to ascertain the quality of title, secure fi-
238. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
Section E of the Model Act prevents a landlord from selling converted units to inves-
tors while asserting that the tenants will have an opportunity to purchase their units 
from the investors. The landlord must offer to sell the unit directly to a tenant. The 
Model Act is thus designed to prevent landlords from circumventing the legislation. For 
discussion of such attempts to circumvent condominium conversion legislation, see 
Wells, The Correian War, Boston Tab, Jan. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 4; Snyder, Ad Launches a 
Condo Case, Boston Globe, Aug. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 1. A Pennsylvania court has ruled 
that a newspaper advertisement that merely announces the availability of condominiums 
but does not quote unit selling prices does not entitle a tenant to receive notice of con-
version and the opportunity to purchase the condominium. Touraine Partners v. Kelly, 
333 Pa. Super. 196, 482 A.2d 240 (1984). 
239. FLA. STAT. § 718.612(1) (1985) (right of first refusal premised upon a minimum 
residency of 180 days preceding receipt of the notice of conversion). 
240. E.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 4-112(b) (1980). 
704 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:3 
nancing, and other tasks. In addition, by legislatively establish-
ing the purchase right of co-lessees, it is possible to avoid litiga-
tion wherein eac:h lessee asserts an exclusive right to purchase 
the converted unit. 241 
Sections E(l) and (2) emphasize that the purchase option ap-
plies solely to the housing accommodation occupied by the ten-
ant, and only if the rental unit substantially conforms to the 
unit dimensions prior to conversion. Section E(l) also draws a 
distinction between a tenant who exercises an option to 
purchase and a tenant who actually purchases the unit. The 
Model Act requires a reasonable period of time for completion of 
both events. Most conversion statutes do not make such a dis-
tinction. Too often they leave landlords and tenants uncertain as 
to whether the time period established by statute refers to the 
expiration date for executing the purchase and sale agreement or 
to the final date for actually acquiring title. 242 
Existing state legislation also fails to consider the relationship 
between the purchase option and the reality that co-tenants may 
reside in a rental unit. Occupancy of an apartment by more than 
one tenant should not disadvantage a purchase opportunity. In-
stead, each co-tenant should .receive an option to purchase a 
proportional share of the unit. Certain apartment occupants, 
however, may not be "tenants" as defined by section C(5) of the 
Model Act. These individuals are not the intended recipients of 
a purchase option. 
For all tenants entitled to a purchase right of first refusal, the 
contents of the condominium contract of sale agreement are of 
prime importance. To compel landlords to offer a viable 
purchase opportunity to tenants, certain provisions of the agree-
ment must be regulated. Unless some of these terms are regu-
lated by statute, a landlord may effectively nullify a tenant's 
right of first refusal by requiring an unreasonably high down 
241. See, e.g., Spitalnik v. Springer, 87 A.D.2d 797, 449 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 
1982), modified, 59 N.Y.2d 112, 116, 463 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (1983) (determining that the 
co-lessees only had a joint right to purchase). 
242. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-C:5(1) (1984) ("Each tenant shall have 60 days 
from the time of receipt of the sales documents to exercise his exclusive right to 
purchase."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.08(1) (West 1981) ("A tenant has the exclusive option 
to purchase the unit for a period of 60 days following the date of delivery of the no-
tice."). The New Hampshire statute seems unclear whether a tenant has actually exer-
cised an option to purchase by notifying the landlord within 60 days of an intent to 
purchase or if the conveyance must occur within the 60 day period. Similarly, must a 
Wisconsin tenant purchase the condominium unit within 60 days after receiving notice 
of conversion? If not, must the transaction be completed within a definite time frame? A 
more definite approach requires a tenant "to purchase the unit during that [60)-day pe-
riod." UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 4-112(b) (1980). 
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payment, 243 by denying a tenant's request to insert a liquidated 
damages clause,244 or financing contingency clause.2411 Although 
these topics are important, a tenant is still likely to be most con-
cerned with the amount of the unit's selling price. No state or 
local legislature appears to have established any direct controls 
over this variable. A common legislative approach prohibits a 
landlord from offering to sell a condominium to a third party 
purchaser, during a stipulated time period, at more advanta-
geous terms than those offered to the tenant occupant. 246 
Section E(3) of the Model Act establishes a seventy-five day 
protected period. Although seemingly directed toward promot-
ing a reasonable purchase price for the tenant, a landlord can 
nevertheless satisfy the statutory requirement by offering a 
purchase opportunity to a tenant at an extravagant price that 
the tenant cannot accept, and then offer the same unit on the 
open market with identical terms during the following seventy-
five day period. 247 This procedure will only be attractive to a 
landlord who does not wish to sell a unit immediately, but 
desires to fulfill the tenant purchase option requirements. By 
following this route, the tenant's right of first refusal has been 
negated, the tenant has received notice to vacate, and the land-
lord may now sell the condominium unit at any time, to any 
purchaser, and at any mutually agreeable price. 
243. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1634(b) (1986): "The owner shall not require the ten-
ant to pay a deposit of more than 5 percent of the contract sales price in order to make a 
contract. The deposit is refundable in the event of a good faith failure of the tenant to 
perform under the contract." 
244. A tenant may be reluctant to contract for the purchase of a condominium unit if 
the landlord could specifically enforce the agreement upon the tenant's default. Liability 
can be limited by inserting a liquidated damages clause, such as the following: "If the 
Purchaser shall default under this contract, the Seller shall retain the sum paid by the 
Purchaser on the execution hereof as liquidated damages, and the retention of said sum 
shall be the sole remedy of the Seller." M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF 
REAL PROPERTY 27 (2d ed. 1963). 
245. Many buyers must receive a loan in order to purchase real estate. Thus the ten-
ant (buyer) may wish to condition the purchase and sale agreement upon obtaining the 
necessary financing. The following clause serves as a model: 
The BUYER agrees to apply promptly for a mortgage loan from an institutional 
lender of not less than $33,000, payable in not less than 20 years at a rate of 
interest not to exceed 8½ % per year. If the BUYER fails to obtain such a mort-
gage loan, all payments made hereunder by the BUYER shall at BUYER's op-
tion be refunded forthwith and all other obligations of the parties hereto shall 
cease and this agreement shall be void and without recourse to parties hereto. 
T. BENNETT & M. PRAGUE, ESSENTIAL REAL ESTATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1-80 (1976) 
(Massachusetts Continuing Legal Educ.-New Eng. Law Inst., Inc.). 
246. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
247. The Uniform Condominium Act requires the significantly longer period of 180 
days for governmental control over the unit sales terms offered to the public. Supra note 
235; see supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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Although a landlord can nullify a tenant's purchase option in 
this manner, sturdier legislation than the Model Act should be 
avoided. If a legislature attempts to place direct controls upon 
the selling price, such as by establishing formulae for determin-
ing the price or by requiring a tenant discount, the legislation 
may be subject to constitutional challenge. Forcing a landlord to 
sell a condominium unit at an established or discounted price 
seems to raise serious substantive due process and taking is-
sues248 that cannot be countered by analogy to the justification 
for rent controls. Regulation of rent levels during a rental hous-
ing shortage2n allows the landlord to remain the owner of the 
rental property. The same legal argument cannot be applied to a 
statute requiring a conveyance of real property at a controlled 
price. The basic concept of a tenant right of first refusal is ac-
ceptable because a landlord voluntarily offers to sell a condo-
minium. The usual form of legislation only requires that the cur-
rent unit occupant has the first opportunity to purchase. If the 
tenant can pay the selling price, then the valid objective of 
avoiding housing displacement has been achieved. Accomplish-
ing this objective by legislatively creating a "special deal" for the 
tenant, however, denies the landlord the right to sell for the 
highest market price. Perhaps this reasoning has dissuaded leg-
islators from strengthening the presently popular form of "first 
refusal" law. 
Landlords may decide to offer reduced selling prices to ten-
ants voluntarily. "Insider discounts" are a common feature of 
condominium conversion.250 Often the best interest of the land-
lord is to offer such a discount to tenants. Although the amount 
of the discount varies among locales and in some instances is 
directly attributable to the overall strength and structure of the 
jurisdiction's condominium conversion controls,m the Model 
248. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text for a consideration of substantive 
due process standards as applied to condominium conversion legislation. See supra notes 
77-141 and accompanying text for a similar discussion of condominium conversion laws 
subject to "taking" claims. 
249. See supra note 74. 
250. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text. 
251. Tenant discounts appear to be most significant in New York City due to the 
restrictive nature of local conversion controls. Discounts ranging from 25% to 75% below 
market value appear to be common. Moreover, some developers offer significant dis-
counts coupled with full financing of the remaining balance at low interest rates. Mc-
Cain, Co-op Conversions Give N. Y. 'Insiders' Incredible Bargains, Boston Globe, Apr. 
14, 1985, at 31, col. 1; Oser, Eviction-Plan Co-op Sales Still Strong In Manhattan, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 28, 1983, § 8, at 7, col. 1. 
During the 1970's, 70% of the nation's conversions occurred in the New York City 
metropolitan area. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at IV-8. To regulate this high activity 
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Act avoids any attempt to control the selling price of a tenant's 
converted rental unit. 2112 
Section E(3) of the Model Act safeguards the tenant by pro-
viding for liquidated damages. and financing contingency clauses 
in the executed contract of sale. Section E( 4) declares a 
purchase right of first refusal and all rights under a contract of 
sale as personal rights of the tenant. This seems prudent be-
cause landlords become justifiably outraged when "insider dis-
counts" or purchase contract rights are assigned.2113 
conversion center, the New York State Legislature enacted strict controls designed to 
safeguard as well as benefit tenants. Eviction and noneviction plans are the two alterna-
tives available to a project sponsor. An eviction plan requires that "at least fifty-one 
percent of the bona fide tenants in occupancy of all dwelling units in the building" agree 
to purchase their unit. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(l)(c) (McKinney 1984). If the 
project sponsor fulfills the statutory requirements, certain nonpurchasing tenants may be 
evicted following a notice period. In 1982, the state legislature increased the required 
percentage of purchasing tenants necessary for an effective eviction plan. The amend-
ment, increasing the requisite number of buyers from 35% to 51 % resulted in a dramatic 
decrease in the filing of eviction plans. Gutis, Eviction Plans Fading Fast as a Road to 
Conversion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1986, § 8, at 7, col. 1. Project sponsors are generally 
unable to generate the significant tenant purchasing interest necessary to meet the in-
creased statutory percentage requirements. Id. 
Under a noneviction plan, the sponsor must receive executed agreements for the 
purchase of "at least fifteen percent of all dwelling units in the building." N.Y. GEN. Bus. 
LAW § 352-eeee(l)(b) (McKinney 1984). The 15% calculation may include units being 
bought by occupying tenants and bona fide third party purchasers representing "that 
they ... intend to occupy the unit when it becomes vacant." Id. Nonpurchasing tenants 
are legislatively entitled to reside indefinitely within a rental unit. 
The Model Act proposed in this Article virtually ignores the New York program. The 
tenant consent requirement seems extreme and a similar legislative provision was re-
cently invalidated as a standardless delegation of legislative power. Hornstein v. Barry, 
530 A.2d 1177, 1181-85 (D.C. 1987). The continued lure of conversion projects in Man-
hattan may best be explained by the magnetism of New York City real estate ven-
tures-where a monetary profit for a project sponsor is still apparently available. It is 
unlikely that the New York City program could survive in less active real estate markets 
because it would thwart conversion activity and the concomitant benefit of offering home 
ownership opportunities. 
Tenant purchasers in Connecticut and New Jersey do not benefit from deeply dis-
counted prices "because the laws protecting tenants' rights to stay on are so light that 
they do not create the pressures that force New York sponsors to offer the units at far 
below true value. Insider prices in these states are therefore usually not more than 15 
percent below market value." Brooks, With Conversion Comes Hard Choice for Tenants, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984, § 12, at 72, col. 1. 
·under a different approach, a landlord may transfer cash payments to a tenant upon 
the condition that the tenant relinquish the purchase right to the occupied unit and 
vacate the premises prior to expiration of the rental agreement or any extended term 
provided by local law. In Boston, such tenant "buy-out" amounts have varied from $750 
to $21,000 with many offers in the $10,000 range. Ball, Tenant Buy-Out a Key to Condo 
Conversions, Boston Globe, Nov. 2, 1985, at 1, col. 2. 
252. See Model Act § E, supra Part IV. 
253. A common practice in Manhattan involves a tenant receiving funds from a third 
party to enable the tenant to purchase at the "insider price." The tenant then sells the 
unit to the third party financier for a profit that was agreed upon prior to the loan. See 
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As a related matter, the Model Act also establishes a proce-
du1'.'e for determining whether a tenant has exercised a purchase 
right of first refusal. A third party purchaser may wish to ascer-
tain that this right no longer exists. Section E(5) addresses this 
issue and provides that a tenant may waive the right only subse-
quent to receiving the written purchase option. Note that the 
tenant's written waiver does not permit the landlord to acceler-
ate the date upon which the landlord may offer the unit for sale 
to the public. This aspect of the Model Act may provide a slight 
safeguard against a landlord requesting an inordinately high 
purchase price from a tenant who does not wish to relocate. 
Even with a written waiver, the landlord must wait until expira-
tion of the entire thirty day period commencing from the date 
upon which the tenant received the purchase right of first re-
fusal before offering the unit to third party purchasers. 2 M 
6. Compensation for tenant relocation- State legislation of-
fering only an extended possessory term or an opportunity to 
purchase a condominium seems of limited benefit to preconver-
sion tenants who do not desire or cannot afford to purchase their 
apartments. Accordingly, certain state and local governments 
have formulated additional "relocation assistance" packages. 
The mildest example of such regulation requires a landlord who 
converts a rental housing accommodation to assist in paying a 
tenant's moving expenses. A more extreme legislative approach 
demands a landlord's active involvement in locating suitable 
housing for displaced tenants. This protection is generally re-
served for elderly, handicapped, or financially disadvantaged 
tenants.2511 
Goldman, Purchase Rights Bought and Sold, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, § 8, at 1, col. 1; 
see also Comment, Tenant's Conditional Contract to Sell His Apartment Upon Conver-
sion to Condominium Ownership Does Not Violate "No Assignment" Clause in Stan-
dard Lease, 60 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 387 (1986). 
Another purchase approach in New York City centers upon a tenant signing a contract 
to purchase a unit at the "insider price" and then assigning (for consideration) the 
purchase rights to a third party prior to the conveyance. Monetary compensation for the 
tenants tends to be about one quarter of the "insider price." See Brooks, Selling Rights 
in Co-ops, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, § 8, at 1, col. 1; Brooks, supra note 251, at 72, col. 
1. Although the Model Act cannot prohibit a purchasing tenant from reselling the unit, it 
regulates any prepurchase assignment of rights by the tenant. 
The transfer of purchase rights has been legislatively sanctioned in the District of Co-
lumbia, if the tenant assigns those rights "to an agency or instrumentality of the District 
or federal government." D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1635 (1986). 
254. Legislative restrictions upon an attempt by a landlord to circumvent the tenant's 
right of first refusal are considered infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text. 
255. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1621 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.10 (West 
1987). These programs are considered infra notes 268-97 and accompanying text. 
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The Model Act follows the typical legislative pattern requiring 
a compulsory payment by the landlord.2116 The Act also, however, 
seeks to eliminate the confusing formulae and overly intricate 
procedures2117 associated with some existing regulations. Certain 
legislative approaches include a statutory format entitling a ten-
ant to compensation for those actual moving expenses falling 
within a stipulated monetary range. 2118 Such laws appear to re-
quire a tenant to document actual moving expenses. At least one 
statute appears to require a tenant to utilize the services of a 
professional mover in order to be compensated. 2119 Questions also 
The justification for such laws is the direct correlation between a tenant incurring 
moving costs and the landlord's conversion of the apartment building. National Council 
of Senior Citizens, supra note 20, reprinted in Condominium Housing Issues Hearing, 
supra note 2, at 141. Because tenant displacement is often prompted by the conversion 
process, it appears that the validity of such compensation/relocation assistance laws will 
be generally upheld. For example, Kalaydjian v. City of Los Angeles, 149 Cal. App. 3d 
690, 197 Cal. Rptr. 149 (Ct. App. 1983), upheld an ordinance requiring relocation assis-
tance payments ranging from $1000 to $2500. It is reasonable to require a developer to 
"cushion[] the displacement effect" caused by a condominium conversion. Id. at 693, 197 
Cal. Rptr. at 151; see also Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 
3d 892, 223 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Ct. App. 1986). In Terminal Plaza, the owner of residential 
hotel units challenged an ordinance requiring the issuance of a permit prior to con-
verting the property to any other use. The permit required owners to provide relocation 
assistance to displaced hotel residents. The court upheld the ordinance despite claims of 
due process, equal protection, and takings violations. Id. at 910-12, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 389-
91. Moreover, the hotel owner unsuccessfully argued a "taking" because the ordinance 
did not cause a permanent physical invasion of the property. The owner also failed to 
demonstrate that investment-backed expectations were lessened, or. that the property 
did not generate a reasonable rate of return. Id. at 911-12, 223 Cal. Rptr at 390-91. 
256. In Virginia, for example, the compulsory relocation expense may not exceed "the 
amount which the tenant would have been entitled to receive, . . . if the real estate 
comprising the .condominium had been condemned." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.94(g) (Supp. 
1987). Condemnation values, however, are often difficult to compute due to the applica-
tion of various standards. See 3 P. ROHAN, CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 
§ 8A.02 (1987). 
257. For example, the Massachusetts condominium conversion statute requires relo-
cation expense compensation "only as long as the tenant voluntarily vacates the housing 
accommodation for which recovery of possession is sought on or before the expiration of 
the notice period." Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 4(c), 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 930-
31 (emphasis added). Apparently, the legislature intended tenants to be entitled to com-
pensation only in those cases where the landlord-developer requests the tenant to vacate 
the rental unit prior to the expiration of the notice period. This approach is confusing, 
technical, and illogical. It fails to recognize that the tenant who chooses to vacate at the 
termination of the notice period is probably departing due to the condominium conver-
sion and encountering moving expenses. 
258. Id. at 930 (The converter "shall pay ... relocation benefits for the actual, docu-
mented costs of moving, not to exceed seven hundred and fifty dollars per housing ac-
commodation."); Mo. REAL PROP. CooE ANN.§ 11-136(h)(l)(i) (Supp. 1987) ("The owner 
shall . . . reimburse the household for moving expenses . . . up to $750 which are actu-
ally and reasonably incurred .... "). 
259. D.C. CooE ANN. § 45-162l(b) (1986) ("An owner shall pay the tenant only if the 
tenant provides a relocation expense receipt or a written estimate from a moving com-
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arise concerning the components of the total moving costs. Are 
brokers' fees, telephone and utility installation charges, and 
apartment cleaning costs included? Should compensation de-
pend upon the converted apartment having been furnished or 
unfurnished at the commencement of the tenancy?260 
Flexible compensation standards invite further confusion. One 
state statute fails to establish a monetary limitation upon a 
landlord's required contribution and merely stipulates that a 
lessee must be reimbursed for "reasonable expenses" associated 
with a relocation within a fifty-mile radius.261 This formulation 
invites litigation concerning the reasonableness of such an ex-
pense, particularly when a relocation award also depends upon a 
tenant vacating the unit "immediately upon" receiving actual 
notice of conversion. 262 A final example of faulty legislation per-
mits a landlord to base relocation compensation upon the 
amount of a tenant's rental payments.263 This practice may un-
evenly benefit certain tenants, particularly in communities 
where some, but not all, residential units are subject to rent 
control. 
The basic concept of landlord-funded relocation compensation 
is desirable as a balm for displaced tenants. Section F of the 
Model Act approaches the topic in a direct manner and ad-
dresses the following concerns: (1) determining a reasonable 
compensation amount; (2) ascertaining the individuals entitled 
to the award; and (3) adopting a method designed to ensure that 
the tenant actually receives the funds. 
Burdensome technical difficulties may be avoided by stipulat-
ing a uniform dollar amount to be contributed by the landlord 
who converts the apartment. The amount of $750 suggested by 
section F(l) fits within the range established by existing legisla-
tion.26" By simply selecting a reasonable and definite dollar con-
pany or other relocation service provider."). This statute also limits the required pay-
ment for moving expenses to $500. 
260. In Long Beach, California, a tenant "of any furnished unit shall receive moving 
expenses equal to two months' rent." LONG BEACH, CAL., ORDINANCES ch. 20.32, 
§ 20.32.320(A) (1982). "The tenant of any unfurnished unit shall receive moving ex-
penses equal to three months' rent .... " Id. § 20.32.320(B). 
261. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.12(e)(2) (1984) (awarding payment only to "any ten-
ant who has attained the age of sixty-two (62)."). 
262. TENN. CooE ANN. § 66-27-123(c) (1982). 
263. FLA. STAT. § 718.606(4) (1985) (allowing a developer to offer "the option of re-
ceiving in cash a tenant relocation payment at least equal to 1 month's rent"); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:18-61.10 (West 1987) ("Any tenant receiving notice ... shall receive from the 
owner moving expense compensation of waiver of payment of 1 month's rent."). 
264. The minimum amount of relocation compensation mandated by statute appears 
to be $125. D.C. CooE ANN. § 45-1621(b) (1986). The maximum seems fixed at $750. Mo. 
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tribution, the Model Act avoids investigating whether tenants 
have retained the services of professional movers, whether re-
ceipted moving bills should be produced, and whether the 
amount of the monetary award should depend upon the amount 
of tenant rental payments, the size of the tenant household, or 
the tenant's income.2611 Any compulsory assistance of this type is 
an additional cost to the converter. Emphasis should therefore 
be placed upon determining an equitable dollar amount, achiev-
ing uniformity of rules, and creating an uncom'plicated proce-
dure for satisfying these obligations. Statutorily required reloca-
tion compensation should not be so burdensome as to influence 
owners to refrain from converting rental property. 
Under the Model Act, a tenant seeking relocation compensa-
tion must not be in arrears in rental payments. Conversely, a 
landlord must conform with all laws concerning return of a ten-
ant's security deposit, if any, in addition to paying the relocation 
amount. The Act states that a landlord owes a compensation 
award only to those tenants entitled to receive notice of the con-
version and to those tenants entering into a rental agreement 
subsequent to, but unaware of, the Master Deed recording. 
Moreover, the Model Act proposes that a relocation lump sum 
payment of $750 be awarded per tenant household. This money 
would then be divided among tenant occupants of the 
household. 
A tenant household should not be forced to pursue a landlord 
for payment of the sum after the tenants have vacated the rental 
REAL PROP. ConE ANN.§ ll-136(h)(l) (Supp. 1987). The slightly dated 1980 HUD Study 
indicates that the median cost experienced by those tenants who move due to condomin-
ium conversion is approximately $145. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at IX-16. 
A recent nationwide survey, involving only respondents who moved within the prior 12 
months, reveals that 55% of those responding moved themselves without professional 
assistance or rental vehicles. Another 21 % moved themselves with the assistance of 
rental equipment. Sordillo, Moue, Boston Globe, Aug. 15, 1986, at 25, col. 1, 28, col. 1. 
Alternatively, moving four rooms of furniture a distance of 40 miles costs $1100 when 
the packing and transport is performed by professional movers. Id. Thus a relocation 
amount of $750 seems to gauge adequately the compromise between self-moving and 
retaining professional assistance. Nevertheless, a legislature may decide to require a 
higher relocation payment due to increased moving costs in a particular state, or to re-
flect a local cost of living increase. 
Los Angeles, California, adopted the commendable practice of selecting a uniform 
compensation amount for relocating tenants, exacting a lower uniform payment of $1000 
for nonelderly and physically able tenants. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, 
art. 7, § 47.06(D)(l)(a)(4) (1981). 
265. Limiting relocation compensation only to those tenants with gross income falling 
below a minimum threshold would complicate an otherwise simple procedure. Such legis-
lation should require that proof of tenant income be presented. Connecticut appears to 
be the only state adopting the income cutoff approach. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-
287(c) (West Supp. 1987). 
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unit.266 Similarly a landlord should not be obligated to compen-
sate a tenant prior to the tenant's removal. The Model Act in-
troduces a compromise position involving a municipal oversight 
authority. The municipal office or board acts as the depository 
of the compensation payments. The landlord must deposit the 
payment with the oversight authority within three days follow-
ing the tenant's relocation or at least three days prior to the 
landlord's conveyance of the tenant occupied unit to a third 
party purchaser. The tenant may reclaim the amount within six 
days of vacating the apartment. The municipal office will release 
the payment upon receiving a signed statement from the land-
lord or presentation of other information indicating that the 
unit is vacant. 267 
Section F(3) of the Model Act imposes the responsibility of 
paying relocation compensation upon the landlord "who con-
verted the building" and not upon a third party purchaser of a 
unit. The latter individual may be a "landlord" under tradi-
tional notions of property law, but not for purposes of this statu-
tory section. 
7. Special tenants and special protections- The legislative 
bodies of various states and communities have determined that 
the condominium conversion process usually has profound ef-
fects upon certain tenants. Accordingly, they have enacted 
stronger protections for these individuals. Although these laws 
often benefit both handicapped268 and low income tenants,269 
elderly tenants comprise the most frequently protected group.270 
266. A relocating tenant should not be further burdened with the possibility of initi-
ating litigation in order to recover relocation expense money from a recalcitrant landlord. 
Some tenants may forego the payment rather than endure the rigor, complexity, and 
duration of court involvement. For these reasons, certain seemingly helpful statutory 
provisions may not prove beneficial to tenants. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1621(d)(3) 
(1986) ("[T]he tenant has a private right of action to collect the payment and is entitled 
to costs and reasonable attorney fees for bringing the action."). 
267. See Model Act § F(3), supra Part IV. 
268. Condominium conversion laws in Maryland, Michigan, and Virginia protect 
handicapped or disabled tenants. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-137 (Supp. 1987); 
M1cH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.204a(a) (West Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.94(0 
(Supp. 1987); see also infra note 278. 
269. Massachusetts, for example, safeguards financially strained tenants residing in 
converted rental units. Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 4, 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 
929-31. 
270. Statutes in the District of Columbia, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, and Virginia cover elderly tenants facing condominium conversion. See Comment, 
supra note 3, at 211. 
Other states offering statutory protections to elderly tenants include Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. CoNN. GEN. 
STAT. § 47a-23c (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-290(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1985); MINN. 
STAT. § 515A.4-110(a) (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 448.4-112(3) (Vernon 1986); N.H. REV. 
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Studies indicate that though the elderly constitute only twenty 
percent of conversion-displaced tenants,271 they often suffer the 
most grievous wounds inflicted by the loss of their apartments to 
condominium ownership. The security and stability of a resi-
dence is most important to the elderly. A forced disruption of 
home life, accompanied by a change of environment, can pro-
duce severe trauma. 272 The elderly are also often financially 
strained by high rental payments. In 1976, sixty-five percent of 
elderly tenants expended more than twenty-five percent of their 
annual income for rent. 273 Sixty percent of those who earn less 
than $12,500 are elderly.274 Their forced relocation probably en-
tails the payment of increased rental costs.2711 Unlike younger 
displaced tenants, the elderly are often incapable of seeking any 
form of employment to offset rising housing costs. Handicapped 
and low income tenants may similarly experience the impact of 
financial limitations upon locating suitable alternative housing. 
Moreover, handicapped tenants may encounter the additional 
burden of locating housing suitable to accommodate their physi-
cal challenge. For these reasons, the relationship between condo-
minium conversion and elderly tenants, as well as handicapped 
and low income individuals, has not passed unnoticed by legisla-
tors.276 Sections D(l) and G of the Model Act recognize the spe-
cial needs of these tenants and attempt to provide reasonable 
protections for them. 
a. Definitions- Most relevant state statutes require a ten-
ant to be at least sixty-two years of age277 to be considered eld-
erly for purposes of condominium conversion laws. Statutes set 
STAT. ANN. § 356-C:3(I)(a)(8) (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.12(e) (1984); Act ap-
proved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 4(b)-(c), 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 930-31. 
271. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at Vl-18. 
272. See Condominium Conversions Hearing, supra note 2, at 27, 28 (Statement of 
· Dr. Leon Pastalan, Director, Environmental Aging Program, Institute of Gerontology, 
and Professor, College of Architecture & Urban Planning, University of Mich.) ("[T]he 
trauma associated with being forced to change residence is a very devastating one . . . . 
[A]n involuntary move is not a good option for most elderly adults."); see also Condo-
miniums and the Older Purchaser Hearing, supra note 2. 
273. Condominium Housing Issues Hearing, supra note 2, at 62 (statement of Cush-
ing N. Dolbeare, Consultant). 
274. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 3, at Vl-18. 
275. Upon relocation, elderly tenants are more likely than nonelderly to incur higher 
rents for equal quality housing. They are also more likely to pay as much or more than 
they paid previously for housing of lower quality. Id. at IX-24. 
276. See supra notes 268-70. 
277. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1616(c) (1986); Mo. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-
137(a)(6) (Supp. 1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 352-eeee(l)(O (McKinney 1984). 
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forth varying definitions of handicapped,278 disabled,279 and "fi-
nancially disadvantaged."280 But other critical issues are often 
unaddressed by current legislation. For example, the following 
questions are left unanswered: (1) Should legislative protection 
be available only if the rental unit is the tenant's principal resi-
dence? (2) Should an income or means test be applied to elderly 
and handicapped tenants? (3) Should a legally permitted occu-
pant who is not a tenant be afforded any benefits due to age, 
physical infirmity, or low income status? 
Section C of the Model Act establishes that an elderly, handi-
capped, or low income tenant must have resided in the subject 
apartment or an apartment within the same building or struc-
ture for a period of one year prior to the tenant's receiving no-
tice of conversion. 281 The Model Act intends to insure that a 
tenant has a more than transient interest in the rental unit and 
the locale. Moreover, an elderly or handicapped tenant with a 
current annual income exceeding $40,000 is ineligible for special 
protection. A state legislature may decide to vary this amount,282 
but at some income level the hardships of displacement would 
278. E.g., Mo. REAL PROP. CooE ANN. § 11-137(a)(3) (Supp. 1987) ("'Handicapped 
citizen' means a person with a measurable limitation of mobility due to congenital de-
fect, disease, or trauma."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.204a(a) (West Supp. 1987) 
("The person is ... paraplegic, quadriplegic, hemiplegic, or blind .... "). 
279. E.g., VA. CooE ANN. § 55-79.94(() (Supp. 1987) ('"Disabled' means a person suf-
fering from a severe, chronic physical or mental impairment which results in substantial 
functional limitations."). 
280. E.g., Mo. REAL PROP. CooE ANN.§ 11-102.l(f) (Supp. 1987) ("To qualify for an 
extended lease [the] ... [a]nnual income for all present members of your household 
must not have exceeded ... 80 percent of applicable median income .... "). 
281. To qualify for additional legislative protections, a New Jersey "senior citizen 
tenant" must demonstrate "that the building or structure has been the principal resi-
dence of the senior citizen tenant . . . for the 2 years immediately preceding the conver-
sion recording." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.24(a) (West 1987). 
The Model Act does not require a minimum residency period. All tenants are entitled 
to a notification period of at least one year. Such tenants are also entitled to a purchase 
right of first refusal. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. A minimum residency 
period is required of "special tenants" due to the two year possessory term awarded to 
them by the Model Act. See infra notes 286-88 and accompanying text. 
282. The New York State Legislature formerly established a $30,000 annual income 
limitation for senior citizen eligibility relative to special conversion protections. The 
method for determining this income requirement is discussed in Conforti v. Goldberg, 
118 Misc. 2d 590, 463 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Term 1983). The $30,000 income limitation 
was repealed by Act approved July 20, 1982, ch. 555, § 2, 1982 N.Y. Laws 1474, 1475-81; 
and no income limitation currently applies in New York. 
The relevant New Jersey legislation requires senior citizens to apply for protected ten-
ancy status and demonstrate that their total household income "does not exceed an 
amount equal to three times the County per capita personal income." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2A:18-61.28(c) (West 1987). The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the amount of a 
senior citizen tenant's income is a proper concern when judicially determining the re-
maining length of the tenant's possessory term. 
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be significantly reduced. Finally, the Model Act offers certain 
additional protection to the spouse of an elderly tenant. If the 
elderly tenant dies after receiving notice of conversion and the 
surviving spouse is at least sixty-two years of age at the time of 
the elderly tenant's death, then the surviving spouse is entitled 
to all statutory protections that would have otherwise been 
available to the deceased elderly tenant. An alternative ap-
proach would require a spouse to be sixty-two years of age at the 
earlier date when the notice of conversion is actually received by 
the elderly tenant. This formulation, however, would seem to 
hamper the Model Act's intent to provide an elderly surviving 
spouse, already experiencing the loss of a husband or wife, with 
a reasonable period of time within which to relocate. By limiting 
elderly, physically disabled, and low income status only to ten-
ants, 283 the landlord is not required to offer benefits to a house-
hold which contains nontenant elderly, handicapped, or low in-
come persons. 284 Although sentiment may strongly tend toward 
broadening the protected class, it seems inequitable to burden a 
landlord with additional duties when the beneficiaries would not 
be tenants. Expanding the umbrella of statutory protection 
might also discourage landlords from renting to households with 
elderly, handicapped, or low income members. 
Because a special tenant will receive additional benefits under 
section D(l) of the Model Act, the tenant is required by section 
G(l) to present proof of eligibility to the landlord. Furthermore, 
section G(2) establishes a mechanism for determining when the 
The court correctly noted that the Act "was intended to protect senior citizens 
on fixed limited incomes who would not be able to afford to live elsewhere 
should they be evicted from their rental units as a result of a conversion of said 
unit to a condominium or cooperative," and accordingly denied the tenant the 
Act's full protection. 
Edgewater Inv. Assocs. v. Borough of Edgewater, 103 N.J. 227, 243, 510 A.2d 1178, 1187 
(1986) (quoting with approval, Radin v. Bartolomei, 195 N.J. Super. 626, 632, 481 A.2d 
313, 317 (Law Div. 1984)). The Edgewater decision permits the retroactive application of 
the state's Senior Citizens and Disabled Protected Tenancy Act, thereby rejecting an 
impairment of contractual obligations claim. 
283. See Model Act § C(5), supra Part IV. 
284. This sentiment was judicially adopted in Belmont E. Co. v. Abrams, 123 Misc. 
2d 404, 473 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sup. Ct. 1984). But the state legislatures of Connecticut and 
Minnesota have decided to extend special protections based upon the residency of indi-
viduals other than traditional tenants. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-23c(a)(l) (West 
Supp. 1987) ("(T]his section applies to any tenant ... who is ... [s]ixty-two years of 
age or older, or whose spouse, sibling, parent or grandparent is sixty-two years of age or 
older and permanently resides with that tenant .... "); MINN. STAT. § 515A.4-110(a) 
(1982) (a tenant or subtenant may possess a converted rental unit for an additional 60 
days "if any of them, or any person residing with them, is 62 years of age or older, 
handicapped, ... or a minor child on the date the notice is given."). 
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special status may have terminated. But it should be empha-
sized that section D(l) of the Model Act offers all tenants a min-
imum remaining term of one year following notice of condomin-
ium conversion. If elderly, handicapped, or low income tenants 
lose their special status, then some portion of the one year mini-
mum term may be available. 
b. Length of extended term- The principal benefit awarded 
to special tenants by existing legislation appears to be the op-
portunity for them to occupy a converted rental unit for a longer 
period than that afforded to other preconversion lessees. Notice 
of condominium conversion provides most tenants with a right 
to possess a rental unit for a period of 120 days2811 or until expi-
ration of the rental period, if longer. But special tenants are al-
lowed possessory rights for a period ranging from two years286 to 
forty years,287 or even a life tenancy.288 When selecting the ap-
propriate length of the extended term, a legislature should ques-
tion the reason(s) for adopting this special tenant protection. If 
the legislative intent is to provide elderly, handicapped, or low 
income tenants with a reasonable opportunity to evaluate alter-
native housing sites, although realizing that special needs must 
be accommodated, then a period of two years seems appropriate. 
To expand the term beyond two years may exacerbate the prob-
lem by encouraging the tenant to continue to reside in the con-
verted apartment. A forced relocation upon expiration of a 
lengthier term may impact more harshly upon a tenant who has 
become older and who probably will face higher rental rates and 
a tighter rental market. The only way to guard against such 
eventualities is the grant of a life estate. Although this approach 
is sometimes adopted, it results in an undue burden upon a 
landlord. Section D(l) of the Model Act chooses to avoid the 
creation of a life tenancy or any term approaching such lengths, 
285. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
286. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3410(0 (Purdon Supp. 1987). River Park Tenants 
Association v. 3600 Venture, 534 .F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Pa. 1981), procedurally dismissed a 
constitutional challenge to the validity of the two year extended tenancy for special 
tenants. But the court suggested that the plaintiffs would have encountered difficulty in 
prevailing upon the merits of their equal protection challenge. Id. at 50 (dictum). 
287. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.24(h), -61.25 (West 1987); see Edgewater Inv. 
Assocs. v. Borough of Edgewater, 103 N.J. 227, 510 A.2d 1178 (1986) (upholding validity 
of 40 year extended term as established by the state's Senior Citizens and Disabled Pro-
tected Tenancy Act). 
288. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-23c (West Supp. 1987) (special tenants resid-
ing in Connecticut are the beneficiaries of legislation effectively prohibiting their eviction 
except when they violate their rental agreement); see also OAKLAND, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 
10,203, § 7-7.05(A)(6) (1982) (tenants in units containing "a tenant 62 years or older 
shall be provided a lifetime lease on their unit"). 
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settling upon a two year term as representing a suitable compro-
mise between the interests of the conversion-minded landlord 
and the special needs of elderly, handicapped, and low income 
tenants. Moreover, the presence of a special tenant residing in a 
converted rental unit may result in a coterminous period of pos-
session for other lawful unit occupants such as family members. 
c. Miscellaneous considerations- Several other concerns 
must be addressed by a legislature considering the issue of spe-
cial tenants. The statutorily provided benefit should be viewed 
as personal to the special tenant and nontransferable.289 During 
the special tenant's extended term, the landlord is entitled to 
periodic rent increases200 and is precluded from altering other 
provisions of the rental agreements.291 Moreover, a special ten-
ant should be entitled to a purchase right of first refusal.292 
Other provisions of the Model Act deal with the topic of relo-
cation compensation.293 Certain state and municipal legislatures 
have also promulgated laws establishing relocation assistance 
programs. Such assistance programs may require more than a 
landlord's payment to a special tenant of a certain sum to defray 
moving expenses. The relocation assistance benefit may demand 
that a landlord locate comparable housing for the displaced 
lessee. 294 In lieu of finding comparable housing, a tenant's term 
may also be further extended or an additional payment made to 
a tenant.2011 Relevant existing laws of this sort range from exam-
289. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.204b(8) (West Supp. 1987) ("A lease subject to an 
extended lease arrangement shall not be assigned, devised, subleased, or transferred by 
the qualified senior citizen or qualified handicapped person."). 
290. See Model Act § D(2), supra Part IV. 
291. Id. 
292. See supra notes 234-54 and accompanying text. 
293. See Model Act § F, supra Part IV; supra notes 255-67 and accompanying text. 
294. 
[T]he landlord may elect to relocate any tenant into a comparable replacement 
rental unit satisfactory to the tenant .... [C]omparability shall be determined 
from the following factors: size; price; location; proximity to medical and recrea-
tional facilities, parks, community centers, shops, transportation, schools, 
churches, and synagogues; amenities. 
Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CoDE ch. IV, art. 7, § 47.06(D)(l)(b) (1981). 
295. New Jersey legislation requires that a landlord offer a "comparable housing" 
opportunity to those tenants facing condominium conversion and requesting such hous-
ing. If the landlord does not provide comparable housing to the affected tenant, a court 
may grant to the tenant a one year stay of eviction, which can be renewed up to a total 
period of five years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.ll(a) (West 1987). The landlord may, 
however, limit a tenant to a one year stay of eviction by providing "a tenant with hard-
ship relocation compensation of waiver of payment of 5 months' rent." Id. § 2A:18-
61.ll(c). The waiver of a tenant's rental payment is a landlord's alternative to providing 
comparable housing. Mountain Management Corp. v. Hinnant, 201 N.J. Super. 45, 51, 
492 A.2d 693, 696 (App. Div. 1985). Pyramid Investments v. Leon, 212 N.J. Super. 494, 
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ples of questionable legislative judgment and incomplete draft-
ing296 to those of an overly regulatory nature. 297 The Model Act 
views the concept of mandatory "relocation assistance" as dis-
tinct from the concept of relocation compensation. The former 
requirement imposes an impermissible burden based solely on 
the special tenant's proof of residence at the time when notice of 
conversion was tendered. For this reason, the proposed condo-
minium conversion statute does not provide for optional or 
· mandatory relocation assistance to tenants. 
8. Governmental oversight, penalties, and enforcement-
Stiff penalty and enforcement provisions coupled with the cre-
ation of a governmental oversight authority urge converting 
landlords to comply with the various requirements of the Model 
Act. Documentation abounds concerning attempts by landlords 
to avoid compliance with statutory provisions benefiting precon-
version tenants.298 Although crafting problem-free legislation is 
virtually impossible, existing conversion statutes fail to contem-
plate adequately the sanctions to be imposed upon statutory vio-
lators. Most statutes simply offer a criminal or civil liability pro-
vision299 without adequate explanation concerning the rights of 
disadvantaged parties. The Model Act focuses detailed attention 
515 A.2d 808 (Law Div. 1985), discusses the consequences of failing to offer comparable 
housing in a timely manner. 
296. Massachusetts, for example, requires landlords to assist special tenants in locat-
ing "comparable rental housing within the same city or town in which such tenant re-
sides which rents for a sum which is equal to or less than the sum which such tenant had 
been paying for the housing accommodation" in which the tenant resided when the con-
version notice was received. Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 4(d), 1983 Mass. Acts 
926, 931. Special tenants residing in Massachusetts are also entitled to a two year notice 
period. Id. § 4(a)(iii). Thus a landlord must locate comparable rental housing at the 
rental rate that the tenant was paying two years earlier, when the notice was provided. 
This may prove to be a difficult, if not impossible, task. Also, the legislation fails to 
indicate the time period for which the new unit must remain at this rental amount. 
Another criticism of the statute concerns the omission of a thorough definition of 
"comparable housing." Although the "rental rate" factor is noted, other issues relating to 
"comparability" are avoided. Los Angeles provides a detailed listing of issues affecting 
the comparability of replacement housing. See supra note 294. 
297. For example, the relevant Los Angeles ordinance requires a landlord to pay up 
to $2500 to tenants relocating due to condominium conversion, to provide each tenant 
with a "reasonably complete and current list of vacant and available rental units within 
a one and one half mile radius" of the converted building, to make a good faith effort to 
transport tenants in order to inspect units, and even to hire an ambulance to assist dis-
abled tenants. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CooE ch. IV, art. 7, § 47.06(D)(l)(a)(l)-(4) 
(1981). 
298. E.g., Snyder, supra note 238, at 1, col. 1; Wells, Renters' Rights, Boston Tab, 
Mar. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 4; see also supra note 238. 
299. E.g., Act approved Nov. 30, 1983, ch. 527, § 5, 1983 Mass. Acts 926, 931-32 
("Any owner who converts residential property in violation of ... shall be punished by a 
fine of not less than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment of not less than sixty 
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upon this broad topic by presenting a proposal designed to safe-
guard tenants' rights, and at the same time respecting the need 
of a landlord-converter and third party purchasers to avoid bur-
densome detail. 
a. Waiver of a tenant's statutory rights- Section H of the 
Model Act explicitly bars a landlord from including a provision 
in a rental agreement that may be interpreted as a tenant waiver 
of individual rights arising under the statute. Section H also 
prohibits the landlord from manifesting any wrongful behavior 
· designed to prompt a tenant to vacate a rental unit. 
The anti-harassment provisions of Section H seem appropri-
ate despite a recognition that general legislation governing resi-
dential landlord and tenant affairs often contains similar 
terminology. 300 
b. Governmental oversight- If a condominium conversioQ 
act does not create or designate a governmental department or 
agency to oversee the application of the statute, many tenants 
will probably not be aware of their statutory rights. Strong ten-
ant protections will weaken if a legislature fails to provide an 
oversight mechanism for coercing adherence to the statutory re-
quirements. By establishing a governmental oversight authority, 
the Model Act seeks to achieve the objectives of tenant protec-
tion and notice and still avoid miring the conversion process in 
excessive bureaucratic entanglement. 
Although the proposed conversion statute mandates state pre-
emption of municipal regulation of condominium conversions, 
the Model Act is also designed to permit the state to select vari-
ous counties, districts, or communities to serve in an oversight 
capacity. The state legislature should determine areas of varying 
conversion activity and then designate an appropriate county or 
municipal office to coordinate the application of the statute in 
that sector. 301 For example, many communities will probably ex-
perience little conversion activity. Accordingly, a single munici-
pal clerk's office might monitor the conversion process in a num-
ber of neighboring communities. On the other hand, a large 
urban area may be monitored by a local municipal office. Al-
days. . . . The district and superior courts . . . shall have jurisdiction in equity to re-
strain any such violation."). 
300. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 14 (1986). 
301. Section 1(1) of the Model Act creates a state legislative preference for county or 
municipal administrative offices to monitor condominium conversion activity. At these 
levels, responsible officials may be more attentive to local concerns. This legislative pref-
erence rebuts the concept of a state office (e.g., Office of the Attorney General) regulating 
the process and serving in an oversight capacity. 
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though additional costs are imposed upon those communities 
designated to provide monitoring, this reasonable cost may be 
partially assessed to the conversion project sponsor. Such a leg-
islative requirement, termed a "certification fee," exists in the 
District of Columbia.302 Under section 1(7) of the Model Act, the 
state determines a reasonable fee to be paid upon the conversion 
of each rental unit. It is anticipated that the appropriate moni-
toring office collects the fees and forwards them to a central lo-
cation for distribution across the state to defray the cost of ad-
ministering the statute. The amount of the "certification fee" 
should be set by state regulations promulgated under the au-
thority of the model conversion legislation. 
Involving county or municipal offices and the personnel of 
various Registries of Deeds will compel landlords who are con-
verting rental units to adhere to the dictates of the Act. Within 
this format the proposed statute attempts to urge voluntary 
landlord compliance amidst an atmosphere of moderate 
regulation. 
c. The converting landlord and oversight authorities- Sec-
tion 1(2) of the Model Act requires that a converting landlord 
file certain documents and an affidavit with the designated over-
sight office. More specifically, the landlord must deposit a copy 
of all conversion-related materials that have been delivered to 
each tenant in accordance with the terms of the statute. These 
records must be accompanied by a signed affidavit stipulating: 
(1) the date and method of document delivery, (2) the name of 
each tenant recipient, and (3) the names of those tenants, if any, 
previously residing in the subject unit and vacating their rental 
housing accommodation within the 180 day period prior to 
Master Deed recording. Also, the landlord must, in writing, set 
forth a basis for rebutting the presumption of a condominium 
conversion eviction303 relating to any such departed tenant. In 
this way, the landlord is forced to explain any tenant eviction 
302. D.C. CODE ANN.§ 45-1614 (1986) ("An owner who seeks to convert must pay the 
Mayor a certification fee. The Mayor is authorized to collect and establish the amount of 
the fee. The certification fee shall be sufficient to cover the cost of administering this 
subchapter."). 
303. A tenant vacating a rental unit within the 180 day period prior to recording of a 
Master Deed raises a presumption that the tenant is a victim of a condominium conver-
sion eviction. The Model Act seeks to prevent a landlord from evicting a tenant without 
just cause during the approximate six month period before recording of the constituent 
documents. If such landlord action is legislatively protected, then a landlord could easily 
avoid the "tenant protection package" of the Model Act by terminating all tenancies 
before Master Deed recording. For a more detailed discussion of the condominium con-
version eviction issues, see supra notes 145-46, 193-96 and accompanying text. 
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precipitated by the landlord's conversion plans. The landlord 
must sign the affidavit under the penalty of perjury. The affida-
vit and supporting documentation must be presented to the 
oversight authority within seven days following delivery of the 
conversion notice and accompanying materials to the tenant or 
tenants. 
Upon receiving the landlord's submissions, the authority must 
notify the appropriate resident tenants. Such notification must 
alert the resident tenants of the landlord's belief that the notifi-
cation requirements of the statute have been satisfied. The au-
thority does not act as an adjudicatory body, but simply reviews 
the sufficiency and facial validity of the landlord's submissions. 
Any aggrieved resident tenant may seek judicial assistance to re-
dress a statutory violation. so• 
Upon reviewing the landlord's filings and finding them accept-
able, the authority issues a certificate of conversion approval, re-
corded in the appropriate Registry of Deeds along with the first 
deed conveying title to the subject unit. Section 1(9) of the 
Model Act bars the personnel of the Registry of Deeds from ac-
cepting such a deed for recording absent an accompanying cer-
tificate of approval. Moreover, upon subsequent conveyances of 
the subject unit, each deed must refer to the existence of the 
certificate and where it is recorded. This latter requirement alle-
viates the need for Registry officials to investigate the certifica-
tion issue repeatedly and places the burden upon the party re-
cording the instrument. 
d. The converting landlord and the tenant- Section D(l) 
of the Model Act requires the landlord to deliver to an appropri-
ate tenant a copy of the Model Act along with the notice of con-
dominium conversion. It does not require the landlord to obtain 
a statement signed by the tenant indicating that the landlord 
has fulfilled the statutory requirements. This would be unduly 
burdensome because certain tenants will probably oppose the 
conversion plans and be reluctant to assist a landlord by provid-
ing this information. 
e. The third party purchaser- To stipulate that a third 
party unit purchaser must fulfill all of the "landlord" statutory 
responsibilities seems inequitable. This individual merely 
purchases a unit that may house a tenant. If a tenant resides in 
the conveyed unit, then the market purchaser is defined as a 
landlord but not the converting landlord. The unit purchaser 
must honor the tenant's preexisting possessory right and the 
304. See Model Act § J(3), supra Part IV. 
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Model Act unambiguously adopts this position. But the landlord 
who converts the unit must provide a tenant with notice of con-• 
version,306 a purchase right of first refusal,306 relocation compen-
sation,307 and other benefits. 
Section 1(6) of the Model Act requires the converting landlord 
to provide a prospective market purchaser with a copy of ten-
ant-notification documents filed at the local oversight authority 
office by the landlord. The landlord is only required to provide a 
copy of those materials relating to the subject unit. This mate-
rial must be delivered upon the execution of a purchase and sale 
agreement relating to the converted unit. Also, the proposed 
statute mandates that the converting landlord indicate, in writ-
ing, the method by which the tenant, if any, relinquished the 
purchase right of first refusal. The tenant may have expressly 
waived the purchase opportunity or merely allowed the relevant 
time period to expire.308 The converting landlord must also file 
this information with the oversight authority before it may issue 
a conversion approval certificate. 
By receiving a copy of all relevant documents, the potential 
market purchaser may determine whether the landlord appears 
to have satisfied the statutory notification requirements. Any 
lending institution assisting the purchaser will probably also de-
sire to review this information. 
f. Penalties and enforcement- The following discussion ex-
pands upon the earlier fragmented presentation concerning the 
oversight authority, landlords who convert, tenants, and market 
purchasers. The legislation's liability rules highlight their re-
spective rights and duties. 
The Model Act does not empower the oversight authority to 
undertake investigatory chores. But it may refer incidents of po-
tential violation to the office of the appropriate district attorney 
or attorney general for investigation. The oversight authority 
may refer such matters based upon receipt of falsified informa-
tion submitted by the converting landlord or upon notification 
of an alleged statutory impropriety. Upon a criminal conviction 
the off ending converting landlord "shall be fined not less than 
$5,000 or double the amount of gain from the transaction, 
whichever is larger, but not more than $50,000; or such person 
may be imprisoned for no more than six months; or both for 
305. See supra notes 201-33 and accompanying text. 
306. See supra notes 234-54 and accompanying text. 
307. See supra notes 255-67 and accompanying text. 
308. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
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each offense."309 Although the criminal sanctions provided by 
section J(2) of the Model Act are primarily directed toward the 
illegal acts of a project developer, prohibited acts also include 
the wrongful failure of a third party unit purchaser to permit a 
tenant's continued possession until the expiration of the conver-
sion notice period. 310 
A preconversion tenant is entitled to three basic benefits or 
protections. These include notice of condominium conversion, a 
purchase right of first refusal, and receipt of relocation compen-
sation. Under the provisions of the Model Act, if an appropriate 
tenant is occupying the rental housing accommodation, then a 
landlord will be compelled to provide proper notification and of-
fer the relevant one or two year postconversion, possessory 
term. 811 If the otherwise intended beneficiary of the Act no 
longer occupies the unit due to a condominium conversion evic-
tion, 312 that individual is entitled to recovery for the landlord 
converter's violation of the Act's civil liability provisions. In this 
case, section J(3) of the Model Act provides for the tenant to 
recover double the amount of actual damages suffered or $5000, 
whichever is greater.313 The Model Act also entitles the tenant 
to payment by the offending landlord for the tenant's reasonable 
attorneys fees and court costs. State legislation should clearly 
indicate the court to which aggrieved individuals may turn for 
redress of statutory violations. 
The violation of another tenant benefit, the right to purchase, 
proves more complicated to resolve due to the possible presence 
of a third party purchaser. If the oversight authority issues a 
certificate of approval, then the documentation submitted by the 
landlord would comply, at least facially, with the statutory re-
quirements. Sections 1(10) and J(5) of the Model Act indicate 
that so long as the third party purchaser relies upon the land-
lord-furnished information and the certificate of approval, the 
conveyance cannot be set aside without a finding that the buyer 
309. Model Act§ J(2), supra Part IV. The Model Act's criminal penalty provision is 
based upon a strong statutory statement adopted in the District of Columbia. D.C. CooE 
ANN. § 45-1660 (1986). 
310. See Model Act § D(4), supra Part IV. A market purchaser of a converted condo-
minium unit must permit an occupying tenant to possess the unit under the provisions 
of the Model Act. Any attempt by the unit purchaser to remove the tenant prematurely 
and without cause violates the Model Act. 
311. See Model Act § D(l)-(2), supra Part IV. 
312. See supra notes 145-46, 193-200 and accompanying text. 
313. The civil liability provision of the Model Act is generally based upon a relevant 
New Hampshire provision. The New Hampshire legislation requires converting landlords 
to comply with all provisions of the statute or risk the imposition of significant civil 
penalties. N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 356-C:9 (1984). 
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did not act in good faith. This finding would require a presenta-
tion of evidence by an aggrieved tenant and a judicial resolution 
favorable to the tenant. 
Permitting an aggrieved tenant the right to void314 a transfer 
to a good faith purchaser would imperil the public's reasonable 
reliance upon the Registry of Deeds recording system and would 
severely impact upon the willingness of institutional lenders to 
be involved in conversion unit transactions. Section J ( 4) of the 
Model Act places liability for the improper conveyance on the 
offending landlord. If a conveyance to a good faith market pur-
chaser has not yet occurred, then the Model Act entitles the ag-
grieved tenant to receive the purchase option. 
Section F(3) of the Model Act deals with relocation compensa-
tion and requires a landlord who converts a unit to deposit the 
compensatory amount with the oversight authority when the 
earlier of the following occurs: (1) within three days after the 
tenant vacates the unit, or (2) no later then three days prior to 
the conveyance of the unit to a grantee other than the tenant. 
The latter clause contemplates a unit being sold to a third party 
grantee who must honor the existing tenant's possessory term. 
Requiring a tenant, vacating a unit at some future date, to pur-
sue the converting landlord in order to obtain relocation com-
pensation seems inadvisable. Under the terms of the Act, such a 
tenant may claim the sum deposited earlier at the governmental 
oversight office. Alternatively, the landlord who converted the 
unit may reclaim this amount if the tenant remains in the unit 
after the possessory term expires. But the landlord who converts 
the unit cannot avoid depositing the relocation compensation 
because the oversight authority will refuse to issue a conversion 
approval certification. No third party purchaser acting in good 
faith would accept a conveyance without the presentation of a 
valid conversion approval certificate. 
Sections I and J of the Model Act offer an oversight authority 
along with stringent criminal and civil sanctions for violations 
by converting landlords and third party grantees who act in bad 
faith. The teeth of the Act lie in these legislative provisions. The 
statute is designed to achieve an equitable balance between the 
legislative desires of assuring statutory compliance and avoiding 
excessive regulation. 
314. A New Hampshire statutory provision permits any tenant, who does not prop-
erly receive a purchase right of first refusal, to render the sale to a third party voidable if 
such option is exercised within a limited time period. Id. § 356-C:5(11). 
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CONCLUSION 
The condominium conversion of residential rental units offers 
the attraction of a home ownership opportunity, but also results 
in the eventual dislocation of those tenants · declining to 
purchase a converted unit. The realities of this process may not 
be denied or ignored. An equitable legislative response would 
not ban conversions, offer life tenancies to affected tenants, or 
present insurmountable legal obstacles to market purchasers in-
terested in acquiring a converted unit. The Model Condominium 
Conversion Act presented here attempts to balance appropri-
ately the interests of project sponsors, resident tenants, and 
third party purchasers. A property owner's right to convert 
rental units is not unjustifiably denied. The proposed legislation 
results from a detailed study and comparison of existing 
laws-highlighting the relevant positive aspects and deleting the 
negative features. Thus the proposed condominium conversion 
act combines well-considered provisions announcing the conver-
sion protections afforded to resident tenants and establishing 
the . statutory rights of converting landlords and market 
purchasers. 

